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

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A

DISCOURSE

OF THE

Necessity and Usefulness

OF THE

Christian Revelation;

By Reason of the

CORRUPTIONS of the PRINCIPLES

OF

NATURAL RELIGION

Among *Jews* and *Heathens*.

By DANIEL WHITBY, D. D. and
Chantor of the Cathedral Church of *Sarum*.

LONDON:

Printed by *W. B.* for *A.* and *J. Churchil* at the
Black Swan in *Pater-Noster-Row.* 1705.

UPB

AN

Advertiſement

TO THE

READER.

I *Do with ſome Reluctancy Diſcourſe in this Treatiſe of thoſe impure Practices which obtained among the* Heathens, *and which on that account may be offenſive to chaſt Ears; but then conſidering that all the Fathers who have written* Apologies *for* Chriſtianity, *or Confutations of the Religion of the* Heathens, *from* Juſtin Martyr *to* Theodoret, *have been as full in thoſe Diſcoveries, I thought their Piety and Prudence might be a juſt* Apology *for doing the ſame thing, to the ſame good end; eſpecially, when the Subject muſt*

must have been imperfect, had this been omitted. This is the Treatise mentioned in the Preface to the Gospels, and now submitted to the Judgment of the Courteous Reader, by

His Friend and Servant,

D. W.

A DIS-

A DISCOURSE OF THE NECESSITY OF THE Christian Revelation.

CHAP. I.

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REligion being stiled by the *Greeks* Θεοσέβεια, the Worship of a Deity, and having its very Name, either, as *Lactantius* saith, *a religando,*

gando, from the Obligation it lays upon us to obey his Laws, or, as *Cicero*, from *relegendo*, from ruminating upon, and recollecting them; all Religion, and all Laws of Nature must suppose a Deity who doth require to be worshipped according to some Laws; for certain it is,

§ I. 1. Negatively, that if there be nothing naturally Good, and so required, or Evil, and so forbidden by the Deity, there can be neither God, nor Devil, good, nor evil Spirit; for Justice, Holiness, and Goodness, are the essential Characters of the Divinity, and all Men, who believe there is a God, do own that he is holy, just, and good; whereas it is a contradiction to believe there is a God of Righteousness and Justice, if there be nothing just, and righteous; or a God of Holiness, and Goodness, if there be nothing good, and holy; or to say he is an Hater of Iniquity, if there be nothing which deserves that Name; an evil Spirit must also be a Contradiction in the Terms, nor can he be supposed to tempt, provided there be nothing evil he can tempt us to.

2*ly*, 'Tis also certain affirmatively, that if there be a God who made us, and gave us all things we enjoy, if we derive our Beings, our Preservation, and all our Blessings from him, who is the true and only

God, it is highly reaſonable to conceive, that he expects we ſhould *glorifie him as God*, and ſhould be thankful to him for all the Bleſſings we have received at his hands; again, ſince Juſtice, Holineſs, and Goodneſs internally conſidered, ſeem only to import a love unto, and propenſity to do what is holy, juſt, and good, and conſequently an hatred of, and averſation to the contrary; ſeeing all theſe are relative Perfections, and only can be exerciſed by doing what is juſt, and good, and ſuitable to his Holineſs, to others, or by requiring them to do ſo; if God hath no regard to Juſtice, Holineſs, and Goodneſs, there is no cauſe to ſay he is either holy, juſt, or good: Now if he have made no Laws to require us, or no Proviſions to encourage us, to live holily, righteouſly, and charitably in this preſent World, or to deter us from the greateſt Injuſtice, Inhumanity, and Profaneneſs, what regard can we think he hath for the one, or hatred of the other? If he hath eſtabliſhed ſuch Laws, or laid ſuch Obligations on us, then muſt it be acknowledged that there are Laws of Nature obliging us to be holy, and pious towards God, juſt and charitable towards our Neighbour; nor can the contrary be aſſerted by any one, but he muſt believe that a God of all Power will do nothing for his Creatures; that he who is neceſſarily good, yea *optimus*, the beſt

best of Beings, will do no good to any; that to him who is immutably just, and righteous, good and holy, there is nothing acceptable, and well-pleasing; or if there be, he will have no respect to them that do it: For were it otherwise, he must have given all Men Laws obliging them to do what is well-pleasing, and to avoid what is displeasing in his sight, and reason to expect good or evil from him, as they comply with, or transgress them, and so must be their Governour by Law at present, and their Judge hereafter.

In a word, if God would be worshipped, served, and obeyed by all his rational Creatures, he must have given them sufficient knowledge of that Being whom they are to serve, worship, and obey, and of that Service which he will accept, and of those Laws which he requires them to obey, and must have given them Abilities to do his Will, and Motives sufficient to encourage them thus to serve, and to obey him; for all Mens Reason must convince them, that a righteous God will not require any Person, in order to his acceptance of him, to do that Good, or to avoid that Evil which he hath given him no means to know, no ability to do, or no motive to perform; for what I cannot either know to be my Duty, or knowing cannot do, I cannot be obliged to do, and what I have no motive to do

or to avoid, I can have no just ground or reason to do, or to avoid.

§ II. These Laws, as far as we are capable of knowing them by Reason and Reflection, which are the Faculties congenial to our Nature, are stiled the Principles of Natural Religion; those Articles of Christian Faith which Nature was not able to discover without a Revelation, *viz.* the Godhead discriminated by the Relations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the Incarnation, Birth, Passion, Resurrection of the Son of God, his Intercession, and Session at the Right-hand of God, and his Appointment to be the Judge of all Men, the Inhabitation of the Holy Spirit in the Hearts of the Faithful, the Calling of the Gentiles to be Fellow-heirs with the believing Jews, the Resurrection of the Body, the Beatifick Vision, and the Judgment to come, being the proper Articles of Revealed Religion, which Human Reason without a Revelation could never have found out; it is thence evident that the Practical Precepts of Christianity, for the most part, are only the Results of Natural Religion, drawn forth to our advantage in plain Rules adapted to the Capacity of the meanest, and recommended to our Practice from the most excellent Examples of our God and Saviour.

More-

Moreover, these Laws of Nature may be said to be implanted in the Hearts of Men in general, not that God hath put any innate Ideas, or natural Impressions of them on the Souls of all Men; for then there cannot be any need of Reasoning, or making Inferences, to deduce one of them from the other, whereas the Apostle plainly seems to found them on the λογισμοὶ, *i. e.* the Reasonings of Men, *Rom.* 2. 14. but they are rather said to be implanted in us, because we have within us that Principle of Reason, Judgment, and Reflection, which when they are propounded to us, and considered, enables us immediately to discern the truth and equity of them; and how apparently they tend to the inward satisfaction, peace, and quiet of our Minds, and to the common interest and welfare of Mankind, and so that they were certainly designed for their good, and therefore fit to be done by them.

Now that God actually hath given to Mankind such Laws, as I have proved already from his Attributes, so is it farther evident;

§ III. 1. From those words of the Apostle *Peter, Verily I perceive that God is no respecter of persons, but in every nation he that feareth God, and worketh righteousness, is accepted of him,* Acts 10. 34. Whence it is evident,

(1.) That ſome of all Nations, owning the true God, as did *Cornelius*, who gave occaſion to theſe words, not only might, but actually did fear God, and work Righteouſneſs; and otherwiſe they very ill deſerved the Titles given to the Proſelytes of the Gate, *viz.* that they were pious, and devout Men, and Men *that feared God*; which Titles I have ſhewed to belong to them, *Note* on *Acts* 10. 2. Nor could St. *Peter* perceive, that God was *no Reſpecter of Perſons*, on the account of a thing which never did, nor could happen; and tho' it be commonly ſaid, that there is no reſpect of Perſons in *gratuitis*, in things given, yet this is only true when no Duty is required, no Service is demanded in order to that Gift; where therefore God requires under Penalty, that I ſhould do him ſuch a Service, if he gives the Grace neceſſary to the performance of that Service to another in like Circumſtances, and not to me, there he is a Reſpecter of Perſons; and where he makes a Promiſe of Acceptance, as he muſt do where he requires Duty, ſince I can have no motive to perform that Duty which will not be accepted, there the acceptance of another before me ſtanding upon equal Terms with him, is an accepting of Perſons: Nor, (2.) Could St. *Peter* otherwiſe have proved from the Example of *Cornelius*'s Alms accepted by God, that he was *no Reſpecter*

specter of Persons, had not God some way obliged himself, without distinction of Persons, or Nations, to accept every one that worketh Righteousness: It therefore is a manifest absurdity to say, that God requires the same Duty of all *Christians*, *Jews*, or *Heathens*, upon Condition of Reward, or under such a Penalty, and yet is *no Respecter of Persons*, if under equal Circumstances he affords Grace sufficient, to obtain that Reward, and avoid that Penalty, to one, and will not do it to another, since this most plainly is, in Matters of Rewards and Punishments of the highest nature, to have respect to one above another, without regard to the worthiness of the one, or the unworthiness of the other.

2*ly*, This may be argued from those words of St. *Paul*, *He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a Rewarder of them that diligently seek him*, Heb. 11. 6. whence it is obvious to observe, (1.) That all Men may diligently seek God so as to please him, if they will, since otherwise it cannot be their Duty to seek to please him, it being no Man's Duty to do that which he cannot do. (2.) That if they do so, they shall be rewarded by him, and so God must be willing both that they should seek him, and that they should be rewarded for so doing. And, (3.) That the *Heathens* may have grounds sufficient to induce

duce them to believe that they should be rewarded for serving him diligently according to that Light which God had given them; deny the first Inference, and you exempt the *Heathens* from any obligation to seek that God they could not please; deny the second or third Inference, and you deprive them of any motive to endeavour to do that which is pleasing in his sight, this being that which *Heathens* by the Light of Nature taught, that if Piety and Profit did not go together, Piety could not be preserved; as I have shewed in the *Note* upon that place. And,

3*dly*, This seemeth evident from what the *Apostle* hath declared touching the Gentiles who had not the Law, *viz.* (1.) That God would judge them according to their Works; for a righteous God will only judge them for the neglect of that which they knew to be their Duty, and might have done but did not; and for the doing that which they knew to be evil, and might have avoided, and did not: And both these things suppose, that they had both sufficient grounds, even from the Light of Nature, to know, and to perform their Duty: For, as *Origen* saith, if God condemned the *Gentiles* because they *held the truth in unrighteousness, and when they knew God, did not glorifie him as God, neither were thankful*; it seems agreeable to Reason

son to conceive, that had they done what they culpably neglected, and might have done, *i. e.* had they glorified him as God, and been thankful, they would have done what was acceptable to God, and fit to be rewarded by his Goodness. (2.) When he adds, That *the Gentiles who have not the Law* of *Moses* written in Tables of Stone, *do by Nature*, i. e. by virtue of the Law of Nature written in their Hearts, *the things contained in the Law*; he must insinuate, that they had the Natural Principles of Good and Evil, by their own Reason and Discretion discovered to them; hence when they did that which was naturally evil, their Conscience, saith he, did accuse them for it, they *knowing that they who did such things were worthy of death*; whence it is evident, that they must have both the knowledge of all the Principles of Natural Religion, and an ability to perform them, and to avoid those Sins against the Light of Nature, for which their Conscience did accuse them; for a Conscience rightly informed will accuse no Man for doing what he was not able to avoid. Again, when Conscience in them is said ἀπολογεῖν, to apologize, or plead for them; since Conscience evidently doth imply the knowledge of a Rule by which our Actions are to be directed, and that our Actions have been done according to, or in repugnance to that

Rule

Rule, can it otherwiſe plead for them than by an inward ſenſe that they have acted ſuitably to that Rule, or to that knowledge of their Duty towards God or Man, they from the Light of Nature, or the Convictions of their Reaſon, had diſcovered?

I know the *Atheiſts* and *Epicureans* ſay, That all theſe Workings of the Conſcience which we find within us, are only the Effects of ſuperſtitious Education, and of falſe Ideas ſuggeſted to us from our Infancy: But,

1*ſt*, They who ſay this, affirm what no Man can have juſt Reaſon to believe; for that which hath its riſe from Superſtition, muſt be the fruit of Error and Miſtake: Now if it be an Error we cannot diſcern to be ſo, what Reaſon can we have to judge that theſe Effects of Conſcience are the Reſult of Error? If Reaſon can diſcern the Error, it muſt by doing ſo correct it, and free the Conſcience from theſe ſuppoſed Effects of Superſtition, even as Chriſtianity embraced freed all the *Heathen* Converts entirely from the dread of thoſe falſe Gods they formerly had, by their Education, been induced to worſhip; whereas the Experience of all Mankind, and of theſe Enemies of all Religion, ſhews they are not able wholly to exempt themſelves from theſe Misbodings of their Conſcience; at leaſt they cannot do it, but either,

1*ſt*, By

1*st*, By being unthinking and continual Sots, scarce ever fresh enough to entertain one sober thought, or make a serious Reflection on their Actions, and so their Conscience is benumb'd only because their Reason first is so: Or,

2*ly*, By bribing their Reason by a long Course of Profaneness and Sensuality, to use its utmost Efforts to stifle the Convictions of their Conscience, it being now their highest Interest that there should be no God to punish them, and that those Workings of their Conscience, which are now become only terrifying and condemning, and which can only fill them with dreadful Expectations of Divine Vengeance, should be laid asleep: And yet,

3*ly*, Tho' Interest be now so strong against them, and that little Peace and Quiet they can have at present, depends on their Imagination that they may be false, yet can they not advance to any tolerable exemption from these Checks of Conscience, without many sharp Conflicts with the Dictates of their Reason, and many Struglings with the Impressions it hath laid upon them; 'tis then no Argument that these Effects of Conscience are not natural, because they may at last be conquered: For is there any thing more common than to abate and alter that natural aversation which we have to some Meat or Drink, or other Objects of

our

our Senſes? Do they not own that there is in all Men a natural averſion to Pain and Sickneſs, Contempt and Poverty, and a ſtrong Bias in our Natures to worldly Pleaſures and Grandeur, and ſenſual Enjoyments? And yet 'tis evident from Hiſtory, and from Experience, that more *Philoſophers* and *Chriſtians* have conquered that natural abhorrence which we have to Pain and Sickneſs, and even Death it ſelf, have choſen Poverty, and lived in a generous Contempt of worldly Pleaſures and Grandeur, than there be Atheiſtical Spirits who have been able to exempt themſelves from all the dreadful Fruits of a condemning Conſcience, and the uncomfortable Attendants of a vicious Life; how therefore can it follow from their ſuppoſed Conqueſt of theſe Fears, and their Exemption, for a Seaſon, from theſe Laſhes of a guilty Conſcience, that they are not as natural as is our averſation to Pain and Sickneſs, and to all thoſe other Acts of Self-denial, which Philoſophy and Chriſtian Prudence will enable us to perform?

2*ly*, There be ſome Principles of Natural Religion, which cannot rationally be aſcribed to any falſe Ideas ſuggeſted by our Education, as *v. g.* theſe Rules and Principles of the *Pythagoreans*, *Platoniſts*, and *Stoics*, and all Philoſophers who own'd a Providence; and which yet never can be true, unleſs there be ſome certain Princi-

ples

ples of Good and Evil; as *v. g.*

1*st*, That [a] he can never be neglected by the Deity, who is desirous to be a vertuous and good Man, and as like to God, as he can: Or that [b] the good Man living, or dying, can suffer no evil, because the Gods never neglect his Affairs; which Proposition flows from the Natural Idea of Divine Goodness.

2*ly*, That if Piety and Profit do not go together, Piety would be preserved in none, because [c] nothing is so natural to us as to affect and pursue our own advantage, so that if you place what is holy and just, in what is profitable, you preserve them; but if you separate what is just and honest from what is profitable, you destroy what is just and honest, as being weighed down by profit; which Rule depends upon this plainest Principle of Reason, that we can

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[a] Οὐ χῶ δὴ ὑπὸ θεῶν πολὺ ἀμελεῖ ὃς ἂν σπουδῇ ἐθέλῃ δίκαιος γίνεσθαι, καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον δυνατὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁμοιοῦσθαι τῷ θεῷ. Plato de Repub. l. 10. p. 760.

[b] Ἐν τί ἓν τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι δεῖ ἀληθὲς, ὅτι ἐν ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὔθ' ἕν ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτων πράγματα. Iamblic. Protrept. p. 84. Socrat. Apol. p. 31. D. Cicero Tusc. Qu. 1. N. 87.

[c] Πᾶν ζῶον οἰκεῖον ἔστως ἀκείωται πρὸς τὸ ἰδίῳ συμφέροντι, διὰ τοῦτο ἂν μὲ ἐν ταύτῳ τις θῇ τὸ συμφέρον, καὶ τὸ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ καλὸν, σώζεται ταῦτα πάντα, ἂν δ' ἀλλαχοῦ τὸ συμφέρον, ἀλλαχοῦ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ δίκαιον, οἴχεται ταῦτα πάντα καταλυόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ συμφέροντος. Arrian. l. 1. c. 27. p. 53. l. 2. c. 22. p. 243. l. 3. c. 3. p. 269. Simpl. in Epictet. p. 80.

pursue

purſue nothing, and therefore neither Piety or Vertue, without the Motive of ſome Good to be received by ſo doing.

3*ly*, That the [d] Deity loves Vertue, and the Effects of it, and hates Vice, and is diſpleaſed at it, and therefore will be an Enemy to the wicked Man, but a Friend to the good, diſpenſing good things to the latter, but evil to the wicked; which is the conſequence of that natural Idea we have of the Holineſs and Juſtice of the Divine Nature, and of the natural Reſults of Love and Hatred; and to repreſent theſe things as falſe Ideas ſuggeſted by our Education, is in effect to deny that Holineſs and Goodneſs belong to the Divine Nature, or that the Will is moved only by the apprehenſion of ſome good.

3*ly*, If there be nothing morally good or evil, then can we have no inward Principle directing us what to avoid, or do, to chuſe or to refuſe; for neither can the Will chuſe, or the Deſire be carried out after any thing but what is firſt conceived good, nor be averſe from any thing but as it is conceived evil: If here it be replied, that theſe

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[d] Τῶν θεῶν οἰκειμένων μὲ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τοῖς ταύτης ἔργοις, ἀλλοτριμένων δὲ τῇ κακίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ὑπὸ ταύτης συνίστασθαι. Stob. Eclog. Eth. p. 181. Quod bonum à Deo petendum, Πάντες γὰρ ὅσοι μὲ ἂν φιλῶσι, καὶ οἷς ἂν χαίρωσι, τοιούτοις διδόασί τ' ἀγαθὰ, πρὸς οὓς δὲ ἐναντίως ἔχουσι τὰ ἐναντία. Pythag. apud Iamb. p. 89.

Deſires

Desires and Aversions only respect the Good and Evils of the Body, and of this present Life, which are naturally not morally so; as *v. g.* Pain and Pleasure, Poverty and Riches, Health and Sickness, Life and Death; I only ask, why are these things esteemed good or evil, but that we feel something of pleasure and satisfaction to the brutish appetite in the enjoyment of them; some pain, uneasiness and trouble when we want them? If then there be such Moral Actions as create greater satisfaction, ease, and pleasure to the Mind; if there be a more sensible delight in doing good, in easing the miserable, in serving him who highly hath obliged, and shew'd true Friendship to us, in acting suitably to the Dictates of Reason and of Conscience, in doing what is highly serviceable and beneficial to Mankind; if there be any Nobleness in real Goodness, a Confidence and Bravery in Innocence, an Ease in Patience, a Quiet in Contentedness of Spirit, a Rest in Peaceableness, an Excellency of Spirit in living by the Example of a Deity, a Greatness of Mind in the Contempt of sensual and worldly things; if on the other hand Vice generally produceth Horror and Anguish in the Mind, and Conscience *being burthened with its own witness, always abodeth terrible things*; if a confounding Shame, a terrifying Fear, a desponding Spirit, a distracting

ſtracting Care and Anxiety of Thought, are always painful to, and do increaſe the Miſeries of the ſinful Soul; if Wickedneſs doth render Men baſe and contemptible, mean and ſneaking, aſhamed to own, afraid to recollect what they have done; in a word, if good Men do enjoy far greater Pleaſures from a vertuous Life, than carnal Perſons find in the purſuance of their bruti ſh Luſts; if more Philoſophers, and Chriſtians, as was before obſerved, have conquered that natural averſation which we have to Pain and Sickneſs, have choſen Poverty, and lived in a generous Contempt of worldly Pleaſures and Grandeur, than there be *Atheiſtic* Perſons who have been able to exempt themſelves from the amazing Terrors of a guilty Conſcience; what reaſon have we, from what we feel, or do experience, to conclude that moral good or evil is leſs natural, than that which they call ſenſual good and evil?

§ 4. Now the Heads to which the *Heathens*, by the Light of Nature, and from them the *Civilians* have reduced theſe Laws of Nature, are,

1ſt, The Law of *Juſtice*, requiring us to do no hurt or damage to the innocent, in any of his Intereſts, Poſſeſſions, or Relations, if we can poſſibly avoid it, becauſe we would not have this done to our ſelves:

This

This Rule the Heathens have declared thus; [t] *Jure naturæ æquum est neminem cum alterius detrimento fieri locupletiorem*, the Law of Nature doth forbid us to receive advantage to our selves by doing injury to others; these being the Foundations of true Justice, Τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἀπέχεσθαι, καὶ βλάπτειν μηδένα, μήθ' ὠφελεῖσθαι ἑαυτῷ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖσθαι συμφοράς, to abstain from that which is anothers, and to hurt no body, nor to make advantage to our selves by the detriment or calamities of others: This, saith [u] *Cicero*, is the Law of Nature, that no Man should desire that which is another's, or take it to himself, and that if any Man thinks he acts not against Nature by violating the Rights of others, he is not fit to be discoursed with, as being one, *Qui omnino hominem ex homine tollat*, who bereaves Man of his Humanity.

2*dly*, The Law of *Truth*, which doth enjoyn us to be faithful to all our Covenants and Promises, to speak the Truth from the Heart, without Hypocrisie and Falshood; for thus we would have others deal with us; to this end God hath given us the use of Speech, which if it be not the Interpreter of our Intentions, and the sincere Expression of our Thoughts, comports not

[t] Pomponius de Regulis Juris, l. 206.
[u] De Offic. l. 3. n. 30, 32.

with the end for which it was deſigned; and as for Promiſes and Compacts, if they do not naturally bind, all Society is diſſolved, and Human Commerce ceaſes; for then no Princes, or States, who lie under no Obligation to each other, can be obliged to perform their Promiſes, nor can their mutual Compacts be of any force; and as for any Compacts and Promiſes, made by Men of the ſame Community, and ſubject to the ſame Laws, if they lie under no Obligation from their own Conſent to make ſuch Promiſes and Compacts, they cannot poſſibly oblige them on the account of any Promiſe or Compact they have made, but only by virtue of ſome Penalty the Laws have laid upon the Violaters of them.

3*dly*, The Law of *Humanity*, which prompts us to do good to others, when we can do it without conſiderable damage to our ſelves, or others: Conſider only, ſay the Moraliſts, thou art a Man, and that will certainly incline thee to all the Offices of Kindneſs to Men, we being framed by Nature, Πρὸς κοινωνίαν, καὶ πρὸς συνεργείαν, for mutual ſociety and help, or to be communicative, and labour for the good of one another: Hence theſe are reckoned by them among the natural Precepts of Humanity, to [g] ſhew the Way to him that hath wan-

[g] Apud Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 186.

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dred from it, and a Fountain to the thirsty Traveller; to give Food to him that is ready to perish for Hunger; and to succour him, as we are able, who is in danger to be slain by a wild Beast; and would all Men, [h] say they, be thus continually helpful to one another, no Man would stand in need of Fortune.

Now all these three are plainly laid down as Rules of Nature by the Holy Scripture: For, saith the Wise Man, *Let not mercy and truth forsake thee, bind them about thy neck, write them upon the tables of thine heart, so shalt thou find favour*, Prov. 3. 3, 4. καὶ προνοῦ καλὰ, *and provide things honourable in the sight of God and man.* God, saith the Prophet *Micah*, *hath shewed thee, O man! what is good, even to do justice, and love mercy*, chap. 6. 8. And *Justice*, *Mercy*, and *Faith*, are by our Saviour represented as the most weighty Precepts of the Moral Law, *Mat.* 23. 23.

4*thly*, The Law of *Natural Affection*, which doth instruct us in the first place, and more especially, to be kind to our own Flesh: Hence do the Heathens put this among the first and most indissoluble Principles of Nature, first to honour the Gods, and after

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[h] Εἰ πάντες ἐθοποιοῖμεν ἀλλήλοις ἀεὶ, εὐδεὶς ἂν ὢν ἄνθρωπος ἐδεήθη τύχης. Ibid. Eclog. Eth. p. 197.

them our Parents; and [i] *Plutarch* adds, ἥτε φύσις ὁ τε τὴν φύσιν σώζων νόμος, Nature, and the Law of Nature requires that Parents ſhould have the higheſt Honour next to the Gods, and that nothing is a greater Evidence of Atheiſm than to deſpiſe them: The Love of Brethren, and near Kinsfolks, who are of the ſame Blood with us, is by all Men ſtiled Natural Affection, becauſe it plainly hath its riſe from this conſideration, that they are of the ſame Fleſh and Blood with us, or in the Language of the Scripture, are *Fleſh of our Fleſh*, and *Bone of our Bone*, and much more our own Off-ſpring, which are, μέρος πως τὸ ἡμέτερον, a part of us a little Image, and new Edition of our ſelves: All theſe Relations are therefore by *Philoſophers* ſtiled σχέσεις φυσικαὶ, Natural Relations, becauſe they do ariſe not from our Will, but from our Nature, and therefore by our cloſe conjunction in Affection to them we only act agreeably to Nature; whereas the Relations we contract by Affinity with others, are the Reſult of our Choice; as the Relation between Man and Wife, who chooſe ſo cloſe an Union as renders them one Fleſh, and conſequently doth engage them to that mutual Love they owe to one another, and to Affection to each other's Kindred, as being one in Blood with them, they have aſſumed into ſo cloſe an Union with themſelves. And

[i] De Fratr. Amor. p. 479. E. F.

hence

hence in Scripture, the Reverence and Affection we bear to our Parents is declared to be honourable in the sight of Men, and acceptable to God the common Father of us all, *Colos.* 3. 20. Brotherly affection is made an instance of the highest, the love of Parents to their Children, of the most tender love; and the *Apostle* hath inform'd us, that *if any Man provides not for his own, he hath denied the Faith, and is worse than an Infidel*, 1 Tim. 5. 4, 8.

Now hence we may easily learn the higher Obligation which lies upon us to love our selves, as that imports the welfare of our Souls in the first place, and then the preservation of our Lives, and the welfare of our Bodies; for if I am obliged thus to affect my Kindred because they are so near to my self, I must be obliged more to love my self; if I must bear so great affection to my Parents because they have contributed to my Being, and my Well-being is of higher importance than my Being, (it being no desirable thing to have a miserable Being) even that must instruct me to be more concerned for the weal and happiness of my Being.

5*thly*, The Law of *Gratitude* which doth oblige us to do good to them who have deserved well from us, and make returns of kindness to them; for to love them who love us, and to do good to them who do

good to us, is only to do that which *Heathens*, by the Light of Nature, do, as we learn from our Saviour's Question, *Do not Heathens and Publicans the same?* Matth. 5. 46. And indeed, as [k] *Seneca* puts the Question, What is more laudable, and more generally implanted in the Hearts of all, than that obliging Kindness doth oblige us to reciprocal Affection; and that he who hath deserved well of me, should receive well from me? And therefore [l] *Cicero* places this among the first of Duties, *Ut ei plurimum tribuamus à quo multum diligimur*; And *Seneca* observes, that no written Laws prescribe this Gratitude, because 'tis as unnecessary to do it, as to require us to love our selves; Ingratitude being so hateful in the eyes of all Men, that they who give examples of it in themselves complain of it in others.

Now from this Gratitude, as it is by the *Moralists* declared to be a branch of Justice, naturally do arise,

First, The Duties of Reverence and Love, Submission and Obedience, both to our heavenly Father, and our earthly Parents; whence, of those *Heathens*, who, *when they knew God, did not glorifie him as God, neither were thankful*, and who were *void of natural Affection, and disobedient to*

[k] De Benefic. l. 4. c. 17. [l] De Offic. l. 1. N. 71.

Parents,

Parents, the *Apostle* doth declare *they were without excuse*, since by the Light of Nature they well knew, that *they who did these things were worthy of Death*, Rom. 1. ult.

Secondly, The Duties of subjection to Superiors, of peaceable deportment in those Societies of which we are a part, and in our Conversation with all Men, in gratitude for those advantages we reap from Government, Society, and Converse with others: Hence *Righteousness and Peace, i.e.* a peaceable deportment among Men, are by St. *Paul* declared to be things which find a general approbation in the World; for, *he that in these things*, saith he, *serveth Christ, is acceptable to God, and approved of Men.* For to begin with that Duty which we all owe to God.

1. Who can dispute the truth of these Assertions, *viz.* That our Affections should be chiefly placed upon the chiefest Good; and that we should most highly value that which is most excellent in it self, and beneficial to us; and by just consequence, that God is to be chiefly loved? That we should fear him most whose Power is Almighty, and therefore Uncontroulable, and who is able to destroy both Soul and Body; that is, that we should fear God more than Man? That we should chiefly place our hope and confidence in him who is able to save to the uttermost; whose Power doth assure us,

he can do all his pleaſure; his Wiſdom, that he knoweth what beſt conduceth to our Welfare; whoſe Goodneſs doth encourage all good Men to hope he will do for them what is beſt? That we ſhould yield a firm aſſent to that which Truth it ſelf affirms, and depend confidently on the Promiſe of that God who cannot lye, and ſo ſhould yield a firm aſſent to his Word? That we ſhould chiefly be obſervant of, and uprightly obedient to him, whoſe Children, Servants, and Subjects we are born, from whom we have derived all our Faculties, and all the Bleſſings we enjoy, and whoſe Service is our trueſt Freedom, and our great Reward; or, in one word, that we ſhould be obedient to God's righteous Laws? That we ſhould glorifie him with thoſe Souls and Bodies which are his; and be concerned to promote his Honour, who always is concerned to promote our Good? That our Souls ſhould chiefly be employed in actions ſuitable to their ſpiritual Nature, and moſt perfective of their Being; in imitation of the moſt perfect Pattern of Holineſs and Goodneſs, the doing of thoſe things which render us moſt like to the beſt of Beings; that is, that we ſhould live to his Honour? That, for ſupply of all our Wants, we ſhould repair to him whoſe Wiſdom is acquainted with them; whoſe Power doth enable him to

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do above what we can ask; and whose Goodness doth incline him to fulfil all the reasonable desires of them that fear him? And lastly, That we should be most grateful to him from whom proceeds every good and perfect Gift, and from whom we entirely derive our present Mercies, and our future Hopes? Which are all the Duties of Natural Religion toward God.

2. The Duties which we owe to our Neighbour, are all comprised under the Heads of Charity and Justice. Now Justice, as it respects our Deeds, requires us to give every Man his own, and therefore neither to detain, nor to detract from others, what is theirs, either by Fraud, by Violence, or Oppression, Over-reaching, or Out-witing them; nor to do any Injury to them in their Goods, Relations, Honour, or Life, much less in the concerns of their immortal Souls. The comprehensive *Rule of Justice* affirmatively runs thus; Do thou to others as, in like Circumstances, thou dost judge it reasonable and honest others should do to thee: And negatively thus; Do not thou that to others which, in like Circumstances, thou dost conceive unreasonable and dishonest when thou art so dealt with. Now, is not this the Voice of Nature, and a Rule engraven on our Hearts? Can any reasonable Creature doubt the truth of this Assertion, That what is just, and right, when

it is done to him, muſt be ſo alſo, in like caſes, when it is done by him to others? And as for the negative part of this Injunction, *viz.* Do not to others as thou wouldeſt not be dealt with; is it not built on theſe clear Principles, that what is evil when it is done to thee, muſt, in like Circumſtances, be likewiſe evil when it is done by thee to others? And that thou oughteſt to be as unwilling to do evil to thy Neighbour, as to receive evil from him? To appeal to the common Suffrage of Mankind; Would not all Men retain their Right, and quietly enjoy their Own? Do they not all expect their Innocency ſhould protect them, and that they ſhould not ſuffer without cauſe? Do they not covet the Reputation of honeſt Men? Is it not matter of their Glory, that none can tax them with Diſhoneſty or injurious Dealing? Do they not hate to be eſteemed Knaves, Cheats, or Robbers; or Men of Violence, and Oppreſſion? Do they not labour to conceal, excuſe and extenuate ſuch actions, and put upon them ſome colour or pretence of Juſtice? Is it not therefore evident from theſe Conſiderations, that to be juſt in all our Dealings, and careful that we do no injury to others, is to provide things honeſt in the ſight of all Men?

Again,

Again, Justice, as it respects our Words, obligeth us to speak the truth from our Heart, and put away the lying Lip, to be sincere in our Professions and Converse with others, in opposition to Hypocrisie, and Pretence of what indeed we are not; and to be faithful to our Promises and Compacts, in opposition to Perfidiousness: Now, have not all these things the general approbation of good Men, which is the truest test of what is honourable? Are we not all desirous to be thought Men of our Words; Men upon whose Sincerity and Truth our Neighbour may rely? Are not the lying Tongue, and the false Witness, the Hypocrite, and the perfidious Person, an abomination both to God and Man? Can we endure to be represented in the *Psalmist*'s Words, as Men whose *Mouths are filled with Deceit and Fraud, who give good Words with our Mouths, but dissemble in our double Hearts; whose Words are sweeter than Butter, when War is in our Hearts?* Do we not take it very heinously when we are charged with any of these things? Do not our Hearts rise up against the Man who brands us with the name of Lyar, or dissembling Hypocrite? Are we not much concern'd to vindicate our selves from such vile Imputations cast upon us? Would we not have others to deal above-board with us? To be sincere in their pretences of Affection

fection to us, and faithful to their Promiſes? Is it not very hateful and diſpleaſing to us to be ſhamm'd by fair Pretences, cajol'd by the Diſſimulations, and trapann'd by the falſe Promiſes of others? And do not theſe things ſhew that when we are guilty of theſe things, we do not deal with others as we would be dealt with? Do they not evidently demonſtrate, that Truth, Sincerity, Fidelity in Words and Actions, are things of good report; and that by taking care to eſchew all Falſhood and Hypocriſie, to be veracious in our Words, inflexibly obſervant of our Promiſes, and cordial in our Expreſſions of Affection towards others, we do provide things honourable in the ſight of all Men?

3. That which we *Chriſtians* ſtile Charity, is, in the Language of the Heathen *Moraliſts*, Humanity; and it requires us to maintain an unfeigned Good-will, an affectionate Kindneſs to, and a ſincere Concernment for, the Good of all Men; cauſing us to rejoice in their Proſperity, and to be ready to promote it, as far as we can do ſo, without conſiderable damage to our ſelves; to ſympathize with them in their Afflictions, and, as far as conveniently we can, to ſupply their Wants, to relieve them under any Miſery, and to contribute to the Eaſe and Comfort of their Lives; and more eſpecially to labour to prevent the Ruin,

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and to promote the Welfare, of their Souls; and lastly, upon any reasonable submission, any fair acknowledgment of the Offence, and desire of Reconciliation, to be easie to be intreated, and ready to forgive. Now, as this Humanity carries Goodness in its very [m] Name, so is it easie to discern that it is highly equitable: For, is it not natural to all Men to desire that others should be ready, as occasion serves, to do good to them, when they can do it without hurt of any? That they should bear a kind affection to them, should sympathize with them in their Afflictions, and be inclined to shew mercy to them, upon their earnest desire, and humble acknowledgment of their Offence? Since then this Charity only obligeth us to shew that Kindness and Good-will to another, which we, in his condition, would desire, and expect; why should we desire, or expect, this from him, if we do not judge it reasonable for him to do it? Moreover, Do we not naturally condemn that Man who is inhuman and unfriendly to his Brethren; who, seeing them in Misery and Want, doth, with the *Levite*, pass unconcerned by, or shutteth up his bowels of Compassion from them? Do we not count it matter of Credit and Reputation to be like the good *Samaritan*,

[m] Χρηστότης, ἀγαθωσύνη.

or

or like to our great Maſter, doing good to all; or like to that God who is good to all, and *whoſe tender Mercies are over all his Works?* Do we not hate to be reputed unkind, unmerciful, revengeful, or implacable; and muſt not this convince us that the Man of a compaſſionate and tender Heart, and of an univerſally obliging Temper, is a valuable Perſon, one who doth what is highly commendable, and worthy of our imitation; and that the contrary Temper hath ſomething in it which deſerveth blame? In ſhort, is it not highly reaſonable that a Man, ſubject to like Wants and Exigencies with other Men, ſhould do thoſe offices of Kindneſs to his Fellow-man which he himſelf may ſhortly need? So true is that of the Heathen, *Homo qui homini calamitoſo eſt miſericors meminit ſui*; He that is merciful to another under his Calamity, is mindful of himſelf.

Laſtly, The Duties which we owe to our own ſelves are chiefly theſe; Sobriety, Chaſtity, Contentment, Moderation of our Paſſions and Deſires, Examination of our Ways, or Chriſtian Vigilance: Now, what do all theſe aim at, but the preſervation both of our Souls and Bodies in the beſt ſtate, of which, in this Life, they are capable? And is not this Self-preſervation that which even Nature doth ſuggeſt to all?

All

All that right Reason doth prescribe for moderation of our sensual Desires and brutish Appetites, must be comprised in a due care to keep our selves from all tormenting Passions, inordinate Affections, insatiable and unreasonable Lustings after the Pleasures and Enjoyments of this World, all which are by the Heathen *Moralists* stiled Perturbations, because they tend to the anxiety, disquiet, and disturbance of our Minds, as do apparently all Anger, Envy, Rancor, Strife, contentious Dispositions, and all worldly Cares, which therefore are both opposite to the ease and quiet of our Minds, and to the health and vigour of the Body; and needs there any farther reason to persuade us to avoid these things? Moreover, what is Contentment, but an Art to live at ease in all events that may befal us in this life? Or, what is Patience, but an alleviation of every Burthen that we bear? And, what are Temperance and Chastity, but kind expedients to preserve the Body from Distempers, Rottenness, and Stench? What do they aim at but the prolongation of that Life in health and vigour, which our Intemperance and Luxury destroy before the time? And, what is vigilance over our Ways, besides a prudent care that we neglect no opportunity of doing good to our selves; and that we labour to prevent as much as may be,

that which conduceth to the hurt or damage of our Bodies, or our Souls; as knowing even from [a] *Plato*, that κίνδυνος κινδυνεύεται εἰ τὶς αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει, we cannot neglect the care of the Soul without great danger? Who then can rationally deny that all this is our reaſonable ſervice; and that we are doing good to our ſelves, when we are carefully employ'd in theſe Duties?

§. V. Now this Conſideration affords a ſatisfactory Anſwer to the Arguments of *Pyrrhon*, *Sextus Empiricus*, and others, to prove theſe are not Laws of Nature, or actions naturally good or evil, becauſe the Practices or Cuſtoms of ſome barbarous Nations, and of ſome Philoſophers, were oppoſite to many of them; for if the unprejudiced Judgment of the beſt, the wiſeſt, and moſt civilized Nations, who had improved their Reaſon moſt, ſaw cauſe ſufficient to approve theſe Laws as ſuitable to the dictates of right Reaſon; then muſt it follow that others, had they cultivated their Reaſon, as they might have done, and freed themſelves from thoſe unreaſonable Prejudices, thoſe falſe Opinions, which they had received from Education, Cuſtom, or from Superſtition, might have as eaſily diſcerned thoſe actions, done by them, in

[a] Phæd.

oppoſition

oppoſition to thoſe Laws, to be unſuitable to the dictates of right Reaſon, as the wiſer *Heathens*; And tho' 'tis to be lamented as a Scandal to *Chriſtianity*, that Whoredom and Adultery, Theft and Rapine, Lying and Swearing, bearing falſe Witneſs, and coveting what belongs to others, are now become almoſt as common among *Chriſtians*, as they were formerly among *Heathens*; yet ſure this is no proof that *Chriſtians* do not, or may not, ſee the evil of thoſe actions, or the contradiction which they bear to the Precepts of the Goſpel; what reaſon have we therefore to conclude from the like practices of the *Heathens* againſt the tenor of theſe Laws, they could not have diſcerned the oppoſition which thoſe actions bore to the dictates of right Reaſon, as well as did thoſe wiſer and more civilized Nations which condemned them?

To conclude this Section: There ſeems to me to have been a defect in moſt of the Authors, who have writ upon the Law of Nature, in this particular; That they have only conſidered Man as Social and Part of a Community, or as being obliged to preſerve himſelf, and ſo have divided the Laws of Nature into thoſe which reſpect a Man's behaviour towards himſelf, and towards other Men, without regard to natural Religion, or to that outward and in-

ward Reverence and Duty which he owes to the Deity, which ſeem moſt naturally to ariſe from Man conſidered as a Being capable of Religion, and ſenſible of his Original from a God that made, and ſtill preſerves him; introducing Religion only as a thing neceſſary to oblige them to thoſe Duties which they owe to others and themſelves, and not as a part of that Duty which they owe to God, by virtue of his divine Excellencies, and their dependence on him for their Beings and their Well-beings, or as a thing neceſſary to a future ſtate, when all Communities ſhall ceaſe, and, with them, all the Duties of Juſtice, Peace, and Truth, and Charity to the Indigent, or Mercy and Forgiveneſs; and when there ſhall be no farther place for Temperance and Sobriety, or the due government of our Paſſions, the objects of them being removed and done away; whence it muſt follow, by the cleareſt conſequence, that there can be no Law of Nature obliging any Man to purſue his future Felicity.

§. VI. I therefore, with ſubmiſſion to better Judgments, chuſe rather to conſider Man as a Rational Being, capable of Religion, as *Lactantius* deſcribes him, and of the knowledge of God, as the Author and Preſerver of his Being; or, as the Apoſtle

faith,

saith, as one that hath given him Life, Breath, and all things; one, lastly, who is an all-perfect Being, and therefore one who is perfect in Power and Wisdom, Truth, Holiness, and Justice, Love and Goodness: From which Considerations, I think, 'tis easie to deduce all the Foundations of my obligation to Worship him in all the offices of natural Religion. And,

First, Hence evident it is that God requires some Duty from us, he having *shewed Man what is good*, and therefore *what the Lord requireth of him*, that he doth certainly expect from all Men, that they should own and honour him as God, by paying that obedience and service to him which is due from Creatures to their great Creator: Whence the *Apostle*, Rom. 1. 21. represents the *Heathens* as inexcusable and subject to his just displeasure in that *when they knew God, they did not glorifie him as God, nor were they thankful* to him for his Benefits. The School of *Epicurus* went so far in this, as to acknowledge, that if God thought fit to require any service from Man, he must stand bound, by his relation to him, to perform it; and all Nations have, by their continual practice, own'd it was their sentiment that he did actually require that service, there being no Nation without *Priests* and *Sacrifices*, or without

Prayer and Praiſes tendred to the Gods they own'd; it being natural to infer from that Capacity to all the Acts of natural Religion in which they were framed, and from thoſe noble Faculties he had given them, to diſcern their obligations thus to ſerve him, and from that lively ſenſe they had of thoſe tranſcendent Excellencies which rendred him moſt worthy to be ſerved, that he did actually intend that they ſhould ſerve him: For evident it is that all wiſe Agents act for ſome prudent end and deſign, ſomething good and worthy of themſelves in what they do; now, to what end ſhould God have framed us with this Capacity of Religion, if he deſigned not that we ſhould be religious? Why hath he given us thoſe noble Faculties, whereby we naturally diſcern this is our reaſonable ſervice, if he doth not require us to act according to theſe dictates of our Reaſon? Why hath he given us Wiſdom and Diſcretion to diſcern his glorious Excellencies, if he is not concerned that we ſhould glorifie him, either by imitation of his communicable Perfections, or by acknowledgment of his tranſcendent Excellencies, by actions proper to expreſs our ſenſe and apprehenſion of them; that is, by worſhipping him according to thoſe Excellencies which render him ſo fit an Object of our religious Service, and from which our obligation to

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perform it naturally spring; so that by looking into the Frame of Human Nature, by consulting our own inward Sentiments, and then reflecting on that wise Agent, who doubtless hath thus framed us for some good Ends, and hath implanted in us all these Principles, and given us those Apprehensions of his Nature and Perfections to produce in us their proper and immediate Operations, we may rationally conclude that he hath made us for his Service: Hence,

2*ly*, It follows that he will reward us for the faithful performance, and punish our neglect of this his Service; since *he that cometh to God, must believe* not only *that he is, but also that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him*, Hebr. 11. 6. And indeed Duty must be a vain and insignificant expression, and even a contradiction, if I be not obliged to perform it; obliged thus I cannot be without some motive to it, and yet what motive can I have to practise it, if I shall never be the better by it, or rewarded for it? Again, there can be no such thing as Duty, if I am left at freedom to omit it, and sure it is I may neglect it, if I shall suffer nothing by so doing; that is, if I shall not be called to account, or punished for the neglect, as in this present Life it often happens: But this will still appear more evident from the consideration of those noble Faculties

with which our Natures are endued; for is it not highly equitable, that a reaſonable Creature ſhould give a Reaſon of his Actions? And is not this a juſt preſumption, that he who made him ſo will require a Reaſon of them, and call him to Account for acting contrary to his Reaſon? Is it not reaſonable to conceive, that he to whom God hath given Wiſdom to diſcern his Duty to him, and what the Lord requireth of him, and a Will to chuſe it, and to incline him to act according to that Judgment, ſhould act ſuitably to theſe Faculties? Is not that Sovereign who hath thus framed us, our Superior, and muſt he not then have a Right to call his Subjects to Account for the Improvement of thoſe Talents which he hath put into their hands? Moreover, if Children or Servants do neglect their Duty, or do what they ought not, do we not ask, why is this done, why is this left undone? Would not Society be diſſolved, and the World run into confuſion, if no Man were accountable to his Superiors for what he did? And is it reaſonable to conceive, that God ſhould make us accountable to our Fellow-Creatures for our Actions, but not accountable to himſelf, but leave us all at liberty to diſobey, diſhonour, and neglect our Duty to him, whoſe Children, Servants, and Subjects we all are? Shall Parents judge their Children,

Maſters

Masters their Servants, and Magistrates their Subjects, and shall not the Judge of all the Earth do so? Hence even the ° Philosophers declare, That they were moved to embrace the Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul, from the Consent of all Nations, fearing what should be after this Life, or hoping for a better Life, who from Tradition, or from Natural Reason, or from both, had still an expectation of their going hence, to some blessed, or infernal Regions, and also have excluded those whom they deemed impious and profane, from their *Elysian Shades*, and their Cœlestial Regions, and have confined them to their supposed *Tartarus*, or those infernal Places which answer to the *Christian*'s Hell. To proceed to Particulars, hence it is evident,

§ VII. 1*st*, That God requires we should honour him, for Honour being only an Acknowledgment of another's Excellencies; it must be a clear Dictate of the Light of Nature, that he who is most excellent, must be acknowledged as most honourable, and therefore he who hath discovered to us his

° Cum de animorum æternitate differimus, non leve momentum apud nos habet, consensus hominum aut inferos timentium, aut colentium. Sen. Ep. 117. Permanere animos arbitramur consensu nationum omnium Cicer. Tusc. qu. 1. p. 29.

Divine

Divine Excellencies, muſt expect that we ſhould honour him by the acknowledgment of what he hath diſcovered to us, ſince for no other reaſon can we judge them to be diſcovered to us: Hence [p] *Seneca* declares, that, *Primus Deorum cultus eſt reddere illis majeſtatem ſuam, reddere bonitatem*: The firſt Act of Divine Worſhip is to agniſe the Majeſty, the Goodneſs, and other Perfections of the Deity.

2*ly*, The Worſhip of God being founded on the Acknowledgment of theſe Excellencies of the Divine Nature, and ſuperadding only to it a readineſs in the Will to teſtifie our Apprehenſions of them, and in the outward Action an actual performance of thoſe things which are expreſſive of theſe Excellencies, if we ſtand bound to honour God by the acknowledgment of theſe Excellencies, we muſt be certainly obliged to worſhip him; that is, to teſtifie our Apprehenſions of them by ſuch Acts as are moſt proper to expreſs that ſenſe which we have of them, either to him by inward Worſhip, or to others by outward Acts of Veneration; for ſure the Honour which I acknowledge to be due to him for theſe Excellencies, I muſt be bound to tender to him on the account of them, ſeeing it cannot reaſonably be ſuppoſed I ſhould be left at liberty to rob him of his Due; and ſeeing

[p] Ep. 95. p. 604.

I ſtand

I stand bound to this acknowledgment to some end, which end can only be obtained by those inward Proofs, or outward Testimonies, by which I shew my Apprehensions of them by Actions properly expressive of them unto God or Man; my Obligation to own these Excellencies, must also be an Obligation to all those Actions which are properly expressive of them, and are by all Mankind received as the proper Indications of these Apprehensions; and hence [9] *Velleius*, tho' an *Epicurean*, is forced to confess that, *præstans Deorum natura digna est*, the excellent Nature of the Gods is worthy, *quæ hominum pietate coleretur, habet enim Venerationem justam quicquid excellit*, to be worshipped by the Piety of Men, since whatsoever doth excel justly deserveth Veneration.

3*ly*, Since 'tis essential to the first Being, or the Creator of the World, to be the Author of our subsequent Beings, Lives and Faculties, and of all the Good Things of the World, and so of those *Set-times, and fruitful Seasons, which fill our Hearts with Food and Gladness*; and all Men naturally are obliged to the free Author of all the Blessings they enjoy; hence necessarily doth result our Obligation to render Praises and Thanksgivings to this God of all our Mercies: Again, since all Men naturally desire

[9] Apud. Cic. de N. Deorum, l. 1. n. 34.

the

the preſervation of their Beings, and therefore the enjoyment of all things needful to that end, 'tis certain that dependent Creatures muſt deſire the preſervation of that Life, and of theſe Bleſſings from the Author of them; and ſince without a Providence which ordereth and taketh Care of our Affairs, there can be neither Piety nor Vertue, as will hereafter be demonſtrated, and the ſuppoſal of this Providence ſhews the neceſſity of our dependence on the Author of it, for Preſervation, and Protection; and the Proviſions of this preſent Life, hence muſt it be our Duty to repair by Prayer and Supplication to the Creator, Preſerver, and Orderer of all Things, for preſervation of our Souls in Life, and the ſupply of all our Wants: And it ſeems ſtrange that any one ſhould think that Man, by reaſon of his weakneſs and inſufficiency to preſerve himſelf, ſhould be obliged by the Law of Nature to enter into Society in order to his preſervation and well-being, and yet that being thus dependent upon God, and much more inſufficient to preſerve himſelf, and to procure his well-being without Divine Aſſiſtance, (as all Societies by the performance of theſe Duties of Prayer and Praiſes to their reſpective Deities, have evidently own'd) ſhould not be thought obliged by the ſame Law to the performance of them.

4*ly*, Since

4*ly*, Since we believe what other Men do testifie, upon the Confidence we have both of their Skill to know what they attest, and of their Fidelity, which will not suffer them to deceive us by a false Testimony, or by averring what they do not know to be the Truth; seeing the infinite Wisdom of God doth render it impossible he should be ignorant of any thing, and his Veracity as impossible that he should lye; hence it is evident, that we stand bound to testifie our acknowledgment of these Perfections, by a firm belief of whatsoever God shall testifie; and may be assur'd, that all that an Almighty God doth promise will be performed, there being nothing more repugnant to the Idea of a God of Truth and Faithfulness, than that he should delude us with false words: For *God is not as a Man that he should lye, nor as the Son of Man that he should repent*, Numb. 23. 19. Hence, say the *Heathens*, that which prevails with Men to vary from their Words, is either that they were deceitful in them, or repent of them afterwards, or if they do continue willing, they are unable to perform them, [r] none of which things can be incident to a God Almighty, a Lover of

[r] Πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ὁ θεὸς ἐκπέφευγε τῷ φιλαλήθῃ τὸ ἀπατηλὸν καὶ βεβαίῳ τὸ παλινδρομον, καὶ τῷ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἔχοντι τὸ ἀτελὲς. Stob. Serm. 11. p. 139.

Truth,

Truth, and who is conſtant to his Word.

And 5*ly*, Seeing we repoſe our confidence in, and hope for good things from a Man of Power, Wiſdom, and of Kindneſs to us, theſe Attributes belonging in a tranſcendent manner to God, muſt render him the beſt, and the moſt proper Object of our Affiance and our Hope.

6*ly*, Fear being that Paſſion which excites us to endeavour to avoid ſome evil that we dread, or the loſs of ſome good thing which we deſire to enjoy, or to preſerve; that Being who is almighty and uncontroulable in Power, and therefore able to inflict the greateſt Evils on us, and in whoſe Favour we enjoy the greateſt Good, muſt be on theſe two accounts moſt worthy to be feared, and ſo even Prudence muſt oblige us to have that awe of him continually upon our Spirits, which may preſerve us from ſo provoking him as to engage his Power againſt us, or to cauſe him to withdraw his Favour from us: And ſince his Omnipreſence aſſures us we can never avoid the Stroke of his Almighty Arm, and his Omniſcience that we cannot conceal from him any of our evil Thoughts or Actions, and his Holineſs and Juſtice that he muſt be exceedingly diſpleaſed with, and ſo inclined to puniſh them, this muſt advance our Fear of him above all finite Beings; and if theſe things do not produce this Fear within

within us, it must be certain we do not truly acknowledge these Perfections in God.

7thly, Seeing all Love ariseth from the Consideration of the excellency, or the kindness of the Object loved, or the relation it beareth to us (for we do only love on the account of Resemblance, where that Resemblance is deemed an Excellency) that God whose Excellencies as much transcend all the Perfections of his Creatures as his Nature doth, and who, as he is *Maximus*, and therefore the most able, so is he *Optimus*, and so the most inclined to do us good, and who is actually the Giver of every good and perfect Gift, the Father, the Creator, and the continual Preserver of us all, must be most worthy of our highest Love, and therefore we must be obliged to acknowledge these his Excellencies by loving him above all things.

8thly, Seeing we think it reasonable to obey, or be subject to that Power which we cannot resist, and is most able to protect us, and to procure our good; to be directed by that Wisdom which best discerns our Interest, and what most tendeth to advance it, especially when it is joyned with that Love and Mercy, which will most certainly engage him to employ that Power and Wisdom to the advantage of all his loving Subjects; and all Men do conceive

it

it their great Happineſs to have ſuch a Governour as truly doth excel in theſe Perfections, all theſe Perfections being tranſcendently in God, he muſt be worthy to be obey'd in all things, and our refuſal ſo to do, muſt be a virtual denial, or a refuſal to own theſe Perfections in the Deity. And,

Laſtly, The ſame Reaſons do as ſtrongly argue for our Paſſive Obedience, that is our acquieſcence in, and our entire reſignation of our ſelves to the Will of Providence; for if this Providence be managed with the higheſt Wiſdom, and the Deſigns of Love, I may be certain that whatſoever doth befal me is wiſely ſuffer'd to befal me, and is intended for my good in the iſſue of it, and therefore if I be not wanting to my ſelf, may be improved for my good: If he who exerciſes this Providence over me be an Almighty God, I know that he is able to divert all that is truly Evil from me, and therefore would not ſuffer it to come upon me, did not his Wiſdom ſee that it is good and needful for me, either as Spiritual Phyſic for my Soul's Health, or Trial to improve my Vertue, and therefore that it only is my Folly which can induce me to be diſcontented or uneaſie under it; and ſo I do not truly own theſe Attributes, unleſs I acquieſce in all the Diſpenſations of his Providence: And this is ſuitable to

that

that celebrated Saying of *Pythagoras*, and *Socrates*, in *Plato* and in *Cicero*, [f] That nothing truly evil can happen to a good Man, becauſe the Gods never neglect his Affairs.

[f] Nec enim Viro bono mali quicquam evenire poteſt nec vivo nec mortuo, nec unqnam ejus Res a Diis immortalibus negligentur. Tuſc. qu. l. 1. g. 81.

CHAP. II

The CONTENTS.

The Neceſſity of the Chriſtian Revelation ariſeth from the Corruption of thoſe Natural Principles both by Jew and Gentile. The Jews having corrupted the Principles of Natural Religion by their vain Traditions, and corrupt Notions of the Deity. § 1. *And enervated their Obligations to all the Duties of the Second Table.* § 2. *And to the Duties of Charity and Mercy.* § 3. *The Reaſon of their Incredulity, notwithſtanding the ſtrong Conviction they had from Holy Scripture, and from Miracles, that our Jeſus was the true Meſſiah.* § 4.

THeſe Principles of Natural Religion being aſſuredly deſign'd for the good and welfare of Mankind, and to render

him capable of the Divine Favour, and ſome Rewards of his Obedience; ſince *he that comes to God, muſt believe that he is a Rewarder of all them who diligently ſeek him*, they being alſo as truly the Revelation of his Will to the *Heathen*, as Scripture was to the *Jew* and *Chriſtian*, and the Rules by which God will paſs Judgment on them at the laſt Day; when once theſe Natural Principles came to be much impaired by the Corruptions of Mens Reaſons, and by their vain Traditions and Opinions, and rendred unſerviceable to theſe good Ends, by the Diſputings of the Wiſe againſt them, and thoſe groſs Errors which deſtroyed the efficacy of them, or by that *Scepticiſm* which rendred them uncertain of them, then was there an apparent ground for, and evident expedience of ſuch a Declaration, or new Revelation of the Will of God, as might place theſe great Principles of Natural Religion in the cleareſt Light, give a freſh luſtre and advancement to them, a brighter and a more convincing Evidence of thoſe Fundamental Principles on which all true Religion doth depend, and more effectual and prevailing Motives to the performance of our Duty.

Now that thus it was, not only with reſpect to the *Heathen* World, but even to the *Jewiſh* Nation, when firſt the Goſpel was revealed; that the Principles of Natural Reli-

Religion and true Vertue, and the Foundations on which they depend, were very much defaced, and the ſtrength of them was in a great degree abated, ſhall be my preſent buſineſs to evince; and the Inference which I ſhall make is this: That the new Revelation made by the Goſpel-Diſpenſation, was highly requiſite to the welfare and happineſs of Man, and that by giving us ſuch bright and full Diſcoveries of our whole Duty both to God, our Neighbour, and our Selves, ſuch new and cogent Motives to perform it, and ſuch clear Evidence of the Foundations on which the Practice both of Religion and Moral Vertue do depend, Chriſtianity is admirably ſubſervient both to God's Glory, and to the Happineſs of all to whom it is revealed.

§ I. 1*ſt*, Then, I ſay, that the Religion of the *Jews* was ſo exceedingly corrupted by their vain Traditions, and fond Opinions of God's partial Affection to them above all other Nations, as made it ineffectual to the true Ends of pure and undefiled Religion; for tho' they entertained a right Notion of God as the Creator of the World, they miſerably err'd as to the end of its Creation, fondly imagining that it was made for them alone, and ſo they corrupted the Notion of God's general

Goodneſs, which is chiefly viſible in the Creation of a World after that manner that it ſhall alway bring forth Food for the uſe of Man; hence the *Apoſtle* makes this the Teſtimony, that he is ἀγαθοποιῶν, a God of general Goodneſs to all Men, in that *he gives them Rain from Heaven, and fruitful Seaſons, filling their Hearts with Food and Gladneſs*, Acts 14. 17.

Again, they own'd the Providence of God, but then they fooliſhly conceived that God had only regard to them in all the Diſpenſations of it, and that he looked on all the reſidue of the World only as *Spittle*, and had given them all up to the Government of *Satan*, and ſo they left the *Heathens* as void of any Providence, reſpecting them, as *Epicurus* did; yea left them to the Government of evil Spirits, which even [t] *Plutarch*, by the Light of Nature, ſaw to be as great a blemiſh to God, as for a Prince to ſet a wicked Governour over a Province; for [u] in *Vajikra Rabba*, they introduce God ſpeaking thus to *Satan*, *Tho' I have made thee Koſmocrator*, i. e. *Ruler over the Creatures*, i. e. the *Heathens*, *thou ſhalt have nothing to do with my People*. See Buxt. Lex. Tal. p. 2007.

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[t] Πῶς ἔν ἐκ ἔστιν ἔγκλημα τῷ θεῷ, &c. De Stoic. repugn. p. 1051.

[u] § 18.

The

The first Opinion we find in the Second Book of *Esdras*, ch. 6. v. 55, 56. where the Jew comes to God with these words, *O Lord thou madest the World for our sakes; as for the other People which also come of Adam, thou hast said that they are nothing, but be like unto Spittle, and hast likened the abundance of them to a drop that falleth from a Vessel:* And V. 59. *If the World be made for our sakes, why do we not possess an Inheritance in it?*

3*dly*, They enervated the Doctrine of future Punishments, as it respected them especially, by teaching that only *Epicureans*, *Atheists*, *Hereticks*, and *Apostates* from their Religion went to Hell, and that no circumcised Jew could abide there; [w] *Hell-fire*, say they, *hath no power over the Sinners of Israel, because Abraham and Isaac descend thither to fetch them thence:* They also taught that no circumcised Person went to Hell, God having promised to deliver them from it for the merit of Circumcision; and as they were thus fondly, and unreasonably partial to themselves, declaring that all *Israelites* had a Portion in the World to come, this being the first Sentence in the *Capitula Patrum*, so have they represented

[w] Vorst. Animadv. in Pirk. Eliezer, p. 160. *See* Note on Rom. 2. 13.

God as most unreasonably cruel and unmerciful to the whole *Heathen* World, declaring that they are all, [x] *Pabulum ignis Gehennæ*, Fuel for Hell-fire.

4*thly*, They rendred Repentance, Holiness of Life, and sincere and general Obedience to the Laws of God unnecessary upon these several accounts,

1*st*, By thinking it a sufficient Title to God's Favour, and a Security from his Judgments, that they were *Abraham*'s Seed; the *Chaldee Paraphrast* making frequent mention of their Expectations to be preserved for the Merits of their Forefathers, *Abraham*, *Isaac*, and *Jacob*; hence saith the *Baptist* to them, *Bring forth fruits meet for repentance*, for *the ax is now laid to the root of the tree, and think* (it) *not* (sufficient to preserve you from excision) *to say within your selves, we are Abraham's seed*, Mat. 3. 8, 9. And [y] *Justin M.* saith to *Trypho*, That by the Instructions of their Masters, and Rabbins, they expected that the Kingdom of Heaven shall be given, τοῖς ἀπὸ τ̃ σπορᾶς τ̃ κατὰ σάρκα τ̃ Ἀβραάμ, *to the Children of Abraham, tho' they were* ἁμαρτωλοὶ, καὶ ἀπειθεῖς πρὸς τ̃ θεόν, *Sinners, and disobedient to God.*

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[x] Vorst. ibid.
[y] Dial. cum Tryph. p. 369, 370.

2*dly*, By

2*dly*, By their Doctrin, that hearing and studying the Law would be sufficient to procure the favour of God without the practice of it; in opposition to which Doctrin St. *Paul* saith, that *not the hearers of the Law only, but the doers of the Law, shall be justified*, Rom. 2. 13. See the Note. And St. *James*, *Be ye doers of the Word, and not hearers only*, Jam. 1. 22. And,

3*dly*, That obedience to one Command, would compensate for their disobedience to the rest; their Doctrine, saith [z] Dr. *Pocock*, being this, that *God gave so many Commandments to them, that by doing any one of them they might be saved:* So *Kimchi* expounds these Words of *Hosea*, *take away Iniquity*, uchac Tob, *and receive good*, i. e. *receive in lieu of them we have transgressed, any Commandment that we have done:* It was a vulgar Rule among them, saith Dr. *Smith*, that Men should single out some one Commandment of God's Law, and therein especially exercise themselves, that so they might make God their Friend by that, lest in other things they should too much displease him; and he cites from them this Rule, He that observes any one Precept, it shall be well with him, and his Days shall be prolonged, and he shall possess the Earth; And against this loose Do-

[z] In Hos. 14. 2, p. 774.

ctrine St. *James* seems to level this sacred Aphorism, *Whosoever shall keep the whole Law*, (in other matters) *and yet offend* (wilfully) *in one point, he is guilty of all*, Chap. 2. 10, 11. See the Note there.

To proceed to the Duties of the second Table.

§. II. *First*, They were noted, say other Writers, and their own *Josephus*, as a Nation averse to Government, their Zealots declaring they were Free-men, and owed subjection neither to *Cæsar*, nor to any other, but to God alone; and their whole Nation clamoured against the Tributes paid to *Cæsar*, as being a token of that Servitude which became not such a Free-people as they were, who owed subjection to the Laws of God alone; and upon this account they rebelled against the *Romans*, and against the Governours sent by them: And hence St. *Peter* doth exhort them to *submit to every Ordinance of Man for the Lord's sake, as free, but not using their liberty for a cloak of maliciousness*, 1 Pet. 2. 13, 16. See the Note there. [a] *Josephus* confesseth that they were represented as ἔθνος δύσαρχτον καὶ δυσπειθὲς φύσει πρὸς τὰς βασιλείας, *a Nation hardly to be governed, and naturally averse from subjection to Kings*;

[a] De Bell. Jud. l. 2. c. 8. p. 782. F.

and

and from them, saith [b] *Tacitus*, *Non Cæsaribus honor*, No honour to *Cæsar* was to be expected.

They made void the Duties of Children to their Parents by their doctrin of *Corban*, as our Lord hath taught us; and by that other doctrin, that [c] *Proselytes* were as new born Babes, and had lost all their Relation to the Kindred which they had before: And to this [d] *Tacitus* seems to refer, when he saith of them, that they are taught, *Parentes, liberos, fratres, vilia habere*, to have no regard to Parents, Children, or Brethren.

Comm. 6th, They violated the sixth Commandment, by the continual Murthers committed by their *Zealots* and *Sicarii*, without all forms of Judgment, and by their bloody Zeal against all *Jews* and *Proselytes* who embraced the *Christian* Faith; for, as our *Saviour* foretold, the time would come when they, by killing *Christians*, should think they did God good service, *John* 16. 2. so *Saul* confesseth, that out of Zeal to the Religion of the *Jews*, he persecuted them to the death; and *Justin M.* saith to *Trypho*, that his Country-men killed the Christians αὐτοχειρ, with their own Hands,

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[b] Hist. l. 5. p. 426.
[c] See Note on 1 Cor. 5. 1. [d] Ibid.

where-

where-ever they were able; thus did the *High-Prieſts* and Chief of the *Jews* lay wait for *Paul* to kill him, or conſent to thoſe that did ſo, *Acts* 23. 12.--25. 1. And hence St. *James* ſaith to them ζηλᾶτε καὶ φονεύετε, ye kill out of a bitter Zeal, *Jam.* 4. 2. And St. *Peter* ſaith to them, *Let no Man ſuffer as a Murtherer*, 1 Pet. 4. 15. And, laſtly, by their hatred againſt, and contempt of, all other Nations or Religions, which was augmented by their unworthy thoughts of God, as one who abhorred all other Nations, but loved them exceedingly; Accordingly, ſaith *Tacitus*, They had great kindneſs for Men of their own Nation, *Sed adverſus omnes alios hoſtile odium*, but as great hatred to all others.

Comm. 7th, They violated the ſeventh Commandment by their proneneſs to Luſt and Impurity, they being, ſaith *Tacitus*, *projectiſſima ad libidinem gens*; by theſe Doctrines, [e] That ſimple Fornication was only a Sin becauſe forbidden, and that to ly with an Heathen Woman was no Sin till it was forbidden by the *Haſmonæans* encouraging them to indulge to Fornication. Whence the *Apoſtle*, in the Epiſtle to the *Hebrews*, bids them look diligently, that there be *no Fornicator among them*, and tells them, that *Whoremongers and Adulterers*

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[e] Seld. de jure Nat. &c. c. 6. c. 12.

God

God will adjudge to condemnation, Ch. 12. 16.--13. 4. (2.) By their Adulteries committed under pretence of Marriage. Thus *Justin M.* tells us, that their blind Rabbins permitted any of them to have four or five Wives, καὶ ἐὰν εὔμορφόν τις ἰδὼν ἐπιθυμήσῃ αὐτῆς: and if any of them, seeing a beautiful Woman, did covet her, they taught them from the examples of *Abraham*, and the Patriarchs, [f] μηδὲν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς τὰ ὅμοια πράττοντας, they did no evil in doing the like things; and that their Rabbins did permit them, in their Travels, [g] ὀνόματι γάμου, under pretence of Marriage, to take to themselves what Women they would, and as many as they would, and as they would; And [h] Dr. *Lightfoot* adds, that it was common with them to proclaim in any place where they came, *Who will be my Wife for this day, or while I stay in this place?* And surely such a Wife could be no better than a Whore; and therefore the *Apostle* puts the Question to them thus, *Thou that sayest a Man should not commit Adultery, dost thou commit Adultery?* Rom. 2. 22. And lastly, by the incestuous Copulations they allowed to *Proselytes*, which perhaps gave occasion to those Words of [i] *Tacitus*, *Concessa apud illos quæ nobis incesta*, those things are al-

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[f] Dial. cum Tryph. p. 363. E. 364.
[g] P. 371. A.
[h] In Matth. 19. 3. p. 425.
[i]

lowed

lowed by them which we account inceſtuous. See the Note on 1 Cor. 5. 1.

Comm. 8*th*, They were alſo prone to rob and pillage other People, from that *Phanatical* pretence, that the World was made for them. Hence [k] *Buxtorf* cites this paſſage from their *Talmud*, *That all the Poſſeſſions of the Gentiles are as common; he that firſt ſeizes on them, is Lord over them:* And touching the People of the Earth, as they ſtiled the *Gentiles*, they had this Rule, That [l] if they found any thing belonging to them, they were not bound to proclaim it. Hence the *Apoſtle*, ſpeaking to the *Corinthians*, of the *Jewiſh* Doctors, who endeavoured to bring them into Bondage to their Law, ſaith, *You ſuffer if a Man devour you, and take away what is yours*, 2 Cor. 11. 20.

Comm. 9*th*, And 5*thly*, It was very common with them to ſwear by the Creatures, or by Idols, this being their opinion, that theſe were not binding Oaths. See Note on *Matth.* 5. 35. Thus *Maimonides* ſaith, If any Man ſwear by Heaven or by Earth, yet is not this an Oath: And *R. Judah*, That he that ſweareth by *Jeruſalem*, it is nothing; and more certainly he that ſweareth by an Idol, becauſe an Idol is nothing

[k] Lex Talmud. p. 1345. [l] p. 1626.

in

in the World; and this gave occasion to those known Words of *Martial*:

Ecce negas, juraſque mihi per Templa Tonantis,
Non credo, jura, Verpe, per Anchialum.

i. e. I will not believe thee, O *Jew*, ſwearing by *Jupiter*, but only when thou ſweareſt thus, *Am Chi Halah*, As the Lord liveth.

Comm. 10*th*, And laſtly, they were very Covetous and Worldly-minded, eſpecially the *Phariſees*, Luke 16. 14. They were ſtill luſting after worldly things, *Jam.* 4. 2. ſtill expecting the time when they ſhould enrich themſelves with the Spoils of the *Gentiles*; and to this coveting they were induced by this looſe doctrine, That evil Thoughts did not defile where they proceeded not to Action. And hence [m] *Joſephus* ſaith, *Polybius* was miſtaken when he ſaid that *Antiochus Epiphanes* periſhed, becauſe he would have robbed *Diana*'s Temple, Τὸ γὰρ μηκέτι ποιῆσαι τὸ ἔργον βεβλάσαμβρον ἐκ ἔχει τιμωρίας ἄξιον, ſince he deſerved no Puniſhment for what he only would have done, but did not: And *Kimchi* on thoſe Words of *David*, *Pſalm* 66. 18. *If I regard Iniquity in my Heart, the Lord will not hear me*, comments thus, *He*

[m] Antiq. l. 12. c. 13.

will

will not impute it to me for sin; for God does not look upon an evil Thought as Sin, unless it be conceived against God or Religion. In a word, [n] *Josephus* declares, that they were guilty of the violation of all God's holy Laws, enquiring thus, *What have you done of all the good things required by our Law-giver? What have you not done of all those things which he pronounced accursed?* And adds, that they were guilty of *Theft*, *Treachery*, *Adultery*, *Sacrilege*, *Rapines*, and *Murthers*, and *new ways of Wickedness invented by them.*

§. III. *Lastly*, As for the Duties of Charity and Mercy to Mankind, they were the greatest strangers to them; for, as *Tacitus* pronounced, that they bore the greatest hatred to Men of other Nations; so doth the *Apostle* say, that they were *contrary to all Men*, 1 *Thess.* 2. 16. The Brother and the Stranger whom they were to love, being, according to their Interpretation, only the *Jew* and *Proselyte* to their Religion; whence they concluded that others might be hated by them. And the Son of *Syrach*, after all his excellent Sayings, betrays his *Jewish* Spirit in these Words; *There be two manner of People which my Soul abhors, the* Philistins, *the* Samaritans, *and the foolish*

[n] De Bello Jud. l. 6. c. 26. p. 930, 931.

People

People which dwell in Sechem, *Eccles.* 50. 25, 26. [o] *Josephus* doth inform us, that no good affection was so entirely lost among them ὡς ἔλεος as *that of Mercy.* And [p] *Juvenal* informs us, that they would not do to others those common offices of Humanity, which even, by the *Heathens,* as *Tully* and *Stobæus* say, were from the Light of Nature accounted due to all Men; for, saith he, their custom was

Non monstrare vias eadem nisi sacra colenti,
Quæsitum ad fontem solum deducere verpum.

not to shew the Way to a wandring, or a Fountain to a thirsty Traveller, who was not Circumcised.

§. IV. And hence we may return a satisfactory Answer to one common Objection against the truth of what the *Apostles* have delivered concerning the Miracles of Christ, *viz.* If the Miracles of Christ were so great and many as they represent them; if he so visibly fulfilled all that the Scriptures had foretold touching the true *Messiah,* if his Doctrine were so holy, his Life so full of Goodness and obliging Charity, is it not matter of astonishment, that of that Nation which was then big with expectation

[o] De B. Jud. l. 5. c. 22. p. 836. [p] Sat. 14. V. 103, 104.

of

of a Saviour, and did ſo readily embrace falſe *Chriſts*, which ſaw the Miracles he did, and were the Objects of his Pity, and the living Monuments of his Power, ſo few embraced his Doctrin, ſo many did reject and blaſt him as a Deceiver and a Malefactor? For,

1*ſt*, Our Saviour gives a plain Anſwer to this Objection, by telling them, they recived not the Light imparted to them becauſe *they loved Darkneſs more than Light*, *John* 3. 18, 19, 20. *i. e.* Thoſe deeds of Darkneſs were ſo pleaſing to them, that notwithſtanding all the Conviction offered of their Contradiction to the Light, and pernicious Conſequences, they would ſtill approve them; and becauſe they were not of God, nor had the love of God in them, but were of their Father the Devil, and the Luſts of Satan they would do, *John* 5. 40.--8. 44, 47. reſolving plainly their Infidelity into thoſe evil Principles and corrupt Diſpoſitions, which made them indiſpoſed to receive, and averſe from living according to his holy Doctrine; for Men of wicked and unhallowed Lives, muſt always be indiſpoſed to receive the pure, ſpiritual, and ſelf-denying Doctrine of the holy Jeſus.

2*dly*, We ſhall have little reaſon to admire this iſſue of our Saviour's coming to the *Jews*, if we conſider that they were moſtly

mostly carnal, and had their Minds still bent on Riches, Victory, Grandeur, Dominion, and such things as bore the greatest opposition to *Christ*'s spiritural Kingdom; for their Religion, in the surface of it, (deeper than which their gross Conceptions did not penetrate) did represent worldly Wealth, Prosperity and Dignity, as things most highly valuable, these only being used as Motives to the performances of their Duty in the Books of *Moses*, whence they imagined that the enjoyment of them must be a certain mark of the divine Favour, and his peculiar Regard; esteeming Poverty, Affliction, Slavery, Disgrace, the greatest Curses, and indications of the divine Displeasure; particularly, they are said to have conceited that to be Rich was a particular qualification for a *Prophet*, and to have said Proverbially, *Spiritus Dei non requiescit super pauperem*, The Spirit of God rests not upon a poor Man. That he therefore who was designed to be so great a *Prophet*, and so signal a Blessing to their Nation, as their *Messiah* was represented by their *Prophets*, should appear so mean and despicable, and undergo so great Sufferings as our Saviour did, seem'd very unreasonable and distastful to them.

3*dly*, They had entertained a general Opinion, that their *Messiah* was to come in a Triumphant manner to subdue all the

Nations under them, and make the *Jews* victorious over all their Enemies, and to reign over them for ever in great Majeſty and Triumph; even *Chriſt*'s Diſciples were ſo poſſeſs'd with this Dream, that they were ſtill deſiring to be Grandees, and contending who ſhould be firſt in this Kingdom, and enquiring whether their Maſter would at that time *reſtore the Kingdom to Iſrael*, Acts 1. 6. It is not therefore to be wondred that this ſo ſtrong and pleaſing Apprehenſion ſhould prejudice their Minds againſt that *Jeſus*, who by his mean and deſpicable condition in the World, and by his grievous Sufferings, by his continual Declarations, that *his Kingdom was not of this World*, that he came *not to be miniſtred to, but to miniſter*, ſo thwarted this Perſuaſion; yea, who had threatned the ruin of that Nation, State and Government, which the *Meſſiah* was, in their apprehenſion, to advance above all Nations. That this was one of the great reaſons why they did reject *Jeſus*, we learn not only from [1] *Origen*, and other Chriſtian Writers, but alſo from the Teſtimony of *Trypho* the *Jew*. And,

4*thly*, This will be ſtill more clear, if we reflect on thoſe many Prejudices which

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[1] Orig. in Celſum. l. 2. p. 78.

they

they conceived both against his Person and his Doctrin. And,

1. Against his Person they had these Prejudices: (1.) That they were well acquainted with his Birth and Parentage, whereas *when Christ cometh, no Man can know whence he is*, *John* 7. 27, 41, 52. (2.) That his Descent was mean and base, and that he came out of *Galilee*, from whence no *Prophet* could arise. (3.) That he came not riding on the Clouds of Heaven as the Prophet *Daniel* had foretold of the *Messiah*, *Dan.* 7. 13. (4.) That *Elijah* did not come to usher in his Advent, according to the prediction of *Malachi*, *Mal.* 4. 5. and the expectation of all the *Jews*. And, lastly, That the *Messiah* was to abide for ever, whereas our Lord *was lifted up*, and died an ignominious death, *John* 12. 34.

2. His Doctrin and Conversation gave greater matter of offence to them: For, (1.) He did what seemed to them inconsistent with their good and holy Man; for he conversed with *Publicans and Sinners*, and suffered a sinful Woman to embrace his Feet; which was by their Traditions thought a great Defilement. (2.) He did what they esteemed a violation of their Sabbaths, and hence they took occasion to conclude, *This Man is not of God, because he keepeth not the Sabbath day* *John* 9. 16. (3.) He represented their *Scribes* and *Pharisees* as the most

groſs, deluding Hypocrites, Men blind and fooliſh, Men buſie about Mint and Cummin, whilſt they neglected the moſt ſubſtantial matters of the Law, yea as Children of *Satan*, *a Generation of Vipers*, who could not eſcape the Damnation of Hell, *Matth.* 23. 13, 15, 19, 23. Whereas the *Jews* eſteemed them Men of the greateſt Piety and Knowledge, ſaying, proverbially, that *if Heaven were reſerved for two Men only, the one would be a Scribe, and the other a Phariſee.* He repreſented their whole Nation as Men who neither did obſerve, nor believe the Law of *Moſes*; who had no real love to God, nor a true knowledge of him; ſuch as pretended to be the Seed of *Abraham*, but were indeed the Devil's Children; and as People whom no Reaſon could reclaim, they having ſhut their Eyes, made groſs their Hearts, and ſtopped their Ears, leſt they ſhould be converted, and healed, *John* 5. 49.--7. 19.--5. 38, 42.--8. 44. *Mat.* 13. 15, 16. (4.) He repreſented their Traditions, for which they had ſo great a reverence as to make them of equal Authority with the written Word, as fooliſh and abſurd, and ſuch as did evacuate the Law of God; he alſo taught the abolition of that Law which they eſteemed eternal, the ruin of their famous Temple, and the deſtruction of their Nation by a Doom more ſad than that of *Sodom* and *Gomorrah*, and with ſuch

such tribulation, *as never was before, and never should hereafter be.*

And now 'tis obvious to consider, how hardly we can brook the Man who blasts those Things and Persons for which we have the greatest kindness and concern, and from which we expect our chiefest Happiness; that 'tis a thing most difficult to sentence and condemn our selves as vile and hypocritical, when we are zealous, as we do imagine, for the cause of God; and lastly, it is certain that Men are slow to credit what they are most unwilling should be true, and what doth contradict those Tenets, they have embraced as the greatest Truths.

CHAP. III.

The CONTENTS.

Among the generality of the Heathen Philosophers, all things were counted dubious and uncertain, §. 1. *Particularly, some of them denied the Being of a God, others his Providence, and most of them owned their uncertainty of these things,* §. 2, 3. *The evil effects which this uncertainty must have upon their Lives shew'd,* §. 4. *And farther verify'd in the Lives of the Philosophers, and the little reformation wrought by their Philosophy,* §. 5. *In some things they questioned God's Omnipotence,* §. 6. *And his Omniscience,* §. 7. *Some of them held, that God would not shew Grace and Favour to us; and all of them, that He would not be angry with us for our Offences,* §. 8.

§. 1. AS for the Heathen *Philosophers*, let it be noted, *1st*, That among the generality of them, all things were counted dubious and uncertain; the common issue of their search after their Duty to God and Man, and the foundation on which they do entirely depend, was mostly *Scepticism*, and the most knowing Men were they who did renounce all knowledge of

of them. 'Tis easie, saith [r] *Cæcilius*, to manifest that in humane Affairs, *omnia sunt dubia, incerta, suspensa*, All things are dubious and uncertain. The various apprehensions of wise Men, saith [s] *Cicero*, will justifie the doubtings and demurs of *Scepticks*, and it will then be sufficient to account them malepert, *Si aut consenserint alii, aut erit inventus aliquis qui quid verum sit invenerit*; When others do consent about it, or any one hath found out the truth; we say not that nothing is true, but that some false things are annexed to all that is true, *Tantâ similitudine ut iis nulla sit certa judicandi & assentiendi nota*, and that with so much likeness, that there is no certain Note of judging what is true or assenting to it. It was this obscurity of things, saith [t] He, which brought *Socrates*, *Democritus*, *Anaxagoras*, *Empedocles*, and almost all the Antients, to the confession of their Ignorance, saying, *Nihil cognosci, nihil percipi posse*, nothing could be known or perceived, Truth lay buried in the deep, Men were held by Opinions and Ordinances, *Nihil veritati relinqui*, no place being left for Truth. *Lastly*, They said, *Omnia tenebris circumfusa esse*, that all things

[r] Apud Minut. p. 4.
[s] De Nat. Deorum, l. 1. n. 10, 11.
[t] Acad. qu. l. 1. n. 30, 31.

were involved in darkneſs; We, ſaith [u] He, deny not that ſomething may be true, *Percipi poſſe negamus*, but we deny it can be perceived ſo to be; for, *Quid habemus in rebus bonis & malis explorati*, what have we certain concerning what is Good and Evil? Nor for this, ſaith He, are we to be blamed, but [w] *Nature which hath hid the Truth in the deep.* Of this opinion, ſaith [x] *Seneca*, were *Protagoras*, *Nauſiphanes*, *Parmenides*, *Zeno Eleates*, the *Pyrrhonians*, *Megarici*, *Eretrici*, *Academici*; and tho' he himſelf profeſſes he is angry with them, and *Epictetus* derides and ſolidly confutes them, yet [y] *Antoninus* confeſſes that things are ἐν τοιαύτῃ ἀποκαλύψει, in ſuch obſcurity, that not few nor vulgar Philoſophers have pronounced them ἀκαταλήπτα, ſuch as could not be perceiv'd, and that the *Stoics* themſelves pronounced them δυσκαταλήπτα, difficult to be perceiv'd. And yet this opinion, as [z] *Arrian* well argues, tends to weaken all Piety and Holineſs, all Juſtice, all our notions of Good and Evil, Vice and Virtue; for if we cannot perceive what is ſo, if, as to theſe things, we are wholly in the dark, and without any certain Note by which we can judge of them, what reaſon can we

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[u] Acad. qu. l. 2. n. 66, 120. [w] Naturam accuſa quæ in profundo veritatem penitus abſtruſerit, n. 32. [x] Ep. 88. ad finem. [y] L. 5. §. 9. Vide Gataker, in locum. [z] In Epict. l. 2. c. 29.

have

have to be Pious, Just, or Virtuous? Nor can [a] *Cicero* ever answer his own Arguments, *viz.* That there can be no Rule of True and False, or Right and Wrong, where there is no perception of what is so, no certain Note of judging, or assenting to any thing as such; for to say, with him, that we must be directed by what is probable, and likely, will not do the work, provided we cannot perceive and know when any thing is probable, and likely. (2.) That [b] no Man can be constant in a course of Virtue, or have just cause not to betray his Faith and Trust under great sufferings, *Si nihil haberet comprehensi, percepti, cogniti, constituti*; for if he can know or perceive nothing, he can perceive no reason why he should continue Virtuous, and know no hurt in falsifying of his Faith and Trust.

§. II. To proceed to Particulars; it is evident to demonstration, that all Religion must be overthrown, and the most vile and pernicious Practices can have no restraint, if,

1st, There be no God to help or punish us. Or,

[a] Acad. qu. 2. n. 33.

[b] Nullo igitur modo fieri potest ut quisquam tanti æstimet æquitatem & fidem, ut ejus conservandæ causa nullum supplicium recuset, nisi iis rebus assensus sit, quæ falsæ esse non possunt, n. 24.

2dly,

2*dly*, If he want Power or Wiſdom ſo to do. Or,

3*dly*, If he want will to do it.

Now Power he muſt want, if,

1*ſt*, He want Power to ſupply our Wants, or puniſh our Offences: Or,

2*dly*, If he want Wiſdom to diſcern our Wants or Wickedneſs: And,

3*dly*, If he be not always preſent with us, when we want his Aid, or violate his Laws: Or,

4*thly*, If his Hands be tied up by an inexorable Fate: Or,

5*thly*, If there be an equal Anti-God to oppoſe him: Or,

6*thly*, If there be ſuch evil in that Matter of which we are compoſed, that he cannot rectifie it.

He muſt want Will to do it,

1*ſt*, If there be no over-ruling Providence.

2*dly*, If there be no future Recompence.

3*dly*, If there be no Grace, or Favour, or no Anger in the Deity.

4*thly*, If we rob him of the ſervice due to him, and give it to them which by Nature are no Gods.

5*thly*, If we either ſeek not his favour, or only ſeek it in ſuch ways as are the higheſt provocation and diſhonour to him.

§. III.

§ III. Now some of all these things we find maintained by the *Philosophers*, or contained in the *Theology* of the *Heathens*; and we find also their wise Men confessing their uncertainty, their doubtings, and fluctuations, in these Foundations of all Piety and Vertue: And,

1st, Among those who openly, and in words denied the Being of a God, and saith [c] *Cicero*, *Apertè Deorum naturam sustulerunt*, are reckoned by [d] *Sextus Empyricus*, [e] *Plutarch*, and [f] *Laertius*, *Democritus*, and *Theodorus*, *Diagoras*, *Euemerus*, and *Euripides*: Others who durst not openly profess this, shewed their Inclinations to it in their private Discourses. *Bion B.* spake many things, [g] ἀθεώτερον, *like an Atheist*, which he had learnt from *Metrodorus*. It is difficult, saith [h] *Cicero*, to deny this in publick, but in such a Meeting and Discourse as we have now, it is very easie, *Multa enim occurrunt quæ perturbant, ut interdum nulli esse videantur*, for many things happen which so disturb us, as to make us sometimes think there are no Gods. The *Persian Magi*, saith [i] *Philostratus*, call upon

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[c] De Nat. D. l. n. 14. [d] S. Empyr. l. 3. c. 24. [e] De pl. Phil. l. 1. c. 7. [f] D. Laert. l. 2. p. 152. [g] Laert. l. 4. p. 259. [h] De Nat. Deorum, l. 1. n. 43. [i] Μάγοι ἐπιθειάζουσι μὲν οἷς ἀφανῶς δρῶσι, τὴν δὲ ἐν φανερῷ δόξαν τῶν θείων καλαλύουσιν.

the

the Gods in their ſecret Myſteries, but they deſtroy the common Doctrine of the Deity. Many who neither publickly nor privately denied them, declared their great uncertainty both of their Being, and their Providence; among thoſe *Lucullus* in [k] *Cicero* reckons *Empedocles*, *Anaxagoras*, *Democritus*, *Parmenides*, *Xenophanes*, *Plato*, and *Socrates*; *Pherecydes Syrus*, ſaith [l] *Theopompus*, was the firſt that writ, περὶ φύσεως καὶ θεῶν, of Nature and the Gods, and ſaith he, I have no certainty of what I write, nor do I profeſs to know the truth, ὅσα δ' ἂν ἐπιλέξῃ (l. γω) θεολογέων, τὰ ἄλλα χρὴ νοεῖν, ἅπαντα γὰρ αἰνίσσομαι, but what things are ſpoken by me as a Divine, are to be underſtood otherwiſe, for I ſpeak all things ænigmatically. [m] *Meliſſus* ſaid, That no Man ought to pronounce any thing of the Gods, there being no knowledge of them. I have nothing to affirm of the Gods, ſaith [n] *Protagoras*, οὔθ' ὡς εἰσὶν οὔθ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν, *whether they be*, or *they be not*; this, ſaith *Philoſtratus*, he learned from the *Perſian Magi*, and for this he

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[k] Vos cum perturbare Philoſophiam benè conſtitutam velitis, Empedoclem, Anaxagoram, Democritum, Parmenidem, Xenophanem, Platonem, etiam & Socratem profertis. Acad. qu. l. 2. n. 14.

[l] Diog. Laert. l. 1. p. 76, 77.

[m] Περὶ θεῶν ἔλεξε μὴ δεῖν ἀναφαίνεσθαι, μὴ γὰρ εἶναι γνῶσιν αὐτῶν, Diog. Laert. l. 9. p. 562.

[n] Diog. Laert. l. 9. p. 576. Menag. in locum p. 420.

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was banish'd from *Athens*, and his Books burnt: [o] *Plato* saith of the Father of the Universe, εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον, εὑρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν, *it is hard to find him*, and *having found him, impossible to speak of him to all Men:* and being to speak of the Gods, and the Generation of the World, he Prefaceth his Discourse thus, [p] *it is fit for* me who speak, and you who judge of what is spoken, to consider we are Men, ὥστε περὶ τῶν εἰκότα μῦθον ἀποδεχομένους περέπει μηδὲν ἔτι πέρα ζητεῖν, and *not to expect any thing beyond a likely conjecture concerning these things.* And hence he introduceth *Socrates*, declaring that wise Men must confess, [q] ὅτι περὶ θεῶν οὐδὲν, ὅτε περὶ αὐτῆς, ὅτε περὶ ὀνομάτων, *that we know nothing either of them, or of the Names by which they call themselves.* [r] *Cicero* having discoursed of God, of his Providence, and of his Wisdom in making the World, according to the Sect of the *Stoics*, he saith, *Latent ista omnia crassis occulta & circumfusa tenebris*, All these things are involved in great obscurity: He also begins his Discourse of the Nature of the Gods with this acknowledgment, that the Opinions of the most learned Men are so various and so opposite concerning them, as to shew, [s] *Prudenter Academicos à rebus*

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[o] In Tim. p. 1047. B. [p] Ibid. E. [q] Cratyl. p. 275. F. 276. A.
[r] Acad. qu. 2. n. 111, 112. [s] L. 1. n. 1.

incertis

incertis aſſentionem cohibuiſſe, That the Academics did wiſely abſtain from aſſenting to things ſo uncertain: And ſpeaking of their Religion, Piety, Sanctity, Ceremonies, Faith, Oaths, Temples, Shrines, and ſolemn Sacrifices, as all relating to the Being and Providence of the Gods, he adds, [t] *Profecto eos ipſos qui ſe aliquid certi habere arbitrantur*, Sure they who think they know any thing certain about theſe things, will be forced to doubt of them, when they conſider the Diſſentions of the moſt learned Men about them; and he concludes his Diſcourſe thus, Theſe things have I ſpoken of the Nature of the Gods, not to take it away, but to ſhew, *Quam eſſet obſcura, & quam difficiles explicatus haberet*, how obſcure it is, and hard to be explained. And [u] *Seneca*, ſpeaking of the firſt Cauſes, according to the opinions of the *Stoicks*, *Ariſtotle*, and *Plato*, pronounce, ſaith he, *Quis tibi veriſimillimum videtur dicere, non quis verum dicit, id enim tam ſupra nos eſt quam ipſa veritas*, who ſpeaks moſt probable, not who ſpeaks truth, for that is as much above us as truth it ſelf. And [w] *Plutarch* brings in *Xenophon* complaining that Man can ſay οὐδὲν σαφὲς, nothing certain of

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[t] Ibid. N. 11. Vide N. 2, 4, 13. & de Divin. l. 2. n. 6.
[u] Ep. 65. [w] De au. Poetis, p. 17. E.

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the Gods. And *Socrates* in *Plato* ἀξιοῖ μὴ δύμμυον, renouncing the knowledge of them with an Oath, these being, saith he, the things ἐν οἷς τὸν φιλόσοφον ἐλιγγιῶντας ὁρῶμεν, in which we find the Philosophers in a Vertigo. Of the Gods and Dæmons many things are spoken by the *Grecian* Philosophers, Ἐικῇ δ' ἐν σοχασμῷ τὸ πλέον, but they speak mostly by conjecture, saith [x] *Porphyry*. Now when after all their Philosophical Discourses concerning those Subjects upon which all Religion and Piety, all Justice and Humanity, Truth and Fidelity, depend, we find them still uncertain what is Truth, complaining of the obscurity and the inexplicable difficulty of the Question, declaring that they doubt and hesitate, and find many things which incline to the other side, professing they have nothing to deliver on this Subject which is plain and certain, but only guesses and conjectures, they in effect declare that all their fine Discourses touching those important Subjects, could have very little effect upon them to make them virtuous, or to restrain them from the vilest and most pernicious Practices; for as [y] *Lucullus* argues well, this *Academical* uncertainty is inconsistent with any constancy in Virtue, or any vigour in persuit of it.

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[x] Epist. ad Aneb. [y] Acad. qu. l. 2. n. 25.

§. IV.

§. IV. Now as the *holy Scripture* doth aſſure us that ὁ δίψυχος *the double-minded Man is unſtable in all his ways*, and that ὁ διακρινόμενος, *the wavering Man* who reaſons in his Heart whether theſe things be ſo or not, will never ſtand the ſhock of ſtrong Temptations to deſert the Faith, but will be now hoping and anon deſponding, apt to quit his dependence upon God, and ready to caſt off that Religion which ſubjects him to thoſe Temptations from which he cannot confidently expect an happy iſſue. So the *Primitive Chriſtians* declared, that [z] he who walks in the Light ὃς μὴ διψυχήσῃ, *will not be doubtful whether the Objects of his Faith be true or not. Clemens R.* informs us, that when he was an *Heathen*, he was ſtill diſquieted on account of the doubtfulneſs of all things: He had embraced this good Notion, which I wiſh ſome others, who are called *Chriſtians*, would attend to, that in *rebus dubiis præſtat vivere pie*, in matters doubtful 'tis Wiſdom to live piouſly: But then, ſaith he, [a] I thought again with my ſelf, *How ſhall I be*

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[z] Barn. Ep. §. 19.

[a] Sed iterum reputabam mecum quomodo poſſim ſub incerto juſtitiæ præmio a peccati me libidine continere, maximè cum etiam quæ ſit illa juſtitia quæ Deo placeat apud me habeatur incertum, & neque ſi immortalis ſit anima, ac ea ſit quæ aliquid ſperare poſſit agnoſcam, neque quid certi futurum ſit noverim. *Recogn.* l. 1. §. 4.

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able to resist the strong lustings of my Soul to Sin, when I am uncertain of the reward of Righteousness, and I know not what is that Righteousness which will please God; nor whether the Soul be immortal, or whether it can hope for any thing, or whether there be any thing certain to be hoped for hereafter. And of the truth of this our Reason is sufficient to convince us; for seeing Faith is the spring and the foundation of all true Obedience, which therefore is in Scripture stiled *the obedience of Faith*; seeing this is necessary to be laid as the Root of all that Service we perform to God, for *he that cometh to God*, saith the Apostle, *must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of all those who diligently seek him*, Heb. 11. 6. The weaker this Faith is, the more imperfect will our Obedience be, and the more difficult we shall find it to engage heartily in his Service; the more our doubts touching the great Objects of our Faith encrease, the more we shall still flag in our Obedience, since 'tis alone that Faith, which is *the expectation or assurance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen*, which doth enable us to overcome the World, to avoid, and fly from, rather than to enjoy *the pleasures of Sin for a season*, and to suffer Affliction, and even Death it self, in prospect of a better Resurrection, rather than

to accept of a deliverance with the loſs of it; the weaker is this Faith, the more 'tis clogg'd with doubtings and diſtruſt, the more unable it will be to grapple with the charms and allurements of thoſe Pleaſures, which, being objects of our Senſes, and very grateful to the Fleſh, and ſuitable to our inferiour Appetites, and our corrupted Inclinations, and certainly to be enjoy'd, will ſtrongly tempt us to the gratification of them, when we have nothing certain to repel their force; and under great uncertainties and doubtings about future Recompences, we ſhall be leſs able to reſiſt the terrors and affrightments, which fiery tryals and a croſs preſent unto us to make us fall from our own ſtedfaſtneſs; theſe being things at which even Nature ſhrinks; and love to Life, and the enjoyments of it, doth render us exceedingly averſe to; ſo that we hardly can think of them without the greateſt horrour. What therefore was to be expected from them who had nothing to fear beſides thoſe things which, by the generality of them, were counted Fables; nor any ground of better hopes hereafter, than ſome idle Tales of *Eris Arimenius*, and others, coming from the dead to give them notice of what was done in the inferiour Regions; or ſome Dreams or Apparitions, like to thoſe of *Scipio*, of an immortal ſtate hereafter, which *Macrobius* ſeems unable

to

to defend from the Objections made against them?

§. V. And this is farther evident from these Considerations.

1*st*, That all their Disquisitions, and Disputations about God, his Providence, and his Worship, wrought no change in any of the most vile, ridiculous and cruel Rites which Superstition had establish'd every where, but rather tended to establish and confirm them by their Example, and their Precepts, they in their Practice submitting to the popular Error, and declaring that they thought all Men obliged to worship the Gods of their own Country, (as will hereafter be made evident) whereas *Christianity*, where-ever it was entertained, prevailed on all its Votaries to turn from their dumb Idols to the living God, and reduced them from Darkness into Light, and from the power of Satan unto God, obliging them to look upon the *Heathen* World, and the whole Race of their Progenitors, as the most vile Idolaters, and to detest as *Devils* what they formerly adored as *Gods*.

2*dly*, That it wrought little or no Reformation upon others; it employed the Understandings, and amused the Heads of their Disciples, but left their Manners as

corrupt as ever; I know but of one *Phædo* and one *Polemon* throughout all *Greece*, ſaith [b] *Origen*, who ever were the better for it; whereas *Chriſtianity* hath reduced its Myriads from Vice to Virtue; on which account, if you do not own the truth of it, you muſt allow it to be highly beneficial to Mankind; yea, ſaith he, even the worſt of *Chriſtians* are much better than the beſt of *Heathens*; and this was ſo apparent that the Apoſtate [c] *Julian* found no better method to regain the loſt credit of the *Heathens*, than by adviſing them to imitate φιλανθρωπίαν καὶ περιλαμπρὸν ἐμνότητα καὶ τὸν βίον the Charity and ſpecious *Sanctity of Life, and the ſeverity againſt Vice they found among the Chriſtians.*

3*dly*, That it wrought none or very little Reformation on the *Philoſophers* themſelves: Some of the *Heathens* ſurmiſed that the ancient *Philoſophers* lived better, but they [d] all generally confeſſed, and made it matter of complaint of the *Philoſophers* of

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[b] Contra Celſum. l. 1. p. 50.

[c] Ep. ad Arſac. Pontif. Gall. Sozom. Hiſt. Eccl. l. 5. c. 16. Naz. Stel. 1. p. 68, 69.

[d] Noſtris vero temporibus ſub hoc nomine maxima in pleriſque vitia latuerunt, non enim virtute & ſtudiis ut haberentur Philoſophi laborabant, ſed vultum, & triſtitiam, & diſſentientem a cæteris habitum peſſimis moribus prætendebant. Fabian Inſtit. Orat. in Proem. —— Quotus enim quiſque Philoſophorum invenitur ita moratus, ita animo, & vita conſtitutus ut ratio poſtulat, qui diſciplinam ſuam non oſtentationem ſcientiæ ſed legem vitæ putet, &c. Cic. Tuſc. qu. 2. n. 8, 9.

their

their Times, that *omnes isti dicebant non quemadmodum ipsi vivebant, sed quemadmodum vivendum esset*, they only taught how others ought to live, but lived not themselves by their own Rules. And that this was so even in the Days of [e] *Plato*, his own Words will not suffer us to doubt. *Zeno*, I think, is the only Person of whom [f] *Diogenes Laertius* gives this Character, that he led βίον ἀκόλουθον τοῖς λόγοις *a Life suitable to his Doctrine*; But whether this was said to his honour, or reproach, is disputable, if we consider, that tho' he used, saith he, [g] Whores seldom, yet Sodomy was his common practice, that he [h] allowed community of Women, commanding both Sexes to shew what Nature doth require them to conceal; that [i] all good and evil things were equally so; that a wise Man should be a *Cynick*, and might eat Human Flesh; and lastly, that [k] having hurt his Finger, he choaked himself, he allowing Self-murther in case of mutilation of a Member, or any severe Pain. And sure it was not very commendable to live or die according to these Rules: And the natural Reason of all this is evident; for since the

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[e] Ὡς παμπόνηροι οἱ πλεῖστοι ἰόντες ἐπ' αὐτοὺς, De Repub. l. p. 675. Seneca de beata vita, c. 20. Ep. 20. & 108. Agell. l. 13. c. 8. l. 17. 19.

[f] L. 7. p. 371. [g] P. 373. [h] P. 385, 448. [i] P. 386, 427, 440, 441. [k] P. 382, 447.

Will is guided by the conviction of the Judgment, where that doth doubt and fluctuate, its influence upon the Will, eſpecially when it's tempted to oppoſe its Dictates by the ſtrongeſt Paſſions and natural Inclinations of the inferiour Soul, and by all the Pleaſures of the Senſes, muſt be inconſiderable; for whether we be moved by Hopes or Fears, the terrors of an Evil threatned, or the expectation of a future Good; the more we doubt of what we hope or fear, the leſs our Judgments will be ſatisfied, and ſo much the leſs able to prevail or ſtand their ground againſt the ſtrength of our Affections, and the importunity of our Paſſions.

§. VI. 2*dly*, The Almighty Power of God, and his All-ſeeing Eye, is the foundation of all our preſent Hopes and Fears, and all our expectation of future Recompences: Now I acknowledge that moſt of the *Philoſophers*, and many of the *Poets*, have ſpoken well of both theſe Attributes, and ſuitably to the Sentiments of *Chriſtians*, eſpecially when they are diſcourſing of Laws to be obſerved, and Rules of Government which are to be obeyed, becauſe they, by the Light of Reaſon, ſaw the denial of theſe things had an apparent tendency to enervate the whole force of Laws,

Laws, and to subvert all Government. *It must be believed*, saith [l] *Plato*, *that God knows, and can do all things.* Saith *Cicero*, *That they are*, Rerum omnium moderatores, *the Lords, and Moderators of all things, and that* [m] *they see what every Man is, and does, with what Mind and Piety he worships the Gods, and that he taketh an account both of the pious and the impious; for these Opinions are very* [n] *profitable to confirm the sacredness of Oaths, and of religious Compacts, to deter Men from Wickedness by the fear of divine Vengeance, and to make all Societies holy by looking upon the Gods as Witnesses and Judges of their Actions.* Yet when they come to dispute with one another, they freely put the Question, [o] *Quis tibi dederit Deum omnia posse?* Who will grant this, that God can do all things? And *Pliny* makes this one of our great Comforts, *Nec Deum posse quidem omnia*, that God cannot do all things. To come to Particulars.

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[l] Θεὸς ἢ ὁρᾷν ἢ ἀκούειν ἢ δυνάμεις πάντα. Plato de leg. l. 10. 955, 956. p. 1010, 1011.

[m] Et qualis quisque sit, quid agat, quid in se admittat, quâ mente, quâ pietate Religiones colat intueri, piorumque & impiorum habere rationem, lib. 2. de legib. n. 13.

[n] Utiles autem esse opiniones has quis neget cum intelligat quam multa firmentur Jurejurando, quantæ salutis sint fœdera Religionis, quam multos divini supplicii metus a scelere revocârit, quam sancta sit Societas civium inter ipsos Diis immortalibus interpositis tum judicibus tum testibus? n. 14.

[o] Cic. Acad. qu. l. 2. n. 47.

1*ſt*, Some of them deny that fundamental Doctrine of *Chriſtianity*, that God could raiſe the Dead, or reſtore Life to them: So [p] *Pliny* goes on, *Nec poteſt mortales immortalitate donare, nec revocare defunctos*, he cannot make mortal Men immortal, or recall the dead to life. After ſo many Ages, ſaith [q] *Cæcilius*, what ſingle Perſon ever aroſe from the dead, *Ut ejus exemplo credamus fieri id poſſe*, to make us by his example to believe the thing is poſſible?

2*dly*, They held it impoſſible that any thing ſhould be made out of Nothing, and conſequentially that Matter was ἀγένητον, uncreated, ſelf-exiſtent, and as eternal as God was. Thus [r] *Timæus Locrus* pronounceth τὰν ὕλαν ἀΐδιον *Matter eternal*. And [s] *Plutarch* ſaith, it is beſt to affirm with *Plato*, that the Subſtance and Matter of which the World was made, was ὃ γενομένη ἀλλὰ κατασκευασμένη ἀεὶ τῷ δημιουργῷ, *not made, but always ſubject to the Maker of it*, ὃ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἡ γένεσις, *for Generation ariſeth not from that which hath no Being, but from that which hath no regular Being*: He declared, ſaith [t] *Origen*, τὴν μὲ ὕλην ἀρχὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἀγένητον τοῦ Θεοῦ, *that Matter was a firſt Principle*,

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[p] Hiſt. Nat. l. 1. c. 7. [q] Apud. Minut. p. 11. [r] Apud plat. p. 1089.

[s] De animæ procreat. ex Tim. p. 1014. B.

[t] Apud. Menag. in Diog. Laert. l. 3. Sequ. 69.

and

and coeternal with God. This also was the Doctrine of the *Stoicks*, who held, saith [u] *Diogenes Laertius* two Principles, *God* and *Matter*, the last eternal, and both ἀγενήτους καὶ ἀφθάρτους, *uncreated* and *incorruptible*. There must be something, saith *Seneca*, by which any thing is made, and something out of which it is made; the first is the Cause, the second is the Matter. That this was ἡ κοινὴ δόξα τῶν Φυσικῶν *the common Doctrine of the Naturalists*, we learn from [w] *Aristotle*, for, saith he, ἀδύνατον τὸ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες οἱ περὶ τὴν Φύσεως, *all Naturalists pronounce it impossible that the World should be made out of nothing*. Hence [x] *Cicero*, speaking of *Epicurus*, saith, *Ut ex nihilo aliquid fiat, nec ipsi nec cuiquam Physico placet*, that neither he nor any Naturalist would allow that any thing could be made out of nothing; and he enquires [y] *Quis hoc Physicus dixit unquam*, what Naturalist ever said this? Now that this Opinion is contrary to the Omnipotence and Independency of God, and exalts Matter into an equality with Him, is fully proved by Dr. *Stillingfleet* in his *Origines Sacræ*, l. 3. c. 2. §. 10.

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[u] L. 7. p. 449. [w] Phys. l. 1. c. 5. [x] De fato, n. 15.
[y] De divin. l. 2. n. 29.

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3*dly*, They held there was such an Obliquity in that Matter of which we were made, as was not alterable by his Power; That this was the Doctrine of *Pythagoras*, of *Plato*, and the *Stoicks*, is proved in the following Discourse of Providence, according to the Sentiments of the *Heathens*; where also we shall fully speak of their Doctrine of Fate, and of an *Anti-God*, or evil Principle, as things which tend to overthrow this Providence.

§. VII. Moreover, some of these *Heathens* shew their dislike of the *Christian* Doctrine concerning God's Omniscience, on which the Dispensations of his Providence depend, and of his knowledge of the secrets of our Hearts, and of things future and contingent. Thus *Cæcilius* complains that the *Christians* had introduced a very troublesome, and impudently busie, God, who did, *in omnium mores, actus, omnium verba denique & occultas Cogitationes diligenter inquirere*, diligently enquire into the Manners, Actions, Words and secret Thoughts of all Men; whereas, saith he, [z] God cannot be sufficient to observe all things in general and particular: And this

[z] Cum nec singulis inservire possit per universa districtus, nec universis sufficere in singulis occupatus. Apud. Minut. p. 10.

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he borrowed from *Velleius* in *Cicero*, who makes the like complaint against the *Stoicks*, that *they had imposed upon them an everlasting Lord, who was continually to be dreaded;* [a] *Quis enim non timeat omnia providentem & cogitantem & animadvertentem, & omnia ad se pertinere putantem*, for who can chuse to fear a God that provides for, and thinks upon, and marks all things, and thinks himself interessed in all things? And [b] *Cicero* himself declares it is beyond the reach of divine Wisdom to know things future and contingent, because this Prescience seems inconsistent with Contingency. And yet seeing all Good and Evil, natural and moral, excepting only those which flow from the necessity of our Nature, depend upon things future and contingent, if God cannot foresee, it is certain that he neither can foretel them, nor can he provide against them; so that without this Prescience we cannot discern how God can govern the World, and Man in particular, on whose Actions, and the Events of them, the glory of God, and the good and safety of Mankind do so eminently depend.

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[a] De Nat. Deorum. l. 1. n 39.

[b] Mihi ne in Deum cadere videatur ut sciat quid casu & fortuito futurum sit, si enim scit, certe illud eveniet, si certè eveniet nulla fortuna est, est autem fortuna, rerum ergo fortuitarum nulla prætensio est. De fato n. 12, 13.

§. VIII.

§. VIII. *3dly*, God muſt want Will to help us, to relieve us in our Wants and Exigencies, or to puniſh us for our Offences.

1ſt, If he neither will be angry or offended with us, nor will ſhew grace and favour to us on the account of any of our Actions. The laſt Opinion ſeems almoſt proper to the School of *Epicurus*, whoſe avowed Tenet was this τὸ μακάριον καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον, οὔτε ὀργαῖς καὶ χάρισι συνέχεται, *that which is bleſſed and incorruptible, ſhews neither favor nor diſpleaſure.* And this Opinion, ſaith [c] *Plutarch*, robs us of all our hopes and comfortable expectations, and of all the pleaſures of Religion; and yet he himſelf ſeems to render all our endeavours to obtain his favour and aſſiſtance vain, by ſaying, [d] ὁ τοίνυν ὀργαῖς καὶ χάρισι συνέχεται τὸ θεῖον, ἀλλ' ὅτι μὴ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ βοηθεῖν πέφυκεν, *that the Deity is not touched with anger, or with favour, but by his very Nature is induced to help, and to ſhew kindneſs to us, and is averſe from being angry with us*; for this ſeems to render neceſſary his Kindneſs to us, and ſo to render it unneceſſary that we ſhould implore it, or ſhould endeavour to render our ſelves fit objects of it.

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[c] Plut. adv. Colot. p. 1103. [d] p. 1102.

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But the other Opinion, that God would not be angry with us, or do us any hurt, was almost generally received by *Philosophers*; [c] *Lactantius* is positive that, *Ita omnes Philosophi de Ira consentiunt*, they all agreed in this Opinion; and that the contrary Opinion, *Ut iracatur Deus, à Philosophis nec susceptum est unquam, nec aliquando defensum*, that God could be angry, was never either embraced, or defended by them. [f] *Plutarch* is very zealous for this Opinion, that God can neither be angry with us, or do us any hurt; this he establisheth upon that celebrated Rule of *Plato*, that as Fire cannot cool, but heat; so what is Good cannot hurt, but profit: And [g] *Porphyry*, from *Plato*, saith the same on the same Principle; and therefore [h] he saith, it is the policy of wicked Spirits to engage us to offer Prayers and Sacrifices to instil into us this Opinion, that the good Gods may be angry: And [i] indeed, *Plato*'s Rule is this, μὴ πάντων αἴτιον τὸ θεὸν, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, *that God is not the cause of all*

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[c] L. de. Ira. c. 2.

[f] Ἀγαθὸς γὰρ ὄτι, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐκ ἐνδεὴς ἐγγίνεται φθόνος, ὅτε ὀργὴ, ἢ μίσος, ὅτε γὰρ θερμῷ τὸ ψυχεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ θερμαίνειν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἀγαθῷ τὸ βλάπτειν, Ibid.

[g] De Abst. animal. l. 2. §. 41.

[h] Τρέπεσι ἐπὶ πλάνειας ἡμᾶς καὶ θυσίας τῶν ἀγαθοεργῶν θεῶν ὡς βορισμῶν, Ibid. §. 40.

[i] De Republ. l. 2. p. 606. A. B.

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things, but of good things only; and to say that he is the cause of evil to any Man, διαμαχητέον παντὶ τρόπῳ *is by all means to be opposed*, and no Man is to be permitted to affirm it. This also was the Doctrine of all the *Stoicks*, *In Deo iram non esse*, that there was no anger in God, that the immortal Gods neither would, nor could hurt us, as having *nullam vim nisi beneficam & salutarem*, no Power but what was beneficial and salutary; and therefore that no wise Man could fear them, [k] *Furor est enim timere salutaria*, it being madness to fear what was salutary, and which, saith [l] *Antoninus*, οὐδὲ τὶ κακῶς ποιεῖ οὐδὲ βλάπτει τι ὑπ' ἐκείνε, *never doth any evil, or hurts any thing*; and yet, as [m] *Lactantius* well notes, *Summa omnis & cardo Religionis*, the sum of all Religion depends upon the contrary Persuasion; for neither do we owe any honour to God if he affords no favour to him that worships him, nor are we to be possess'd with any fear of him if he be not angry with them that do not worship him; and to say with [n] *Celsus*, *That God is no more angry with Men than he is with Apes*

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[k] Seneca de Ira. l. 2. c. 27. De Benefic. l. 4. 19. Ep. 95.

[l] L. 6. §. 1. l. 2. §. 11.

[m] Cap. 6.

[n] Οὐδ' ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκα ὀργίζεται ὥσπερ οὐδὲ πιθήκων οὐδὲ μυῶν οὐδὲ τέτων ἀπεικός, Apud Orig. in Celsum, l. 4. p. 229.

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or Mice, nor doth he threaten any evil to them, is evidently the way to give all Men a liberty to commit the greatest Crimes without fear of the divine displeasure.

CHAP. IV.

The CONTENTS.

That the denial of a Providence tends to the subversion of all Piety and Virtue, is owned by the Heathens, §. 1. This Providence was absolutely denied by Epicurus *and his Sect, §. 2. His doing this to free Men from their fears and troublesome apprehensions, as it was vain and pernicious in respect of bad Men, so was it needless to good Men, and robb'd them of the joys and comfort of a virtuous Life, §. 3. Others held a general Providence, but thought it respected not particular Things and Persons, §. 4.* Aristotle, *and his Followers, confined this Providence to Heaven; See §. 3. The* Stoicks, *tho' they asserted a Providence, they weakened it by making all their virtuous Actions depend wholly upon themselves, and destroyed it by making that God on whom it depends only an intelligent Body, and by the Doctrine of an inexorable*

exrable Fate, §. 5. *The pernicious influence of this Doctrine, and what their supposed* ἀντεξούσιον *was*, Ibid. *The* Platonists *and* Pythagoreans *destroyed that Providence they owned:* 1st, *By asserting a Fate depending on the Revolution of the Stars:* 2dly, *By confining the immediate Providence of God to the Celestial Beings, and leaving Men on Earth to the care of* Genii *and* Dæmons, §. 6. *This Doctrine introduced Idolatry into the World, and spread it through all Nations, and also made it necessary to approve all the ridiculous, vile and cruel Rites which obtained among them*, §. 7.

§. I. 2*dly*, GOD must want Will to help us, if he doth exercise no Providence over us; and if he hath no regard to us, or to any thing we do or suffer, it must be vain for us to pay any service or regard to him. That the belief of the divine Providence is the foundation of all Piety, and that without it Religion can be nothing but an empty Name, is evident even from the voice of Reason, and the acknowledgment of the Heathen World: For, to what purpose should we pray to a God, who regards none of our Addresses; or hope in a God who is not concerned to help us? What should move us to love a God who bestows no good upon us, or to

to fear a God who will inflict no evil on us, or to obey a God that regards not our Actions? Indeed, how can we do it, there being no possibility of obedience or disobedience where he hath given us no Laws by which our Actions should be governed? Why should we thank him if we receive nothing from him; why should we praise him if he be no ways beneficial to the World? Or, in what can we imitate him if he sits still and doth nothing; If he exerciseth neither Power, Wisdom or Goodness, Justice or Mercy, towards any of the Sons of Men? Hence [o] *Cicero* puts the Question thus to the Followers of *Epicurus*; *Quæ pietas ei debetur à quo nihil acceperis*, what can we owe to him who deserves nothing from us? *Est enim pietas justitia erga Deos*, for all Piety is an act of Justice towards the Gods; whereas, if there be no communion between God and Man, what right or justice can there be between them? *Sanctitas autem est scientia colendorum Deorum*, Sanctity is the knowledge of that worship which belongs to them; but who, saith he, can understand why they should be worshipped, if we neither receive nor hope for any good from them? In the beginning of his Treatise of the Nature of

[o] De Nat. Deorum, l. 1. n. 81, 82.

the Gods, he observes, that all their sacred Ceremonies, Temples, Shrines, solemn Sacrifices, Oaths and religious Compacts, depended on the question of this Providence; and if, saith he, the Opinion of those *Philosophers* who deny it, be own'd to be true, [p] *Quæ potest esse pietas? quæ sanctitas? quæ Religio? aut quid est quod ullos diis immortalibus cultus, honores, preces adhibeamus?* What Piety, Sanctity, or Religion can remain? Or, what reason have we to tender any Worship, or Honour, or offer any Prayers to the immortal Gods? And therefore [q] he declares that *Epicurus* by taking from the immortal Gods all help and favour, had utterly extirpated all Religion, as having removed that which is most proper to the best, and the most excellent Nature; there being nothing better than Goodness and Beneficence, which being once removed from the Gods, there is nothing which can render them the objects of our love. And [r] *Plutarch* saith, the *Epicureans* did in Name and Words allow Oaths, Prayers, Sacrifices, and Adorations, ἀ ἀρχαῖς μὲν τοῖς δόγμασιν ἀναιροῦσιν, *but by their Principles and Decrees did overthrow them.*

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[p] Ibid. n. 3. 11.

[q] Epicurus vero ex animis hominum extraxit radicitus Religionem, cum Diis immortalibus & opem & gratiam sustulit. Ibid. n. 84, 85.

[r] Adv. Colot. p. 1112. C.

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They also [s] add, that by thus taking away all Piety and Religion, they had introduced into the World great Perturbation and Confusion, had dissolved humane Society, and made Truth or Fidelity, and Justice, a most excellent Virtue, fall together with them, and by that one Sentence by which they have taken away the Providence of the Gods, they have also overturned all Laws, and all Societies, saith [t] *Plutarch*, τοῦτο γὰρ ζωτικὸν ἁπάσης κοινωνίας καὶ νομοθεσίας ἔρεισμα, *for that is the bond of all Community, and the foundation of all Laws.* That Justice is fundamentally destroyed by the denial of a Providence, is evident; for if God had given Men no Laws to act by, they can be under no Laws, and then there can be nothing unlawful, and therefore nothing unjust; if God hath given any Laws by which Men are to act, he must have given them in vain, or he must punish them who do not act according to them, and so must govern Men by Laws, which is one special branch of Providence, and Men must be unrighteous in robbing God of that Obedience which he of right requires. From the denial of this Provi-

[s] Atque haud scio an pietate adversus Deos sublatâ, fides etiam & societas humani generis, & unâ excellentissima virtus justitia tollatur. De Nat. Deor. l. 1. n. 3.

[t] Color. p. 1125. E.

dence it alſo follows, that no Man is obliged to Fidelity, or to be true unto his Words, his Promiſes or Contracts; for if nothing be unlawful in its own nature, it cannot be unlawful for any Man to falſifie his Words, or uſe that liberty he had before by Words renounced. Theſe *Politicians* tell us, that no Man can be obliged but by his own act, and that the eſſence of injuſtice is nothing elſe but *dati repetitio*, or *the recalling that which we before had given*; but if no Man be naturally obliged to any thing, he cannot be obliged to ſtand to his own act, and ſo it cannot be unlawful or unjuſt for him voluntarily to undo what he before had voluntarily done; ſo that tho' it be true that if Juſtice depend upon a Law of Nature, Covenants muſt oblige us, yet on the contrary ſuppoſition, that there is nothing naturally unjuſt, it cannot be unjuſt to break our Covenants; ſo that Covenants without natural Juſtice, are nothing but mere Words; and when natural Juſtice is once diſcarded, and all truth and obligation to perform our Promiſes and Covenants diſſolved, how is it poſſible that humane Society, which fundamentally depends upon them ſhould ſubſiſt? And therefore [u] *Pliny*, who had repreſen-

[u] Irridendum vero agere curam rerum humanarum illud quicquid eſt ſummum, l. 1. c. 7. p. 10. Verum in his Deus agere curam rerum humanarum credi ex uſu vitæ eſt, p. 11.

ted

ted it as a ridiculous thing, to think that God *took care of humane Affairs*, is in the same place forced to add, that *'tis useful to have this believed.*

Thus have we seen the necessity of a belief and firm persuasion of an over-ruling Providence both to the preservation of Piety and Justice, and to the welfare and even subsistence of Societies, let us now see how this was either openly and directly, or secretly and consequentially overthrown by the various Sects of *Philosophers* and *Heathen* Sages. And,

§. II. 1*st*, This Providence was absolutely deny'd by the prevailing Sect of *Epicurus*, who stiled it, in derision, [w] *anum fatidicam Stoicorum*, the old Hag of the *Stoicks*; and laid it down as an unquestionable Axiom, *That what was blessed and immortal, gave neither any trouble to it self nor others*; [x] *That neither help nor favour, hatred or displeasure can belong to it.*

§. III. And whereas he espoused this Tenet chiefly to free Men from their Fears and troublesome Apprehensions of the

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[w] Velleius apud Cicer. de Nat. Deor. l. 1. n. 14.

[x] Ὃυ γὰρ συμφωνεῖσι πεπαλαίκαμι καὶ ὀργὰς καὶ χάριτας μακαριότητι, Epicur. apud D. Laert. l. 10. p. 634. Cicer. de Nat. Deorum l. 1. n. 33. De Divin. l. 2. n. 81. Sen. de Benef. l. 4. c. 44.

Gods, of Death, and what might follow after death; and his Followers bragg'd, that they were [y] *his terroribus ab Epicuro soluti*, freed by *Epicurus* from those Fears; In this he seems to have shewed his Weakness, as much as in the Doctrine he maintained. For,

1*st*, This was a vain attempt to do what neither *Epicurus* did, nor could do, it being evident from the experience of Mankind, that wicked Men are grievously afflicted with these Fears, and that they are not able wholly to exempt themselves from these effects and workings of a natural Conscience; and why is this, but that the utmost vigour of their Reason, assisted with the strongest bent of their Desires and Endeavours to stifle these effects of Conscience, can give them no assurance of an exemption from the Evils which they dread; it being with the generality of them, as *Cicero* saith it was with *Epicurus*, *Quo nemo ea quæ timenda esse negabat timebat, mortem dico & Deos*, they being in continual dread of that which they teach others not to fear. For this [z] *Plato* hath observed, that this dread then chiefly seizes upon them, ἐπειδάν τις ἐγγὺς ἢ τοῦ οἴεσθαι τελεῦτήσειν, *when any*

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[y] Velleius apud Cicer. de Nat. D. l. 1. n. 40. Acad. qu. l. 2. n. 112.

[z] De Repub. l. 1. p. 573. F.

of

of them thinks he is near to death; for the Stories of Hades, or Punishments after death, which were καταγελώμενοι τέως *laugh'd at while they were well*, τότε ὃ σέφεται ὥστε ἢ ψυχὴν μὴ ἀληθεῖς ὦσι, *do then trouble his Soul lest they should prove true.* And very rational is this Fear, themselves being judges; for therefore, saith their beloved *Epicurus*, the unjust, and violators of the Laws of Men, must [a] ἀβιώτως ζῶσι καὶ ταραχώδως *live miserably, and in continual fear*, since that tho' they may lie hid, πίστιν ἔχει τὸ λαθεῖν λαθεῖν ἀδύνατον ἔστιν, *it is impossible they should be certain that they shall not be discovered.* And in like manner, to exempt them also from the terrors of that future Judgment, which from the inward workings of their Conscience they are taught to fear, they must not only hope God may not, but must be certain that he will not, call them to a future Account, or punish them for their Impiety and Prophaneness; for Man doth naturally fear what may befal him, tho' it be not certain; and still the greater, and more lasting is the Evil, the more tormenting is the Fear: Now, can any Man be absolutely certain that there is no Providence at present ruling in the World, that a God infinite in Goodness should be unwilling to

[a] Plut. non posse suaviter p. 1090. c.

do good, and he who hateth all Iniquity ſhould do nothing to diſcountenance that Evil which bears an infinite contrariety to his Nature? Or that there will be no future Recompences; that God ſees all things as an idle Spectator, looking with the ſame indifference on thoſe that love, and are moſt like to his Nature, and on thoſe who hate, blaſpheme him, and are alienated from the life of God? In a word, I think it certain that more *Philoſophers* and *Chriſtians* have conquered that natural abhorrence which we have to Pain and Sickneſs, and even Death it ſelf, than there be *Atheiſtical* Spirits who have been able wholly to exempt themſelves from the diſturbance of an evil and condemning Conſcience; and then there is no reaſon to conclude the latter is leſs natural than the former.

2*dly*, This attempt is as pernicious to Mankind, as it is vain and fruitleſs; for the ſenſe of ſuch a Providence as ruleth in the World, and ſuch a Being as will deal with all Men according to their Works, as it is ſuitable to the Holineſs and Juſtice of the Divine Nature, to his love of that which renders us moſt like unto, and his hatred of that which is repugnant to his Nature; ſo is it abſolutely neceſſary to deter Men from Injuſtice, Falſhood, Cruelty, diſturbance of the Peace of others, and to

reſtrain

restrain them from being Wolves and Tygers to each other. Many deny the truth of these Doctrines, saith *Cicero*, *utiles autem esse has Opiniones quis neget?* but who can deny them to be profitable? Even that [b] *Pliny* who derided this Doctrine of a Providence, yet holds it useful to believe, *pœnas maleficiis aliquando seras, occupato Deo in tanta mole, nunquam autem irritas esse*, that evil-doers may be punished late, but that they never can escape due Punishment. Of this we are assured from the concurrent suffrage of all Nations, and all Ages, they having always had their Laws to deter Men from doing Evil, and looked upon their Gods as the Avengers of those who did transgress them. Hence all that have ever made Laws for Societies, as *Lycurgus* for the *Lacedemonians*, *Numa* for the *Romans*, *Ion* for the *Athenians*, *Deucalion* for all the *Grecians*, saith *Plutarch*; and all that have writ about Laws and Common-wealths, as *Zeno*, *Plato*, ~~*Aristotle*~~, *Cicero*; have laid this as the foundation of them, that the Gods are the Inspectors of all things, *piorumque & impiorum habere rationem*, and take an account of good and wicked Men, and will deal with them accordingly; and thought it necessary to reject those vile Opinions

[b] Nat. Hist. l. 1. c. 7.

which

which either maintained there was no God, or held, τὸ θεῖον μὴ ἔχειν ὅπως πολὶ τὸ τῶ ἀνθρώπων γένῳ ὡς ἐπιβλέπειν, αὐτὸ μὴ φροντίζειν, ἀλλ' ἐᾶν, μὴ καταλιτορεῖν, *that he did not inſpect or take care of Man, but let him alone and diſregarded him*; which opinion, ſaith *Hippodamus*, being once received, the folly and injuſtice which it will produce muſt be beyond expreſſion; and therefore *Epicurus* did wiſely in permitting his wiſe Man ὁ ὅτε πολιτεύσεται, ὅτε τυραννεύσειν, neither to employ himſelf in governing a Kingdom, or a Common-wealth, or even intereſt himhimſelf in publick Affairs, becauſe he ſaw his Principles were inconſiſtent with all Government; and therefore ſaith in [d] *Seneca, quæ Ego ſcio non probat populus, quæ probat populus, Ego neſcio*, the Populace approves not my Notions, nor do I skill what they approve of. Moreover, ſeeing all Evil is contrived in the Heart, and thence proceeds to Action in the Tongue and Hand, and ſeeing humane Laws only take cogniſance of outward Actions, were there no Eye to ſee, no Wiſdom to take notice of that inward fountain of all Wickedneſs, Men could not be deterred from contriving the moſt pernicious Deſigns, and when Luſt is thus conceived in the Heart, and

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[c] Apud. Diog. l. 10. p. 653. [d] Ep. 79.

that is *fully set in them to do evil*, they will be scarce restrained from the practice of it; So necessary is this belief of an All-seeing Eye and over-ruling Providence to the well governing of the World, and to the Peace and Welfare of Societies. Wherefore,

3dly, He ought to have considered that the belief of such a Providence as doth inspect our Thoughts and Actions, and doth enquire into our Manners, and our very Words, is only troublesome to them whose Hearts condemn them for the evil of their Lives and Manners, whose Words, Thoughts, and Actions, are plainly opposite to the Dictates of their Reason, and who think, speak, and do, what they do inwardly perceive to be unworthy of a Man; that is, to them who are the Pests and Corrupters of the Civil Government, and the Bane of the Societies in which they dwell; and that such Persons should be terrified by the sense of divine Judgments ready to seize upon them, and by the terrors of a future Judgment from their pernicious ways, which is the first design of Providence in all the Punishments inflicted on them in this present Life, is for their great advantage; or if they prove incurable, that they should not only fear, but should be thought to suffer far more dreadful Evils in another state, is for the benefit and welfare of the whole Society.

4thly,

4*thly*, He ought to have conſidered that the Principles he hath eſpouſed as the moſt proper method to free Mankind from all theſe Fears and Troubles, do as entirely rob all Men, and more eſpecially good Men, of all the remedy which they can have againſt the Evils which they fear; certain it is that whilſt we do continue in this World, whether Providence, or Chance, do govern, we ſhall be ſubject to the fear of all Calamities, to which we find humane Nature lies expoſed; but then the happy difference is this, that he who heartily believes that Providence inſpecteth all our Thoughts, and Actions, and lives agreeably to that Perſuaſion, hath Faith, and Hope, and Truſt in God to moderate theſe Fears, and a comfortable expectation of a good iſſue from them, and a reward of all his Patience under them, to mitigate and to alleviate the evil of them. This one Conſideration, ſaith *Hermogenes* in *Plutarch*, that where-ever I am, and whatever I do, the Gods who know, and can do all things, love me ſo [e] ὡς ἐπιμελεῖσθαί με *as always to take care of me*, doth beget in me θάρσος ἀμήχανον *an invincible Confidence*; whereas he that rejects a Providence hath Fear without Hope, and when the Evil is inevitable

[e] Non poſſe ſuav. p. 1103. B. C.

by

by humane Power, Fear turned into Despair: *They leave themselves*, saith *Hermogenes*, *no refuge against Calamities, but are forced cowardly to fly to an Halter* [f] ὡς ἐς μίαν καλαφύγην καὶ λιμένα, *as to their only Port and Refuge.*

Lastly, By the same Principles and Method they entirely robb'd good Men of all the joys and pleasures of true Piety, and all their comfortable hopes and expectations of a future Recompence and blessed Immortality; and upon this account [g] *Plutarch* doth chiefly argue that a Man can never live pleasantly upon the Principles of *Epicurus*, because he by them had cut off τὸ εὐελπι καὶ τὸ φιλόχαρες καὶ πᾶς εὐπραξίας ὄνησιν, *all our good expectations, and our joys, and the advantages of doing well, and the immense pleasures which we hope for after death:* To believe an over-ruling Providence, and live well, are two of the most chearful, hopeful, comfortable things we can imagine; for what is there that a good Man cannot hope for from a God infinite in Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, and who delights in shewing kindness to good Men? And the belief of an immortal state where we for ever shall be capable of his Favour, and the continual expressions of his Good-

[f] Ibid. C. [g] Non posse suav. p. 1101. D.

ness,

neſs, gives us a perfect triumph over death, and renders all the Evils which we ſuffer with patience and reſignation, freſh objects of our hope; and therefore we may rationally enquire with [h] *Plutarch*, πῶς ἐχ' ἀνίαρον ἢ αἰωνίων ἀγαθῶν ἐλπίδα στρέφειν, ἢ πρὸς ἀπροσδόκητον εὐδαιμονίαν ἀποβαλεῖν; *muſt it not be bitter to be deprived of the hopes of everlaſting Bleſſings, and to loſe the ſupremeſt Happineſs?* Whereas the deniers of a Providence can have no object of their Faith and Hope, for they can never rationally expect any help or favour from that Deity, which doth not, ſay they, in the leaſt regard their Actions; and for a Man under the ſharpeſt Miſeries of this preſent Life to take refuge with them in the thoughts of death, is, as 'tis well obſerved by [i] *Plutarch*, but ſuch another kind of comfort, as if you ſhould tell a Man in a Storm at Sea, tho' the Ship hath no Pilot, and there is no hopes of weathering the Storm, he need not be afraid, for in a little while it will ſplit and ſink, and being drown'd, the Storm will trouble him no more.

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[h] P. 1106. D.
[i] Ibid. 1103. C. D.

§. III.

§. III. 2*dly*, [k] *Aristotle* and his Followers confined this Providence to Heaven, but left all sublunary things entirely destitute of the care of God, Angels, or Dæmons, so that [l] *Origen*, *Chalcidius*, and others, declare they took away all Providence; and [m] *Atticus* saith, that his opinion was the same as to the Interests of Vice and Virtue with that of *Epicurus*; it being all one as to us to have no Providence at all, as to have none that takes care of us, Men being by this latter opinion equally deserted by the Gods, and equal impunity being given by it to those who do unrighteousness.

§. IV. 3*dly*, Others believed there was a general Providence, which kept all Kinds and Species of Beings in their continual Vicissitudes, but then they held that it respected not particular Beings; it heard and

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[k] Οὐδὲ ἔμψυχον ὁ κόσμος, ὅτε πρόνοια διοικεῖται, τὰ γὰρ ἐφήνια τούτων ἀπάντων κοινωνεῖν, τὰ δὲ πρείττω μηδενὸς αὐτῷ. Plutarch de Pl. Philosoph. l. 2. c. 3. Stob. Eclog. Phys. p. 48. Diog. Laert. l. 5. p. 286. Arrian in Epictet. l. 1. c. 12. Vide Arist. de mundo, c. 6.

[l] Origines mentionem facit τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν πρειττόνων ἀναιρέσεως τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς προνοίας. Contra Celsum. l. 3. p. 156. & l. 1. p. 17. Propterea tollit omnem providentiam. Chalcid. in Tim. Ed. Leyd. p. 345.

[m] Ἴσον γὰρ ἀμφότερα τὸ ἐν θεῶν ἀμελεῖς εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ᾗ ἴση τοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν ἀπὸ θεῶν ἄδεια. Apud. Euseb. præpar. Evang. l. 5. c. 5.

saw

saw things [n] καθόλε, κ) μὴ κ) μέρ@, *in general, but not in particular*; saith *Xenophanes Colophonius*, it was regardful [o] ἀνθρωπίνων εἰς κοινον ὃ μόνον, ἀλλ' ὀχὶ καὶ' ἰδίαν ἑκάς& *of humane Affairs in general only, but not of each Man in particular*: So *Arrian* represents it, τ γὼων κ) ἰδίων, ἐμε σε, κ) (ὀκ ἔτι, *it regarded the Kinds and Species of Beings, but not me and thee in particular*, saith *Justin Martyr* to *Trypho*: It is mindful, saith [p] *Celsus* τ ὅλ *of the Universe*, but is no more displeased with what Man doth, *than with Apes and Mice*; and therefore, according to this opinion, saith *Arrian*, it cannot be the end of Man ἕπεσ τ θεῷ *to obey or follow God*, and [q] *Justin M.* well observes, that this opinion gives as much licence *to Man to commit all manner of Iniquity as any of the former Sentiments, as freeing them from fear of punishment, or hope of any good from God.*

§. V. *4thly*, The *Stoicks* were stiff Asserters of a particular Providence, but then they weakned the Doctrine of the Divine

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[n] Euseb. Præpar. Evang. l. 1. c. 8.

[o] L. 1. c. 12.

[p] Apud. Orig. l. 4. p. 229.

[q] Ποιεῖν τὲ ὅτι βέλον) κ) λέγειν, μήτε κόλασιν φοβ& μένοις μήτε ἀγαθὸν ἐλπίζουσι ἐκ θεῦ. Just. Dial. cum Tryph. p. 218.

Providence,

Providence by saying, as [r] *Balbus* the *Stoick*, *Magna Dii curant, parva negligunt*, the Gods were only concerned for great things, but neglected little things, to wit, the Vines and Fields of private Persons. And,

2*dly*, This they did more effectually by making all their virtuous Actions entirely to depend upon themselves, and excluding God from any ways contributing to it. Thus [s] *Seneca* declares, that *sibi fidere* to depend upon our selves, is the cause and strength of an happy Life, and therefore whereas it was commonly said, *Si vis esse felix Deos ora*, pray to the Gods for it if thou wouldest be happy, he declares that *turpe est etiamnum Deos fatigare*, 'tis unbecoming to be still wearying the Gods thus; and saith, *Quid votis opus est? fac teipsum felicem*, what need hast thou of Prayer? make thy self happy, labour to get the knowledge of Divine and Humane things; this is the chief Good, which being once obtained, [t] *incipis Deorum esse socius non supplex*, thou beginnest to be not the Suppliant, but the Companion of the Gods:

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[r] De Nat. Deorum, l. 2. n. 125. At enim minora Dii negligunt, neque agellos singulorum, neque viticulas persequuntur, &c. lib. 3. n. 64.

[s] Ep. 31.

[t] Ep. 41.

And again, *stultum est optare cum possis à te impetrare, non sunt ad cœlum elevandæ manus*, it is folly to wish for that which thou may'st obtain from thy own self, thy Hands are not to be lifted up to Heaven, for tho' *nemo sine Deo vir bonus*, no Man is good without God, yet that God is within thee, he is only thy own Soul; which he sometimes stiles God, and sometimes a part of God; yea, he adds, that a wise Man excels God in this, that God *naturæ beneficio non suo sapiens est*, is Wise from his Nature, not his Choice. *Cotta* in [u] *Cicero* makes this a more general opinion; for, saith he, *Judicium omnium mortalium est fortunam à Deo petendam, à seipso sumendam esse sapientiam*, it is the sentiment of all Mankind, that Wisdom is to be derived from our selves, the Goods of Fortune only to be desired of God; that it was generally owned that they received all the Emoluments and prosperous Events of Life from the Gods, *virtutem autem nemo unquam Deo acceptam retulit*, but no Man ever did ascribe his Virtue to divine assistance: And for this he appeals to the common practice of Mankind; for *all Men*, saith he, *pray to Jupiter for Wealth and Safety*, non quod nos justos, temperatos, sapientes efficiat, *but not for Justice, Temperance, and Wisdom.* They

[u] De Nat. Deorum, l. 3. n. 65, 66.

also

also give thanks for all the Goods of Fortune they enjoy'd, and preservation from the Evils of this World, but not for Virtue and Goodness; *nam quis quod bonus esset gratias egit Diis unquam?* for who ever gave thanks to the Gods for his being good? In fine, *We are*, saith he, *praiseworthy for our Virtue, and we rightly glory in it*, quod non contingeret si id donum à Deo non à nobis haberemus, *which would not be, if Virtue were the gift of God, and proceeded not from our selves.* [w] *Arrian* saith, God hath established this as a Law, and said, *If thou wouldest have any good, thou must take it from thy self.* Now by this opinion, saith [x] *Maximus Tyrius*, they represented God unworthily, to wit, as one *who is liberal in things of little moment, but difficult and parsimonious in respect of better things:* And since, saith [y] *Plutarch*, *these outward things, in the opinion of the* Stoicks, *are not good and profitable, if God gives only*

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[w] Τοῦτον νόμον τέθεικε ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ φησὶν, εἰ τι θέλεις ἀγαθὸν παρ' ἐμαυτοῦ λάβε. l. 1. c. 29.

[x] Πρὸς μὲν τὰ φαῦλα καλῶς καὶ δρθόνως θρασυδαιμόνιον, περὶ δὲ τὰ κρείττω ἄπορον. Dissertat. 22. p. 216.

[y] Εἰ μὴν ἦν ὁ Θεὸς ἀρετὴ μὲ ἃ δίδωσιν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ τὸ καλὸν, αὐθαίρετόν ἐστι, πλοῦτον δὲ καὶ ὑγίειαν χρεὶς ἀρετῆς δίδωσιν, οὐκ εὖ χρησομένοις δίδωσιν ἀλλὰ κακῶς, τοῦτ' ἔστι βλαβερῶς καὶ ὀλεθρίως, καίτοι εἰ μὴ δωίαν ἡ ἀρετὴ παρέχειν οἱ Θεοὶ, οὐκ εἰσὶ χρησοὶ μὴ παρέχοντες, εἰ δὲ μὴ δωίαν) ποιεῖν ἀγαθὲς οὐδ' ὠφελεῖν δωίαν), μηδενός τε τ' ἄλλων ὄντ' ἀγαθῶ μήδ' ὠφελίμε, De Stoic. repugn. 1048. D. & adv. Stoic. p. 1075. E.

theſe things, and gives not Virtue to improve them, he doth us no good, but rather hurt; and if they, ſaith he, *take away the notion of a God who take away his Providence, they equally do it who ſay,* προνοεῖν μὲ τὰς θεὰς ἡμῶν, μὴ ὠφελεῖν δ ἡμᾶς, μήθ' ἁγαθῶν εἶ) σωτῆρας, *the Providence of God doth us no good, nor do the Gods give us any good thing, but only that which is indifferent.*

3*dly*, They deſtroyed this Providence by making that God whom they aſſigned as the Adminiſtrator and Conſervator of all things, to be only, ſaith [z] *Plutarch*, (ῶμα νοερὸν, *an intelligent Body*, and *Jupiter* to be Fire. This opinion, tho' ſome would free them from, yet their Friend [a] *Lipſius* confeſſeth. *Diogenes Laertius* ſays they owned two Principles, an Agent and a Patient, ἀλλὰ κ (ώματα εἶ) τὰς ἀρχὰς, *but held theſe Principles to be Bodies*; and this [b] reading is to be retained, as being confirmed by *Plutarch*, by *Porphyry* in *Euſebius*, and by *Origen* againſt *Celſus*, in divers places. Now this (ῶμα νοερὸν *intelligent Body* is a contradiction to it ſelf, and to make all Providence depend upon it, is in effect to deny

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[z] De Com. Nor. adv. Stoic. p. 1085. de facie in orbe lunæ, p. 926. D. [a] L. 7. p. 449.

[b] Οὗτοι (Στωικοὶ μὲ) σώματα φάσιν εἶ), κ τὸ ποιῶν κ τὸ πάσχον. Euſeb. Præp. Evang. l. 15. c. 14. Οἱ σῶμα ἀποφῆς τ θεὸν ſωικοὶ. Orig. adv. Celſum. l. 1. p. 17. l. 3. p. 156. l. 4. p. 169. l. 6. p. 325.

there

there is a Providence, it being in the nature of the thing impossible that any body should have Wisdom, and Foresight sufficient to discern, or Power sufficient to perform all things, or Will to do them.

And lastly, they fundamentally destroyed the benefit of this Providence, by introducing an inexorable Fate, or such a series or concatenation of Causes, as made all things inevitably happen as they did; for tho' they said, that Fate, and *Jupiter*, and Providence were one and the same thing, tho' they were great Asserters of the αὐτεξούσιον *the free motion of the Soul*, and placed all their happiness in being concerned only for the τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν *things which were in our own power*; yet all this can be only an evidence of the *Stoical* repugnances, as [c] *Plutarch* makes it, whilst they maintained this Fate to be αἰτίαν ἀκίνητον, καὶ ἀκώλυτον, καὶ ἄῤῥεπτον, *a Cause unmoveable by any endeavours that can be used, and which cannot be hindred or averted from producing the Effect*; and define it an [d] immutable series of Causes coherent to one another, so that all things are produced by this connexion of Causes, and call

[c] De Stoic. repugn. p. 1056.

[d] Immutabilis causarum cohærentium series, Sen. ad Helvid. c. 8. Fatalis quædam necessitas quâ quicquid accidit id ex causarum continuatione fluxisse dicitur. Cicero de Nat. Deorum. l. 1. n. 30, 39. De divin. l. 1. n. 106.

it *a fatal Necessity, by virtue of which whatsoever happens flows from a continuation of Causes:* But then [e] they speak of That, and Providence, and *Jupiter*, disjunctively, as of several and different Things and Hypotheses, even as different as Providence is from Chance or Fortune. All the liberty they allow to the Will is this, That it may chuse to do what, if Man doth refuse to do, Fate will compel him to do; and may refuse to do what, if he would do, he is by Fate necessitated to leave undone; and that because, saith [f] *Seneca, Omnia certâ & in æternum dictâ lege decurrunt, causa pendet ex causa*, all things run on by a certain and eternally established Law: *Olim constitutum est quid gaudeas quid fleas*, it is of old ordained at what thou shalt Rejoice or Weep, one Cause depends upon another; *fata nos ducunt*, we are led by Fate. This they explain by the example of a Dog tied to a Cart's tail, he may follow without being drawn, but if he doth not, he must follow by being drawn, τὸ αὐτὸ ὀφπε ἡ ἐπὶ τ ἀνθρώπων,

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[e] Ἔτοι ἀνάγκη εἱμαρμένη ἀπαραβάτ[ῳ] τάξις, ἢ πρόνοια ἱλάσιμ[ος] ἢ ὕβρις. Anton. l. 12. §. 8, 14. Phisosophandum est sive nos inexorabili lege fata constringunt, sive arbiter Deus universi cuncta disponit, sive casus res humanas sine ordine impellit — si fatum, si Deus Rector est, si casus imperat. Sen. Ep. 16.

[f] De Providentia, c. 5.

and

and this also is the case of Men, for [g] *if they will not follow Fate, they shall by all means be necessitated to come under the Laws of Fate.*

Now this ὠτεξούσιον μεῖ' ἀνάγκης *Will lying under a necessity* from an outward cause, that doth, and will lay restraints upon it, is indeed no Will; for as [h] *Simplicius* observes, *No Man is said to act voluntarily who is thus necessitated to act, or not to act*; and therefore as *Scripture* still puts Liberty and Necessity in opposition to each other, so *Seneca* himself insinuates the same by saying, *Si vis scire an velim, effice ut possim nolle*, if thou wouldst know whether I am willing to do so, permit me not to be so, *i. e.* permit me to do otherwise. Moreover this Fate therefore destroys the liberty of our Desires, Choice, and consequently of our Actions, because it introduces an external and antecedent Cause on which they do depend as the Effect upon the Cause, and from which they of necessity result; for a Cause being that, [i] *quæ id efficit cujus*

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[g] Καὶ μὴ βελόμενοι γὰ ἀκολυθεῖν ἀναγκασθήσονῦ πάντως ἐπὶ τὸ πεπρωμένον εἰσελθεῖν, lib. ined. apud. Menag. in Laert, illud de Stoic. καθ' εἱμαρμένῃν ἅπαντα φάσι τὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι, l. 7. p. 459. ἅτε με—σὺ ἡ πεπρωμένη ὕποι ποτε ὑμῖν εἰμι διαλελαμμένος, ὡς ἕπομαι γε ἄοκνος, ἢν δ' γε μὴ θέλω κακὸς ἦτλον ἕψομαι. Epict. c. 37.

[h] Οὐδεὶς γὰ ἔξωθεν ἀναγκαζόμενος τι ποιεῖν, ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν, ἀτεξουσίως ὀνῆσεῖν λέγεται. p. 23.

[i] Cic. de fato. n. 26.

eſt cauſa, which produceth the Effect, a Cauſe which neceſſitates the Action, neceſſitates the Effect, and when the Effect depends on my Appetite and Will, Deſire and Choice muſt lay the like neceſſity on them; whence the inference of [k] *Cicero*, [l] *Simplicius*, and others, is clear to a demonſtration, that *they who introduce an eternal ſeries of fatal Cauſes, rob the Soul of its liberty, and leave us nothing in our own power.* And hence it unavoidably follows, that *there* [m] *can be nothing of real Vice or Vir-*

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[k] Qui introducunt cauſarum ſeriem ſempiternam ii mentem hominis voluntate liberâ ſpoliatam neceſſitate fati devinciunt. Cic. de fato n. 16. Nam nihil eſſet in noſtra poteſtate ſi res ita ſe haberet. n. 7. Non ſunt igitur neque aſſenſiones, neque actiones in noſtra poteſtate, ex quo efficitur ut neque laudationes juſtæ ſint, nec vituperationes, nec honores, nec ſupplicia, n. 30.

[l] Ὅι τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἀναιρέντες ἔτοι καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὰ κακίας ψυχικὼς διαφορὰν ἀναιροῦσι, καὶ ἔπαινον, καὶ ψόγον ἐκ ὑπολείπουσι δίκαιον. Simpl. p. 29. Τὰ γὰρ βία καὶ ἀκουσίως πραττόμενα ὡς μὴ ὄντα ἀμέμπτα καὶ ὑπὸ θεῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων συγγινώσκεται, καὶ ἐκ ἔτι ἐφ' ἑνὶ ἔστιν ἀμάρτια ὅλως. p. 169. Πῶς ἂν ὑβρένος αἰσχρὸν ἁμαίτετος ὁ θεὸς, ἐν γὰρ πᾶσι τοῖς γιγνομένοις καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ δίκη θεῶν ὄζει, Plutarc. de Stoic. Repugn. p. 1050. vid. p. 1056.

[m] Oenamaus introducit impios ex hac ſententia ad hunc modum loquentes, τί ἡμᾶς τίννυ] ὁ Ζεὺς ἀλλ' ἐκ' ἑαυτὸν, ὅτι τοιαύτην καθέδρεξεν ἕξιν τῆς ἀνάγκην, τί δὲ καὶ ἀπειλεῖ ἡμῖν — δίκαια γὰρ ἔποιεν πρὸς ὑμᾶς οἱ πονηροὶ ὅτι ἐκ ἐπιτρέψαντε ἡμῖν ὦ θεοὶ ἀγαθοῖς γίνεσθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐβιάσασθε ἐξ πονηρὲς. Apud Euſeb. præpar. Evang. l. 6. c. 7. p. 260. B. D. ἅπερ εἰ ἔστως ἔχει τὰ τῆς κεκινημένης τῶ θεῶ κείσεως οἰκεῖ] — ἁπολύοντες πάντη ἐγκλήματη τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῶ θεῶ προσφέρουσι πάντων τῶν κακῶν καὶ ψυχικῶς πραττομένων ἢ αἰτίαν. Ibid. c. 11. p. 281. C. 282. B. 287. B. 288. A. B. vide etiam c. 6. p. 242. D. 243. B. C. D.

tue

true in our Actions, nothing which can deserve praise or dispraise, because there is no freedom in them; that Man is neither capable of Duty or Reward, of Crime or Punishment; for what is not in his power to avoid, cannot be his Duty to avoid, nor his Sin that he doth not avoid it; nor can it be just in God to punish him for not avoiding it, nor any act of Justice in him to reward him for what he could not refuse to do: And if there be any Sin in the World, that God who made it necessary by such a series of Causes must be the Author of it. Lastly, This Doctrine, as [n] *Eusebius* observes, fundamentally destroys all Religion, and renders all our Prayers and Sacrifices fruitless; for tho' Providence, saith *Antoninus*, may be ἱλασιμὸς placable by these means, yet fate is ἀκίνητος καὶ ἀμετάθετος *immovable* and *immutable*, and so must be deaf to all our Prayers, and inflexible by all our propitiatory Sacrifices, and cannot repent tho' we do so.

And yet this Doctrine so pernicious prevailed not only among the Vulgar, but, saith [o] *Simplicius*, most Men say that Fate is the cause not only of the περιφορὰν *revolution* of all other things, but also καὶ τῶν ὀρεξίων καὶ προαιρέσεων καὶ αἱρέσεως, *of our an-*

[n] Præp. Evang. l. 6. c. 6. p. 242. D. [o] P. 18.

ticipations

ticipations, and our Wills. Of this opinion, ſaith [p] *Cicero*, were *Heraclitus*, *Democritus*, *Empedocles*, and *Ariſtotle*, to whom we may add from [q] *Diogenes Laertius*, *Philolaus*, and from [r] *Stobæus*, *Mercurius*. This Fate moſt of them aſcribed to the motions and converſions of the Stars; and hence, ſaith [s] *Porphyry*, the Gods foretel τὰ μεμαρμένα γινώσκοντες ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ἄστρων φορᾶς, *knowing what things ſhall fatally come to paſs by the revolution of the Stars*, καὶ τοῦτο σχεδὸν πάντες ἐξέφηναν οἱ ἀληθεῖς τῶν θεῶν, *and this almoſt all have declared who ſpeak truly of the Gods*: And [t] *Simplicius* ſaith, they who made Fate to be the cauſe of our Deſires and Elections, μαρτύρων τοὺς ἀστρολόγους ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν τῇ γενέσει τῶν ἄστρων θέσεως, λέγοντας ὅτι ὁ μὲν φιλήδονος, *did this upon the Teſtimony of Aſtrologers foretelling from the poſition of the Stars at a Man's birth, that one will be a lover of Pleaſure, and another of Riches*; and [u] *Sextus Empiricus* adds, εἰ γὰρ μὴ πάντα γίνεται κατ' ἀ-

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[p] Cum duæ ſententiæ fuiſſent veterum Philoſophorum, una eorum qui cenſerent omnia fato ita fieri ut id fatum vim neceſſitatis afferret, in qua ſententia Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Ariſtoteles fuit. De fato c. 29.

[q] De Heraclito Diog. l. 9. p. 551, de Democrito p. 573. de Philolao l. 8. p. 543.

[r] Οὗτος νόμον ἀγνὴν καθ' ὃν πάντα τέλεται. Mercur. apud Stob. Eclog. phyſ. p. 13.

[s] Apud Euſeb. præpar. Evang. l. 6. c. 1. p. 236. D.

[t] P. 18. [u] Contra Matth. l. 5. p. 116.

μὴ μόλις ἂν εἴη χαλδαϊκὴ, *that if all things be not done by Fate, there can be no such Art as that of the* Chaldæans *which depends upon Fate*; both they and the *Egyptians*, saith [y] he, pretending from their knowledge and observation of the Stars to tell, *Quid cuique eventurum, & quo quisque fato natus esset*, to what Fate every Man was born, and what should happen to every Man. *Mercurius* saith that Fate is the effect τῆ ἀστέρων διαθέσεως *of the disposition of the Stars, and that no Man can avoid or shun the force of Fate*, ὅπλον γὰρ εἱμαρμένης οἱ ἀστέρες, *for the Stars are its Armory, and all things happen to Nature, and to Man according to it.* And [z] *Origen* complains that this opinion *that all things happen'd upon Earth, and to every Man in particular, according to the Fate resulting from the complication of the Planets, and the Stars in the Zodiack, was not only the Doctrine of the Gentiles alien from the Faith, but also* πολλῶν τῶν πεπιστευκέναι καταλαμβανομένων *of many who had embraced the Christian Faith.* And this necessity of all our Actions, most plainly follows from that great *Revolution* of all things which would produce in every Man all the same Actions he had done before; and yet this was em-

[y] De divin. l. 1. n. 2.
[z] Apud Euseb. præpar. Evang. l. 6. c. 11. p. 281. B.

braced

braced by most Sects of *Philosophers*, *viz.* by the *Stoicks*, *Pythagoreans*, *Platonists*, and *Plutarch*, who having laid down this for certain, that this long period must have Causes ἑκάστῃ τὰ αὐτῆς ἐξ ἀνάγκης φέρουσαι *producing the same Effects necessarily in every thing*; he illustrates it thus to his Friend *Piso*, *Know therefore that by the same celestial Beings, as the Causes of all things, it is* κ᾽ τὸ ἐμὲ γράφειν νυῖ τάδε, κ᾽ σὲ τὸ ὡδὶ τε τ ποιεῖν ἅπ κ᾽ ὅπως τυγχάνεις ποιεῖν, *that I now write these things, and that thou doest what thou doest, seeing that cannot be without some certain causality or influence of these Stars upon us, which shall necessitate all Men upon such a Revolution of them to do the same things which they had done before, whether they be good or evil:* And therefore when *Mercurius* had taught this Doctrine to his Son *Tatius*, he forbids him to discourse of it among the vulgar Sort; for, saith he, if they know that all things happen according to this over-ruling Fate, they will be the worse, [y] τὰς δ᾽ αἰτίας τῇ κακῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ἀναφέροντες, οὐκ ἀφίξ᾽ ποτὲ παυσὶς ἔσται κακῆ, *and ascribing the causes of their Wickedness to Fate, they will never cease from it.*

Hence therefore it is evident that the Providence asserted by the *Stoicks*, not only

[y] Apud Stob. Ecl. Phys. p. 76.

robb'd

robb'd us of the best effects of Providence, *viz.* Divine Assistance in Spirituals, or in promoting our Virtue, and by that our Felicity; but also rendred it ineffectual, by making the Author of it only σῶμα νοερόν, *an intelligent Body*, and thereby rendring it impossible he should have Foresight sufficient to discern our Wants, or Power sufficient to supply them, or Will to do it, and by laying us under that fatal necessity of acting, which necessarily destroys all Virtue and Religion.

§. VI. The *Platonists* and Followers of *Pythagoras* were also stiff Assertors of a Providence, declaring that all things happen'd κατὰ θείαν πρόνοιαν *according to divine Providence*, especially to the good and pious, and that [z] θεοὶ εἰσὶν ἐπιμελούμενοι πάντων σμικρῶν, καὶ μεζόνων *the Gods take care of all things great and little*; but then they also said many things, which either weakned, or wholly overthrew this Providence: And this they did,

1*st*, By asserting a Fate so depending upon the Revolution of the Stars, that upon the same Revolution of them all things would be done by all as they were done before; so that the *Philosophers* must then

[z] Iambl. de vitâ Pythag. p. 133, 184. Plat. de leg. l. 10. p. 955, 956. ἐστὶν, p. 1008. E.

use

uſe the ſame Boys, and the ſame Whores, as they did before; the ſame good and evil Habits, as [a] *Plutarch* obſerves, *muſt be renewed in all Men, that the ſame good and evil Actions may be deſired, affected, choſen, and done by them*; for what will then be done again by reaſon of the ſame ſite and diſpoſition of the Stars as was before, muſt at the firſt be done by virtue of ſuch a diſpoſition of the Stars. This, ſaith [b] *Origen*, οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Πυθαγόρου, καὶ Πλάτωνος *the Pythagoreans and the Platoniſts aſſert*; and according to it, ſaith he, I know now how [c] τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν (ωθήσεται) *the liberty of the Will can be preſerved, or how our Actions can deſerve blame or praiſe.* That this was the aſſertion of *Pythagoras*, that κατὰ περιόδους τινὰς τὰ γινόμενα πάλιν πάλιν γίνεσθαι, *at certain periods all things ſhould be done as they were before*, ſo that nothing was ſimply New, we learn from [d] *Iamblicus*; and that [e] *Plato* was of the ſame opinion, we learn from the words cited by *Plutarch* from his *Timæus*, and from his own words. Moreover [f] *Diogenes Laertius* having told us that *Pythagoras* ſaid, God took care of us immediately, adds,

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[a] Καὶ τά γε ἐξῆς καὶ ἀπ' ἐξῆς αἰτίαν, p. 569.
[b] Adv. Celſum, l. 5. p. 245. Vide Not. [c] L. 4. p. 408.
[d] De Vit. Pythag. p. 188. De fato, p. 565.
[e] Vid. Proel. in Timæo, p. 9. & 39. Spencer in Orig. p. 208, 245.
[f] L. 8. p. 509. Vide Suidam in Voce.

That

That he held also ἐμπρμμίαν τὲ τῶν ὅλων εἶ, καὶ τὴν καθ' μέρος αἰτίαν διοικήσεως, *that Fate was the cause of the administration of all things, both in general, and in particular:* And [g] *Plutarch* saith, that, according to *Plato*, Fate was λόγος θεῖος ἀπαραβάτος διὰ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνεμπόδιστον, *a divine Decree immutable by reason of a Cause that could not be hindred*; and this makes them both guilty of all the Absurdities which follow from the *Stoicks* Fate.

2*dly*, Both they, and, if we may credit the Apostate *Julian*, all Mankind confined the immediate Providence of God to the Celestial Beings, or made him, with [h] *Numenius*, ἄρχον ἔργων ξυμπάντων, *void of all Employments*; and left Men, and all inferiour Creatures, to the care of [i] *Genii*, or *Dæmons*, *i. e.* of Æthereal Beings, or Created Gods, *whom they placed under the Concave of the Moon*; or of *Heroes*, i. e. of *separated*

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[g] Ex Phædro de Fato, p. 568.

[h] Apud Euseb. præpar. Evang. l. 11. c. 18. p. 537. C.

[i] Παρὰ μὲν τοῖς θεολ. καὶ Δαίμοσιν, καὶ Ἡρώων γένος ἄφθονον ἔστι. Porphyr. de Pythag. vita, p. 197. Vid. Hieron. à p. 40. ad 47. p. 132, 242. & Marcilii notas in aurea Carm. Pythag. p. 347, 348. & de Pythag. Diog. Laert. l. 8. p. 514. ubi vide Not. & Menag. Varro inter Lunæ gyrum & nimborum ac ventorum cacumina aerias esse animas ait, Aug. de Civ. Dei, l. 7. c. 6. Aer Junoni deputetur, ubi volunt cum Dæmonibus Heroas habitare, quo nomine appellant alicujus meriti animas defunctorum, l. 10. c. 13.

Souls;

Souls; for ſo with [k] *Plutarch*, *Varro*, and others, I diſtinguiſh them, tho' I know *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, and *Hierocles*, place *Heroes* in an order ſuperiour to *Dæmons*, or Spirits never united to Bodies. This [l] *Plato* reckons as an evidence of divine Philanthropy, that he hath placed theſe new Gods, as he calls them, over us, *Cantoning out to every one of them his ſhare of the Regions or Cities over which they are to preſide*; to theſe he aſcribes *the Production of all humane Bodies, and the Government of their Souls*; and in this, *Plutarch*, *Celſus*, and *Julian* [m] agree with him, for this reaſon, That they conceived it unworthy of the great God to mix himſelf with humane Affairs, and that he was rather to be exempted from ſuch Actions.

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[k] Εἶναι δ' Ἡρώας τὰς κεχαρισμένας ψυχὰς τῶν σωμάτων. Plut. de placit Philoſ. l. 1. c. 8. Φάσι δ' ἔνιοι καὶ τίνας δαίμονας ἀνθρώπων συμπαθείαν ἔχοντας, ἐπόπτας τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων, καὶ Ἡρώας τὰς ἀπολελυμένας τῶν σωμάτων ψυχάς. Diog. Laert. de Stoic. l. 7. p. 46. ubi vide Menag.

[l] Καὶ ὁ θεὸς δὴ φιλάνθρωπος ὢν τὸ γένος ἅμεινον ἡμῶν ἐφύτευσε τὸ τῶν Δαιμόνων, de leg. l. 4. p. 830. C. Ἡμέτερος φάσι γενέμεναι τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐθνάρχαις καὶ πολιούχοις θεοῖς ὧν ἕκαστος ἐπίσκοπος ἑαυτοῦ λῆξιν οἰκείας αὐτοῦ.

[m] Jul. apud Cyril. l. 4. p. 115. Eadem vide apud Plat. Critias, p. 1100. C. D. 1003. E. Celſ. apud Origen. l. 5. p. 247. Τοῖς νέοις παρέδωκε θεοῖς σώματα πλάττειν θνητά. Tim. p. 1054, 1055, 1073. Τὸν θεὸν καλαμίσυνος ἀνθρωπίναις χερσὶν ἢ φέιδεσθαι τῆς σεμνότητος αὐτοῦ, ἢ τηρεῖ τὸ ἀξίωμα καὶ τὸ μέγεθος αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀφελίας. Plut. de Orac. def. p. 414.

§. VII.

§. VII. Now the manifold Inconveniences and Mischiefs of this Providence are both evident and very great. For,

1*st*, By this denial of God's immediate Power and Wisdom engaged either to create our Bodies, or to govern and direct our Souls, or to preserve us from all Evil; by telling us, that *nullus Deus miscetur homine*, none of the Cælestial Gods had any Converse with Man; that 'twas [n] not fitting to interest them in what was done upon Earth, but only Dæmons and Aerial Gods; they robb'd us of our choicest Motives to adore and imitate, and place our confidence in him, who thought us thus unworthy of his care; for as [o] *Cyril of Alexandria* well argues, How can we judge he should chuse to govern those whom he vouchsafed not to create; or to be delighted in their services, for whose very Being he was concerned so little?

2*dly*, They gave Men too much ground to doubt of, and discard all Providence, when they found their Wise-men thus de-

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[n] Τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐφεστῶτα χρησταῖς μὴ θεὸς οἷς ἀταλλάχθαι τῷ θείῳ γλῶ πρόσηκον ὄτι, ἀλλὰ δαίμονας ὑπηρέτας θεῶν, ὑ δοκεῖ μοὶ κακῶς ἀξιοῦν, Plutarch. ib. p. 418.

[o] Πῶς δ' ἂν ἐλοιτο καλεῖν ὧν ἀτιμάζῃ τῷ ψύσιν, ἢ τίνα δὲ τρόπον τῷ θεῷ ἡωῷ λαλήσαις ὑπισάνυ ἢ εἰ μήδε κλίζειν ἡμᾶς ὅλως ἠξίωτε τῷ ἀρχῷ, Contra Julian. l. 2. p. 60. v. 68, 117.

claring, that the Cœleſtial Gods had no concern for things on Earth, but to commit them to new made created Gods, and to the Souls of dead Men, of whom they could have no aſſurance that they had any knowledge of humane Affairs, or any freedom to attend upon them, or any power to help them; for even by the confeſſion of [p] *Plato*, for this they were obliged, πιςδύειν μακρῷς λόγοις τ τὲ ἄλλως φήμαις, καὶ τοῖς νομοθετῆσι τοῦθ' ὕτως ἔχειν, *to give credit to long Tales and Fame, and to humane Conſtitutions*; that is, to things in many other inſtances plainly ridiculous and fooliſh.

3*dly*, Thoſe Dæmons to whom the care of Men entirely was committed, are by the *Scriptures* declared to be *evil Spirits*, or in the language of the Holy Spirit they were *Devils*, as will be afterwards made apparent from thoſe ridiculous, barbarous, and obſcene Rites they inſtituted, or approved of in their ſeveral Diſtricts, Cities, and Regions where they were ſuppoſed to preſide: And yet [q] *Plutarch* ſaw by the light of Reaſon, that *a vile imputation was caſt upon the Gods, by ſaying they had committed the care of Man to evil and malignant Spi-*

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[p] Apud. Euſeb. præpar. Evang. l. 12. c. 3.

[q] Τὸ δ' φαύλως δαίμονας ἐπὶ προνοίας ὀπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ὀπις ιὰς καθίσεδζ πῶς ἂν ἔξη ἔγκλημα τῷ θεῷ, De Stoic. Repugn. p. 1051. D.

rits,

rits, this being, saith he, *as great a blemish to them as for a Prince to set an evil Ruler over his People.*

4*thly*, They by this Doctrine laid the foundation of all that gross Idolatry the Heathen World committed in worshipping these Dæmons, and the departed Souls of Men; for having once imagined that *by the* [r] *appointment of the great God, the charge of framing all our Bodies, of governing our Affairs, and inspecting all our Actions, belong'd to them; that all Commerce betwixt him and us was managed by their Mediation, that they conveigh'd all our Addresses to him, and brought down from him all the Blessings we derived from Heaven, and all the Injunctions which he laid upon us*, they declared them upon these accounts *worthy to be worshipped with our Prayers, Praises, and Sacrifices*, and said, *in this we only did what would be very acceptable to the supreme Deity;*

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[r] Πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον μέσον ἐστὶ θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητῆς ἑρμηνεύον, καὶ διαπορθμεῦον θεοῖς τὰ ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν, τῶν μὲν τὰς δεήσεις καὶ θυσίας, τῶν δὲ τὰς ἐπιτάξεις καὶ ἀμοιβὰς τῶν θυσιῶν. Plat. Sympos. p. 1194. A. Plutarc. de Orac. def. p. 417. A. Max. Tyr. dis. 27. p. 268, 269. Εὐχαῖς τιμαῖν μᾶλα χρέων χάειν τὸ ξυφήμε διαποεία, Plato Epin. p. 1010. F. 1011. A. Diog. L. l. 8. p. 514, 515. Apul. de Deo Socrat. p. 35. Euseb. Præp. Evang. l. 5. c. 3. p. 182. D. Clem. Alex. Strom. 6. p. 631. Φησὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ θεραπεύσιμα θεὸς πλείονας, πᾶ ἓν τί τῶν τὸ μεγάλε θεραπεύειν φίλον, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ κακεῖνῳ ποιεῖν, Cels. apud Orig. l. 8. p. 381. Vide p. 376, 377. Hieroc. in Pythag. p. 10.

and of all this [s] *Apuleius* ſpeaks fully in his Book *De Deo Socratis.*

Laſtly, The worſt and greateſt Miſchief which followed from this Hypotheſis is this, that it hallowed, and laid on all Men a neceſſity to approve of the Worſhip, ſacred Rites, religious Ceremonies and Solemnities of all Nations, as being inſtituted by theſe Dæmons, ſaith *Apuleius*, *Cæleſtium voluntate, numine, & auctoritate*, according to the will and by the authority of the cæleſtial Gods: And, ſaith *Celſus*, all theſe things are diſpenſed by *Dæmons* and *Heroes*, κ) γνώμῃ τ῀ θεῦ, τ῀τα πάντα ἔχει νόμον ἐκ τ῀ μεγίστ῀ θεῦ, *according to the Counſel and Law of the moſt high God*; and both [t] *Plato*, and from him [u] *Apuleius*, own that

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[s] 1°. Nullus Deus miſcetur hominibus, nullus Deus humanis rebus intervenit. 2°. Sunt quædam divinæ mediæ Poteſtates per quas deſideria noſtra & merita ad Deos commeant, δαίμονες Gr. Vectores hinc precum, inde donorum, &c. 3°. Quæ cuncta cæleſtium voluntate & autoritate, ſed Dæmonum obſequio & operâ & miniſterio fieri arbitrandum eſt, p. 44, 45. 4°. Sunt ex hoc divorum numero qui nocturnis vel diurnis, lætioribus vel triſtioribus hoſtiis vel ceremoniis vel ritibus gaudeant, p. 49.

[t] Διὰ τότ῀ (τ῀ γήϊνς) κ) ἡ μανλικὴ πᾶσα χωρεῖ, κ) ἡ τ῀ ἱερέων τέχνη, τ῀τε περὶ τὰς θυσίας κ) τὰς τελετὰς κ) τὰς ἐπῳδὰς, κ) ἡ μανλεία πᾶς᾽ γοητεία, θεὸς μὲ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐ μίγνυ᾽ ἀλλὰ διὰ τότ῀ πᾶσα ὅσιν ἡ ὁμολία θεοῖς πρὸς ἀνθρώπς, Sympoſ. p. 1194. A.

[u] Unde etiam Religionum diverſis obſervationibus, & ſacrorum variis ſuppliciis (l. rationibus) fides impertienda eſt, &c. quæ omnia pro cujuſque more loci ſolennia & rata ſunt, Apul. p. 49.

from

from *these Heroes and Dæmons they derived all their Instructions concerning Sacrifices, Expiations, Incantations, and all other religious Rites and Mysteries, all Divination, and all the Answers of their Oracles:* And hence [w] *Pythagoras*, [x] *Plato*, and [y] *Celsus*, determine, that *all Men should follow the Rites of their Country, tho' they were worse than others, and that by so doing they would do what was right, and was not to be violated:* Whence [z] *Origen* demonstratively infers, that they must be obliged in many places by the authority of the supreme God, to offer humane Sacrifices, and burn their Children in the Fire to them, and to commit Incest, Sodomy, Adultery, and Fornication, and to be drunk in honour of the Gods; and that the very same things must be holy, religious, and highly acceptable to the Gods, when done in some Cities and Countries where the Law approved of them, and they by custome had

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[w] Τὸ μύειν ἐν τοῖς παλαιοῖς ἔθεσι καὶ νομίμοις ἐδοκίμασε οἱ ἄνδρες ἐκεῖνοι, κἂν ἢ μικρῷ χεῖρω ἑτέρων, Iamb. in vitâ Pythag. 156.

[x] Eadem habet Plato de leg. l. 4. p. 832, 833. l. 5. 846. C. D. l. 6. p. 871. l. 7. p. 886. l. 10. p. 961. Ὥσπερ δὴ ὀρθῶς ἐδόξαμεν τῇ θνητῇ φύσει μὴ τοιούτων θεὸν. Epin. p. 1011. C.

[y] Καὶ δὴ τὰ παρ' ἑκάστοις ὀρθῶς ἂν παράλοιπα ταῦτα προσθεῖμεν ὅτι ἐκείνοις φίλον, ὥσπαλύειν ὃ ἐκ' ὄσιον ἦν τὰ ἐξ' ἀρχῆς κ' τόπες νενομισμένα, Cels. apud Orig. l. 5, p. 247.

[z] Ibid. p. 248, 249.

obtained; and again, impious, profane, and execrable to the same Deity in all those places where they were disapproved of, or forbidden; and so must be things in themselves indifferent, and only good or evil as they were commanded or forbidden.

And thus we see that the Providence asserted by the Followers of *Plato* and *Pythagoras*, was not only overthrown by their Doctrine of Fate, and of that disposition of the Stars which made our Actions necessary, and by excluding God's immediate intendment over us, or concern for us, and giving us up to the charge of Dæmons and Heroes, who were either evil Spirits, and so unfit to govern, and unwilling to promote our Welfare, or such departed Spirits of whom they could have no assurance that they had any knowledge of humane Affairs, or any freedom to attend upon them, or any power to help them, but also laid the foundation of all that gross Idolatry which obtained through the Heathen World, and also forced all Men to approve of all the religious Rites and Ceremonies of all Nations, how barbarous, obscene and ridiculous soever they might be, as being instituted by those *Dæmons* according to the will and by the authority of the cælestial Deities.

This therefore was the result of all their *Philosophical* Disquisitions, either professedly

sedly to deny all Providence in reference to humane Affairs, as did the Followers of *Epicurus* and *Aristotle*, the *Academicks* and the *Pyrrhonians*, who by their Principles stood bound to own and teach there was no reason to believe it; and argued || from the Afflictions of good Men, and the Prosperity of the wicked, that there was no Providence; or consequentially to destroy that Providence they seemed to assert, and therefore to destroy all the foundations of Piety and Virtue, as did the *Pythagoreans*, *Platonists*, and *Stoicks*.

|| Πρὸς τὴν καλασκευάζονλα ὅτι ὄζι πρόνοια ἐν τῇ τάξεως τῇ ἐφεξῆς, ἀνλιθῶμεν τὸ τοὺς μὲ ἀγαθοὺς δυσπραξίαν πολλάκις, τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς εὐπραξίαν, καὶ διὰ τέτο σωπήσωμεν τὸ μὴ εἶ πρόνοιαν, Sext. Empyr. Hypot. l. 1. c. 13. p. 8.

CHAP. V.

The CONTENTS.

They who most owned a Providence were unable to answer the Objections made against it, 1st, *from the Prosperity of the wicked, and the Calamities which happen'd to good Men,* §. 1. *Their usual answers to it shew'd to be unsatisfactory,* Ib. 2dly, *From the great Wickedness which every where abounded in the World,* §. 2. *This they ascribed either to an Anti-God, or to the Stubbornes of Matter; both which Opinions are confuted,* §. 2, 3. *The immortality of the Soul, on which Religion doth so much depend, was absolutely denied by many of them,* §. 4. *They generally rejected the Punishments of another World, and had but very slender hopes of any Good to be enjoy'd hereafter,* §. 5. *That these Doctrines were destructive to Piety, and great encouragements to Vice; and the advantage of the Christian Principles above them.* Ibid.

§. 1. *Lastly,* THey who most owned a Providence, were still unable to give any satisfactory Answer to the great Objection against it, arising from the

the Consideration of the great Prosperity of the Wicked, and the miserable Calamities which oft befel the best of Men. This [a] *Plutarch* speaks of in the most surprizing manner: *The Stoicks*, saith he, *affirm*, προνοίᾳ θεῶν διοικεῖσθαι τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς, *that the things belonging to us are governed by the divine Providence*, who yet are so miserably afflicted, that if the Gods would turn the Tables, and set themselves to hurt and afflict, to overturn and crush us one against the other, [b] οὐκ ἂν δυνάμενο διαθεῖναι χεῖρον, ἢ νυῦ ἔχομεν, *they could not order Matters worse than now they are*; he goes on impudently to say, that *Jupiter* should rather αἰτίας καὶ ἀρχὰς γενέσεως μὴ παρασχεῖν, *not have given us a Being, than having bred us up* ἐπολυμπανίζειν *to torment us, and seek to ruine and destroy us*; *yea*, saith he, *I will add what is much worse, seeing no Wars are without wickedness, that God whose Providence* ἐνδιάθετος *inwardly produceth them, by stirring up Men to them, must be the Author of Wickedness*; and in his Book against the *Stoicks*, he renews the like complaint, if possible, in Words more tragical: And *Cotta*, in *Cicero*, saith, That as an House, or Common-wealth, cannot be well managed without Punishments for

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[a] De Stoic. Repugn. p. 1048. E. [b] P. 1049.

Criminals,

Criminals, and Rewards for good Men, [a] *Sic mundi divina in homines moderatio nulla eſt, ſi in ea diſcrimen nullum eſt bonorum & malorum*; ſo neither can there be any divine Government of the World, if there be no difference between good and bad Men. He confeſſeth there, that he had unwillingly inſiſted ſo long on this Argument, *videtur enim autoritatem afferre peccandi*, becauſe it ſeemed to give encouragement to Sin, as, ſaith he, it would ſurely do, *niſi & virtutis, & vitiorum ſine ulla divina ratione grave ipſius conſcientiæ pondus eſſet*, unleſs Virtue were its own Reward by the Comforts, and Vice its own Puniſhment by the Torments, it produceth in the Conſcience.

And *Simplicius* can find no better Anſwer to this Objection than this, That Men ſhould only judge thoſe things good or evil which it is in their own power to preſerve, or to avoid, and then they never would be ſubject to evil, or want any thing that was truly good; both which, ſecluding Providence inſpecting all our Actions in order to a future Recompence, are plainly inſufficient Anſwers: For,

1*ſt*, Whereas 'tis ſaid by *Cicero*, and others, that Virtue is its own Reward, be-

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[a] De Nat. Deorum n. 64.

cauſe

cause it fills the Soul with inward Pleasures, and with the Satisfactions of an upright Conscience, and so it needs no future Recompence; and that Vice is its own Tormentor, because it overwhelms the Soul with Terrors and Affrightments, and so it needs no other Punishment. 'Tis very certain,

1*st*, That all the tormenting Thoughts which Wickedness produceth in us, depend upon a Providence inspecting all our evil Actions in order to their Punishment, and to the execution of his Wrath. Hence the *Epicureans* so often tell us, that their wise Master, by the denial of this Providence, had at once delivered the Deity from Trouble, and Them from Fear; and *when the wicked Man turneth away from his wickedness, and doth that which is right*, this Reformation gives relief against them, as it gives ground to hope, that this Repentance will avert that Wrath.

2*dly*, 'Tis also evident that all the pleasures of a virtuous and pious Life derive from expectations of God's favour here, and of those Rewards he hath prepared for them hereafter, and vanish when once Sin hath robb'd us of these hopes. And [a] *Dionysius Halicarnassæus* well observes,

[a] L. 8. p. 529.

that

that if the Soul, when it is ſeparated from the Body periſheth, οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως μακαρίως ἀπολάβω τὸν μηθὲν ἀπολαύσαντες τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀγαθὸν δι' αὐτὴν ὑ ταύτην ἀπολεμβύες, *it was not eaſie to diſcern how good Men can be happy, who in this World receive no fruit of their Virtue, but often periſh by it.*

Vain alſo is the Anſwer of *Simplicius*, that he wants no Good, or ſuffers no Evil, who wants nothing it was in his power to preſerve, or ſuffers nothing which he could avoid; when notwithſtanding this he may be miſerably tormented, and almoſt ready to expire with exceſs of Pain, and languiſh for the want of Food, unleſs you can aſſure him of ſome ſubſtantial and more laſting Good, which ſhall aſſuredly ſucceed theſe Miſeries, and will abundantly compenſate all theſe Wants and Sufferings; ſince after this romantick Talk, that *Nothing can be evil which is not diſhoneſt*, and that *he wants nothing, who wants not Integrity*; Pain will be Pain, and Want be Want, and both be equally tormenting ſtill, whilſt the Soul feels what the Body ſuffers.

§. II. But that which ſtagger'd them the moſt, and made them flee to abſurd Refuges, was the conſideration of that prodigious Wickedneſs which every where abounded

abounded in the World. This [e] *Plutarch* exaggerates very tragically, complaining that the Wicked were more numerous than the Sands of the Sea, or the Dust upon the Earth, and that there was ἀρετῆς μηδ' ὀνύπνιον, *not so much as any one who dreams of Virtue, but we all wander, doing things infamous, as if we were possessed with an evil Genius:* He will by no means admit of the opinion of the *Stoicks*, that Sin hath no efficient Cause τὸ κακὸν ἐκ τῆ μὴ ὄντος, *that it should happen* κατὰ τὴν τῆ θεῆ πρόνοιαν πᾶς ὑπονοίαν ἀτοπίαν ὑπερβάλλει *according to the Providence of God, exceeds*, saith [f] he, *the greatest of Absurdities*; on which account he will not suffer this Providence to be the cause of any Wars, *because they are carried on by Sin*; nor yet allow them to arise from any evil Genius presiding over us by his order: He therefore in pursuance of his own opinion, that Evil could not come into the World without an evil Cause producing it, saith thus, δεῖ γάρ εἶναι ἰδίαν καὶ ἀρχὴν ὥσπερ ἀγαθῆ καὶ κακῆ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν, *there must be a natural Principle of Evil as well as Good*; this, saith [g] he, seem'd so τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ σοφιστάτοις *to the most and wisest*; *for they thought*

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[e] Adv. Stoic. p. 1067. C. D. E. de Procreat. animæ, p. 1015. B.

[f] De Stoic. repugn. p. 1049. D.

[g] De Isid. & Osir. p. 369. C. D.

there

there were two Gods emulous of one another, τ μὲν ἀγαθῶν, τ ὃ φαύλων δημιεργόν; *the one the author of Good, whom therefore they called* God; *the other the author of Evil, whom they called* Dæmon: *This,* saith [h] he, *is a Tradition of great Antiquity, derived from the Divines and Lawgivers to the Poets and Philosophers, whose first Author cannot be found.* This, saith [i] *Diogenes Laertius,* and *Agathias,* was the Doctrine of the *Persians* and their *Magi, viz.* That there were two Principles, *viz.* ἀγαθὸς Δαίμων, *one good, whom they called* Jupiter *and* Oromasdes; ὁ κακὸς Δαίμων, *and an evil Genius, whom they stiled* Pluto *and* Arimanius. Now,

1*st*, This Assertion of an Anti-God, as powerful in the production of Evil as the other God is of good, destroys the Notion of a Deity; for, how can the good God be infinite in Power, or in Goodness, if there be an evil Being of equal Power to oppose him, and from whose Power he cannot rescue or deliver those whom this Anti-God subjects to Evil, unless he be of greater Power than this evil Dæmon? So that they who are of this opinion, as *Simplicius* observes, rob God of half of his Power,

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[h] Παμπάλαιος αὐτὴ κατάσιν ἐκ θεολόγων ὁ νομοθετῶν εἰς τε ποιητὰς ὁ φιλοσόφους δόξα, τ ἀρχὴν ἀδέσποτον ἔχουσα, τ ὃ πίστιν ἰσχυρὰν ὁ δυσέκλειπτον, &c. Ibid.

[i] Proem. p. 6. vid. menag. in locum.

and

and of the most noble effects of his Goodness, in preserving us from the worst of Evils.

2dly, It destroys the very notion of Moral Evil; for if there be any such contrary Principle which is the cause of all such Evil, then all this Evil falls out unavoidably and irresistably, it being not in the power of the good God, much less of Man, to hinder it, and then all Moral Evil must lose its Name and its Obliquity, since a Moral Evil implies, in the nature of it, a voluntary breach of some known Law; whereas that cannot be in us voluntary which is caused by an infinite Power in the proper way of Efficiency, and so by this means all Religion, Laws, and Providence, must be banish'd out of the World; for there can be no Goverment by Law, where all freedom of the Will is destroy'd; nor any Religion, or Providence where there are no Rewards or Punishments which both suppose a liberty of Action.

§. III. Others ascribed the cause of all the Evils which were in the World to Matter, which, as they conceived it to be eternal, and uncreated, as was God himself; so did they judge it uncapable of such a change even from God himself, as should free us from the Evils which in this Life we

are

are ſubject to. This Doctrine [k] *Seneca* lays down poſitively in his Diſcourſe on this very Subject, *why evil things happen to good Men*, declaring that this happens, *quia non poteſt Artifex mutare materiam*, becauſe God the Artificer could not change Matter: Hence he informs us, that [l] *à magno Artifice multa formantur prava*, many things were made unhappily by this great Artificer, not that he wanted Art, but through the ſtubbornneſs of Matter. And both [m] He and [n] *Epictetus* agree in this, that *the Gods gave us not ſome good things, not becauſe they would not, but becauſe they could not.* [o] *Chalcidius* from *Numenius* aſcribes this opinion to *Pythagoras* and *Plato*, viz. *Deum eſſe initium & cauſam bonorum, ſylvam malorum*, that God was the cauſe of what was good, and Matter the cauſe of what was evil: And it is certain that [p] *Plato* partly doth aſcribe them to our Progenitors, and partly to the στοιχεῖα *Elements* of which we are compounded: [q] He adds that ἐκ ἐπολίδος τὰ κακὰ δυνατὸν *it was impoſſible to prevent Evils*; nor yet to aſcribe them to

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[k] De Provid. c. 5. [l] Præf. ad nat. qu. p. 683.

[m] Quicquid nobis negatum eſt, dari non potuit, Sen. de benef. l. 2. c. 29.

[n] Ἔσω μὲν δοκῶ ὅτι εἰ ἠδυνάσθο κακεῖνα ἂν ἡμῖν ἐπέτρεψαν, ἀλλὰ πάντως ἐκ ἠδυνάσθο, Arrian l. 1. c. 1.

[o] In Tim. p. 394. [p] Tim. p. 1095. F.

[q] In Thæetet. p. 129. A.

God,

God, seeing they follow τὴν θνητὴν φύσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης *our mortal Nature of necessity*; and *Celsus* saith, that Evil must not be ascribed to God, ὕλη ὑ προσκεῖ ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς, *but Matter is the cause of it*; and *Maximus Tyrius* saith, that the Evils which are in the World *are not* τέχνης ἔργα ἀλλ' ὕλης πάθη *the Works of Art, but the Affections of Matter.* So that the origin of Evil, by this account, lies wholly upon the perversity of Matter, which, it seems, was uncapable of being put into better order by the power of that God who framed the World and our Bodies out of this præ-existent Matter. But against this Hypothesis 'tis argued,

1*st*, That it destroys God's Omnipotency, or at least makes him the approver of Evil; for, as [r] *Tertullian* argues, Either God could have removed Evil from Matter, but would not do it, or else could not; the latter destroys his Omnipotence, the first reflects upon his Goodness: For if God would not remove it when he could have done it, he must be willing it should continue, and so consent to the continuance of it: Now to make his Will the cause why Sin was, without the intervention of Man's Will, reflects on his Goodness; and to say he could not remove it, seeing that im-

[r] Contr. Hermog. cap. 10.

plies no contradiction, muſt deſtroy his Omnipotence.

2*dly*, This Principle, as it reſpecteth Moral Evil, overthrows Religion, becauſe it makes it ſo neceſſary to Matter framed into an humane Body, that God himſelf could not order it otherwiſe, and much leſs Man; and he who hath a Body of Sin framed with his natural Body, is no more culpable for the one than for the other, they being equally unavoidable, and indeed the ſame; and God's Corrections and Puniſhments for not avoiding Sin, muſt be on that account unrighteous.

But to confeſs the truth, I believe the opinion of *Pythagoras* and *Plato* was only this; That as for Natural Evils, Pain, Sickneſs, Hunger, Death, the Fears of them, and the Sorrows they cauſe in us, theſe have their riſe from the Matter of which we are compoſed, and ſo the cauſe of them is indeed ὕλης τὸ παθητὸν the paſſiveneſs of Matter; but that for Moral Evils, called μοχθηρίαι, they had another Principle within us, ἡ ψυχῆς ἐξουσία κυϊσκει καὶ τελεσφορεῖ, *even the free motion of the Soul, which both conceives and brings them to perfection*, as [s] *Maximus Tyrius* diſtinguiſheth. But then conſider that this doth not exempt

[s] Diſſ. 25. p. 146, 148.

them

them from the strength of their own great Objection against Providence, that being taken from the Natural Evils which good Men suffered, and from the Moral Evils which they did: This we find very tragically represented as well by [t] *Seneca* and [u] *Pliny*, and *Maximus Tyr.* as by *Plutarch*, complaining of Nature as *tristior Noverca* a doleful Step-mother; of humane Life, as so full of Miseries that none would have accepted of it, *nisi daretur insciis*, had it not been given to us when ignorant of it; and representing this as the chief Felicity, not to be born, and the next, to die quickly; and them as ignorant of their Miseries, *quibus non mors ut optimum inventum naturæ laudetur*, who praised not Death as the best invention of Nature, and that which was the only cause, *ut nasci non sit supplicium*, that it was not a Punishment to be born; and enquiring, after a long enumeration of the Evils incident to humane Nature, [w] τὶ ἂν ἔν πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπολογήσαιτο ὁ Ζεὺς ἢ ὁ Ἀπόλλων, *what Apology will* Jupiter *or* Apollo *make for these things?* Now from this long Discourse we learn how faint and feeble were their expectations of a future Happiness, when we find not one of the ancient *Philosophers*, who lived before

[t] Consol. ad M. c. 20, 22. [u] Nat Hist. præf. l. 7.
[w] M. Tyr. ib. p. 245.

Chriſt's time, nor *Cicero*, nor *Seneca*, or *Plutarch*, recurring to the only ſatisfactory Anſwer to this great Objection, ariſing from the conſideration of future Rewards, which would abundantly compenſate for all the Evils which the good Man ſuffers for his Virtue in this World; and of the future Puniſhments which evil Men muſt ſuffer from the hand of Juſtice hereafter for their Wickedneſs; tho' it deſerves to be conſidered, that the chief advantages of Virtue, and trouble of a vicious Life at preſent, do viſibly depend on the belief and expectation of thoſe future Recompences.

§. IV. To proceed therefore to the laſt Principle on which all Natural Religion muſt depend, *viz.* the Immortality of the Soul, or her exiſtence in a ſtate of Senſation, and therefore of Rewards or Puniſhments, without which they eſpecially who knew nothing of a Reſurrection, could neither have any ſufficient Motives to lead a virtuous Life, nor any ſtrong Inducements to depart from Evil, or to abſtain from the moſt vicious Practices; for ſince they by experience found, and therefore made it, as we ſee, their great Objection againſt Providence, that good Men often ſuffered very great Afflictions, and bad Men did as often proſper and flouriſh in this World, they only could be induced to live virtuouſly,

ously, or to break off their wicked course of Life, by this presumption, that their Souls might be happy or miserable after death, or after its separation from the Body; but even this could be no matter of their hopes or fears, unless it did remain in a state capable of Perception, and so of Happiness or Misery after the dissolution of the Body. Now 'tis observable,

1*st*, That as some of the *Philosophers* denied the Immortality, and even the Existence of the Soul after death; so all of them owned, that it was uncertain whether they survived the Body or not.

2*dly*, That they had only faint surmises of a future state of Happiness, built upon frivolous and idle Tales, and that they frequently denied the Punishments and Torments of another World.

And *first*, Among the Sects of *Philosophers* who absolutely denied the Immortality and the Existence of the Soul in a state of Perception after death, were first the Followers of *Epicurus*, who said, [x] ἡ ψυχὴ σῶμα ἐστι λεπτομερὲς, *the Soul was only a Body consisting of small Parts*, and therefore after the dissolution of the Body, αἴσθησιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχειν, *it had no sense*: All Good and Evil consists in the sense or perception of them,

[x] Diog. Laert. l. 10. p. 629, 630.

whereas [y] στέρησις ἐστιν αἰσθήσεως ὁ θάνατος, *death is the privation of all Sense*, and therefore, say they, is not to be feared, because when we are, death is not, ὅταν μὲν ὁ θάνατος παρῇ τότε ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐσμέν, *and when death is, we are not.* Hence he derives all the perturbations of the Soul from these two Fables, as he stiles them, *viz.* ἐν τῷ δοξάζειν ταῦτα μακάρια τε καὶ ἀφθαρτα, *the apprehension that they may be blessed and immortal*, and [z] ἐν τῷ αἰώνιον τι δεινὸν καὶ προσδοκᾶν καὶ ὑποπτεύειν περὶ τοὺς μύθους, *and in expecting or suspecting some eternal Terrors:* And that this Doctrine had mightily prevailed before *Epicurus* had taught his Philosophy, we learn from *Socrates* and *Cebes*, who discoursing of the Immortality of the Soul do both confess, that [a] τὰ μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς πολλοῖς ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, *'twas mostly disbelieved by Men*, who rather thought that the Soul, when separated from the Body, was no where, but perished, and was corrupted when the Man died, and vanished away as Smoke, or as the Breath going out of the Body: And that this Doctrine got strength and became more general among the learned *Romans*, and others, somewhat before our *Saviour*'s time, is evident from the complaint of [b] *Cicero* in his Discourse upon this very Sub-

[y] P. 655. [z] P. 637. [a] Plato Phædr. p. 53. [b] Tusc. qu. 1. n. 62, 63.

ject,

ject, that not only the Sect of *Epicurus*, *sed nescio quomodo doctissimus quisque contemnit*, but all the most learned Men did contemn this Doctrine. [c] *Pliny* was certainly of this opinion, declaring that, *non magis à morte sensus ullus aut animæ aut corpori quam ante natalem*, the Soul and Body had no more sense after death, than before we were born: And [d] *Cæsar*, that death dissolved all our Evils, *ultra neque curæ neque gaudio locum*, beyond it there being neither place for care or joy: Yea [e] *Cicero* complains that *populus cum illis facit* the common People mostly complied with this Doctrine of *Epicurus*: That *Aristotle* was of the same opinion, we learn from [f] *Origen*, who saith expressly, κατηγορηκέναι τῦ περὶ τ ἀθανασίας τ ψυχῆς λόγε, *that he condemned the opinion of the Immortality of the Soul*; and from *Atticus* declaring that he held μήτε ὅλως ἐπιμεμηνέναι σωζεσθαι τὰς ψυχάς, *that Souls could not remain after their separation*. And tho' many have undertaken to defend him, yet is this so apparent in his Morals, as to admit of no dispute; for there he plainly doth assert, that 'tis absurd to say, that any Man should be happy [g] ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ *when he is dead*, *because happiness*

[c] Nat. Hist. l. 7. c. 55. [d] Apud Salust. de bello Catil. §. 3. [e] De fin. bon. l. 2. n. 37. [f] Adv. Cels. l. 2. p. 67. [g] De Mor. l. 1. c. 13.

consists in action: He therefore took this for granted, that the dead were capable of no action: And then proceeding to discuss that celebrated Saying of *Solon*, *that no Man could be said to be happy till he died*, he adds, that this was [h] μακαρίζειν ἔκαστον οὐχ ὡς ὄντα μακάριον ἀλλ' ὅτι πρότερον ᾧ *to pronounce Men blessed, not that they were then so*, but because formerly, *i. e.* whilst living they were so, clearly disclaiming any Blessing that could belong to the dead: He owns indeed, that as some good or evil might happen to the living, μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ ὦ *who had no sense of it*; so the dead might be said to be fortunate or unfortunate in respect to their Children and Relations which were so; but then he supposes that they were insensible of these things: And to the enquiry and doubt [i] περὶ τῶν κεκοιμημένων *concerning those that were dead*, whether they were capable of any good or evil, he answers, from what he had discoursed, that if they were so, it was [k] μικρὸν *very little*, and such as could not ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας *make them happy who were not*; clearly again supposing that the dead ceased to be; And therefore adds, that death was of all things the most terrible, because it made an end of us, [l] καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι

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[h] Ibid. p. 13. [i] Ibid. [k] Ibid. p. 15. [l] L. 3. c. 9.

δωκεῖ

δοκεῖ ὅτε ἀγαθὸν ὅτε κακὸν εἶ), *and nothing good or evil seemed to happen to any Man after death.*

The *Stoicks*, saith [m] *Diogenes Laertius*, held the Soul was Body, καὶ μετὰ θάνατον ἐπιμένειν, φθαρτὴν δ' εἶναι, *and remained sometime after death, but was corruptible*; whence [n] *Cicero* saith of them, *diu manſuros aiunt animos, ſemper negant*, they ſay that Souls remain long, but not always; and yet even this, ſaith [o] *Lipſius*, was *inter Stoicos ipſos controverſa res, nec conſenſu recepta*, a thing controverted, and not generally received among them: *Panætius*, ſaith [p] *Cicero*, affirm'd, *interire animos*, that Souls periſhed: *Epictetus*, as [q] *Lipſius* obſerves, hath not one word concerning the duration of the Soul; and *Arrian* is expreſs, that when we die, the Soul goes ὅθεν ἦλθε *whence it had its riſe, to the Elements of which it was compoſed, that of which was Fire to Fire, Earth to Earth, Air to Air, and Water to Water*; στοιχεῖα there not ſignifying the *Stars*, as *Lipſius* imagined, but theſe four Elements: [r] *Antoninus* ſaith, that ἐφ' ὑποθέσει τοῦ τὰς ψυχὰς διαμένειν *upon the ſuppoſition that Souls remain*, yet as the Bodies, laid in the Earth, after a while are chang'd and diſ-

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[m] L. 7. p. 465. [n] Tuſc. qu. 1. n. 63. [o] Phyſ. Stoic. l. 3. cap. 11. [p] Tuſc. qu. 1. n. 64. [q] L. 3. c. 13. p. 293. [r] L. 4. §. 21.

ſolv'd,

ſolv'd, ὅτως ἡ εἰς τ ἀερα μεθισαμβάνει αἱ ψυχαὶ, *ſo is it with the Souls tranſlated into the Air,* ἐπὶ πόσον χρόνον μείνασαι, *after they have remain'd a while, they are chang'd and diſſolv'd, and give place to other Souls to come there*; but then as he always ſpeaks doubtfully of this Hypotheſis, ſo ſometimes he ſeems plainly to deny it; for, ſaith [r] he, *Alexander* and his *Mule-driver*, ἀποθάνοντες εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ καθίστης, *when they die, are reduced to the ſame ſtate, they being either diſſipated into Atoms, or reſolved* εἰς τὰς αὐτὰς τῦ κόσμυ ἀπερμαλικὰς λόγυς *into the ſame ſeminal cauſes of the World*; and elſewhere, *Death*, ſaith [s] he, *is either a diſſipation or a reduction of us into Atoms,* ἢ κένωσις, *or ſtripping us of our Being. Seneca* when he is comforting a Woman, or flattering a Friend of *Cæſar*'s, ſpeaks very magnificently of the duration and happineſs of the Soul after death, but when he is ready *vitam agere* to die himſelf, his comfort is only this, [u] *that he ſhall ceaſe to be, or be as void of ſenſe as before he had a Being, and that he ſhall be extinguiſhed as a Candle is,*

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[r] L. 6. §. 24. [s] L. 7. §. 32.

[u] Mors eſt non eſſe id quod ante fuit—hoc erit poſt me quod ante me fuit, atqui nullam ſenſimus tunc vexationem — quis exiſtimet lucernæ pejus eſſe cum extincta eſt quam antequam accenderetur, nos quoque & accendimur & extinguimur, medio illo tempore aliquid patimur, utrimque vero alta ſecuritas eſt, quicquid ante nos fuit mors eſt, quid enim refert utrum non incipias an deſinas, utriuſque rei hic eſt effectus, non eſſe, Epiſt. 54.

and then shall be no more. And tho' in his Consolatory Letters to *Helvidia* and *Polybius*, he writes in a better strain of words, yet in his Letter to [w] *Marcia* he speaks according to the Doctrine of *Epicurus*, saying, that *Death puts us in the same security in which we were before we were born*; that *it makes us not to be capable of good and evil.* In his 102d Epistle, he talks big of a divine Part in us which joins us to the Gods, and of a glorious Light, which, when we are delivered from the Body, and placed among the Stars, we shall see; and tells *Lucilius* that the Day which he fears as his last, *æterni natalis est*, is the Birth-day of Eternity; but then he had told him before, in the same Epistle, that this was only *bellum somnium* a pleasant Dream; and that he was willing to believe or hope it might be so, on the account of some great Men, *rem gratissimam promittentium magis quam probantium*, who promised what they did not prove, and falls into that abject thought, that *nihil sit ejus qui nullus est*, nothing can belong to him who is nothing: And since

[w] Mors omnium dolorum & solutio & finis est, ultra quam mala nostra non exeunt, quæ nos in illam tranquillitatem, in qua cum nascceremur jacuimus, reponit, mors nec bonum nec malum est, id enim potest vel bonum vel malum esse quod aliquid est, quod vero ipsum nihil est, & omnia in nihilum redigit, nulli nos fortunæ tradit, non potest esse miser qui nullus est, c. 19.

the

the *Stoicks* did in this agree with *Epicurus*, that the Soul was only Body, they could not reaſonably deny what follows unavoidably from that ſuppoſition, that it muſt be diſſolved and diſſipated when the Body is ſo.

Both the *Stoicks*, *Platoniſts*, and others, ſpeak of this as a very doubtful matter: [x] *Plato* introduceth *Socrates* at his death ſpeaking thus, *I hope to go hence to good Men*, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως οὐκ ἂν πάνυ διϊσχυρισαίμην, *but of this I am not very confident, nor is it fitting for a wiſe Man* [y] νῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρὶ *to be confident that theſe things are true: I*, ſaith he, [z] *ſhall now die, and you ſhall live, but which of us is in the better ſtate, the living, or the dead,* ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ, *God only knows.* *Cicero* begins his Diſcourſe on this ſubject with this profeſſion, that he intended to deliver nothing as fixed and certain, but only as [a] *probabilia conjecturâ ſequens*, conjecturing what was probable, and had ſome likelihood of truth; And having reckoned up the different Sentiments of the *Philoſophers* about it, he concludes thus, [b] *Harum ſententiarum quæ vera eſt Deus aliquis viderit, quæ veriſimillima eſt, magna quæſtio eſt*, Which of theſe opinions is true, ſome God muſt tell us; which is moſt like

[x] In Phæd. p. 48. C. [y] P. 84. F. [z] Apol. p. 31. F.
[a] Tuſc. qu. l. 1. n. 15, 16. [b] Ibid. n. 63.

to

to truth, is a great question. And hence we find them [c] all doubting with *Socrates*, whether the things he surmised touching a future State were ἀληθῆ εἰ ὄ μηδὲν ὄντα τὰ τελευτήσαντι, *true*, or *whether there be nothing to be enjoy'd or suffer'd after death*; *whether the last Day would extinguish them, or only make them change their place*; *whether they were then to be in a state of Sensation, or without Sense*; speaking still of this matter by way of disjunction, or conditionally.

The *Pythagoreans* seem to have been the only stiff Assertors of the Doctrine of the Soul's Immortality; but then, as [d] *Cicero* informs us, *eorum disciplina extincta est cum aliquot secula in Italia & Sicilia viguisset*, their Discipline was extinct after it had continued for some Ages in *Italy* and *Sicily*; and *Diodorus Siculus*, that even in the time of *Plato* and *Aristotle* were τῶν πυθαγορικῶν φιλοσόφων οἱ τελευταῖοι *the last of the Pythagorean Philosophers*; so by their Doctrine of the Transmigration of Souls, and περιψυχωσεις their circulation of them for some thou-

[c] Si supremus ille dies non extinctionem sed commutationem affert loci, Cic. Tusc. qu. l. 10. n. 105. Si quis modo extinctis sensus inest. Val. Max. l. 4. c. 6. §. 3. ἐκβηθι εἰ μὲ ἐφ ἑτερον βιον εἰ ὄ ἐν ἀναισθησία. Anton. l. 3. §. Vide l. 7. §. 50. l. 8. §. 25, 58. l. 10. §. 7. Fortasse si vero sapientum vera fama est, recipitque nos locus alius. Sen. Ep. 63. Si modo solutæ corporibus animæ maneant. Ep. 76. Mors aut finit aut transfert. de Provid. c. 6.

[d] De Univer. n. 1.

sand

ſand Years from one Body to another, they deſtroy'd all the comfortable Reflections which could ariſe from the conſideration of its Immortality, eſpecially if we conſider that according to their Doctrine their Souls went not only into [e] Brutes, where they muſt be as incapable of Reaſon, and of Happineſs, as they were; but alſo into [f] *Plants*, where they muſt be incapable of Senſation; and into [g] *bad Men*, where they muſt be as miſerable as their Vice could make them.

§. V. And as the denial of the duration of the Soul in a ſtate of Perception after death did fundamentally ſubvert all expectation of any future Happineſs and Puniſhments in another World, ſo did they generally reject, and abſolutely deny, the Puniſhments of another World; declaring that death will bring us εἰς οὐδὲν δεινὸν *to nothing we can fear; for there is no Hell, no Acheron, no Cocythus, no Puriphlegethon, no Fire to burn Men, no bitter Waters to make them lament*, ſaith [h] *Arrian*. So [i] *Seneca* comforts *Marcia*, by ſaying, *cogita nullis de-*

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[e] Εἰς ἄλλα ἥρη ζώων. Porphyr. de Vita Pyth. p. 188.

[f] Εἰς ὅσα φυτὰ καὶ ζῶα μετενήνεγο. D. Laert. 8. p. 491.

[g] Fuiſſe eum fæminam pulchra facie meretricem, cui nomen Alce, Clearchus & Dicæarchus memoriæ tradiderunt. Agel. l. 4. c. 11.

[h] L. 3. c. 13. p. 253. [i] Cap. 19.

functum

functum malis affici, consider that the dead suffer no evil; those things which make the Infernal Shades terrible, are a Fable; we know that the dead are not in Darkness; there is no Prison, no Rivers of Fire, or of Oblivion, no Tribunals, no guilty Persons, no Tyrants; the Poets have sported with these things, and filled us with vain Fears; *mors omnium dolorum & solutio est & finis*, death is the end and dissolution of all Griefs: These are, saith *Plutarch*, μορμόρων καὶ τίτθων δόγματα, *the Tales of Mothers and of Nurses, which scarce any dread, and almost all do look upon as Lyes and Fables.* Hence doth he represent this as one great folly of the superstitious Person, that he makes his Fears longer than his Life, and *adds to death* [k] κακῶν ἐπίνοιαν ἀθανάτων *the thoughts of never-dying Evils*, calling this τὸ παιδικὸν δέος *a childish Fear*; and representing this as one great benefit of *Philosophy*, *That it had taught them to look upon that death which others fear*, [l] ὡς μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, *as nothing to us*; for the Books of the *Philosophers*, saith [m] *Cicero*, *fully confute all these portentous Figments of the Poets and Painters, nor is there any Man* tam excors quem ista moveant *so void of Sense as to be moved by them, nor any old*

[k] De Superstit. p. 166. [l] De aud. Poet. p. 37. [m] Tusc. qu. l. 1. n. 9. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. n. 4.

Woman

Woman ſo delirous, quæ illa quæ quondam timebantur apud inferos tormenta extimeſcat, *as to fear thoſe infernal Torments* which were once the object of their Fears. Hence he apologizeth for one that killed another, ſaying, [n] *Quid tandem illi mali mors attulit?* What Evil hath he ſuffer'd by it, unleſs being moved by Fooleries and Fables, we can think he ſuffer'd Puniſhment in the infernal Regions? Hence alſo were theſe generally their Conſolations for the Dead, that he was *aut beatus aut nullus*, either happy, or was not; ſo [o] *Seneca:* That *if their Souls remained, they were happy; if they did not, they could not be miſerable*; ſo [p] *Cicero.*

As for the expectation of any good things to be enjoy'd in a future State or any bleſſed Eternity, their hope of it was very little, and chiefly founded upon idle Tales, and therefore is by *Plutarch* ſtiled, *the fabulous hope of Immortality*; by *Cicero, futurorum quoddam augurium ſæculorum*, a kind of Divination that there may be ſuch a thing; by *Seneca* it is ſaid to be *that which our wiſe Men promiſe, but they do not prove*; which ſaying will appear evidently true to any who reads *Plato* or *Cicero* upon that

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[n] Orat. 14. pro A. Cluent. n. 136. [o] Ad Polyp. c. 27.
[p] Tuſc. qu. l. 1. n. 22.

ſubject.

subject. [q] *Plato* relates a Story out of *Homer*, that *Men who lived here holily and justly, should be translated into the Islands of the Blessed, to live there in great Happiness, and freedom from all Evil*; but then he begins it thus, *you will call this* μῦθον *a Fable.* 2*dly*, He hath it only from [r] *Homer*, whom elsewhere he will not suffer his young Man to read, because he had told such foolish and pernicious Lyes of the Gods; and whose Soul [s] *Pythagoras* said he saw when he was in Hell hanging upon a Tree, and surrounded with Serpents, ἀνθ' ὧν εἶπε περὶ θεῶν, *for what he had said about the Gods.* And, 3*dly*, [t] He adds that the Judges both of good and bad Men were only two Men of *Asia*, *Minos* and *Rhadamanthus*, and one of *Europe*, to wit, *Æacus*, who, as it was impossible they should know the Words, Thoughts and secret Actions of all Men; so was it more impossible they should pass Judgment on them according to these things, and therefore are deservedly laugh'd at by [u] *Cicero*; and *Seneca* confidently denies it; he therefore truly concludes all with this remarkable Expression, That *Callicles* might reasonably say, that this was only, μῦθος γραὸς, *an old Wives Tale, and fit to be de-*

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[q] Gorg. p. 356. [r] Ὥσπερ γὰρ Ὁμήρου λέγει. Ibid.
[s] Diog. Laert. l. 8. p. 505. [t] P. 357. A. [u] Tusc. qu. l. 1. n. 8.

spised, [w] εἴπη ζητοῦντες ἔχομεν αὐτῶν βελτίω ἢ ἀληθέστερα δόξαν, *if they by search could find out any thing better, or more true*; and could Tales so confessedly frivolous, and despicable, and in themselves impossible, have any influence upon considering Persons to engage them to live piously and honestly?

Next [x] he tells us a more ridiculous Story of one *Eris Armenius*, dead in Battel, who went to *Hades*, where he was admitted to the sight of the Rewards which good Men there enjoy'd, and the Punishments the wicked suffer'd, and then was sent back to the Earth to declare this to others: Now this Story runs thus, [y] that *all Men who came thither, had* ἐν τῷ ὄπισθεν σημεῖα πάντων ὧν ἔπραξαν *the signs of all that they had done writ upon their Backs, and that some wicked Men were tied Hands and Feet and Head together, and so thrown down, and beaten, and torn with Thorns.* And this, and such like Stories, gave occasion to that reflection of [z] *Cicero*, that Error had prevailed so far, that *tho' they had burnt their Bodies, they feigned they suffered those things* apud inferos *in the infernal Regions, which without Bodies could neither be done, nor understood*; and then he goes on to

[w] P. 359. [x] De Rep. l. 10. p. 761. D. [y] P. 762. C.
[z] Tusc. qu. l. 1. n. 30.

say,

say, that [a] the Souls of unjust Men were put into wild Beasts, but the Souls of good Men εἰς τὰ ἥμερα *into tame Beasts*, perhaps that they might graze the better in their green Meadows and *Elysian* Fields, as if the highest Happiness Man could expect in compensation for all his Sufferings for the sake of Piety and Virtue, were to be turned into a Brute.

§. VI. Now that the denial of the duration of the Soul in a state of Perception after death, and of all future Punishments, did plainly tend to overthrow the fundamental Principles of Virtue and Religion, and give Men great inducements to commit all Iniquity without Remorse, or fear of Punishment, was so exceeding evident, that they themselves did see, and were even forced to confess it. For,

1*st*, They could not but discern that the Doctrine of a state of endless Happiness hereafter, was a great encouragement to lead a pious and virtuous Life; that, as *Plutarch* saith, it was marvellous to see how they who had these hopes of Immortality in them φροντίζουσι τῆ ἀρετῆ *were addicted to Virtue.* 2dly, *How* αἱ τ μετὰ θάνατον ἀγαθῶν ἐλπίδες *the hopes of good things after*

[a] P. 765. D.

death, attended with inexplicable Pleasures, comforted them under all Calamities, and made even the Thoughts of them to vanish; there being, saith he, *such Consolations* ἐν τῇ ἐλπίδι ἀφθαρσίας *in the hope of incorruption and the opinion of Immortality, as, I dare say, must be sufficient to make both Men and Women endure to be torn by* Cerberus, *or put into the Tub of* Danaus: *If then*, saith [b] he, *it seems so sweet to the* Epicureans *to be delivered from the fear of eternal Evils,* πῶς οὐκ ἀνίαρον αἰωνίων ἀγαθῶν ἐλπίδα στερεῖσθαι, καὶ τὴν ἀκρογωνίαν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀποβαλεῖν, *must it not be very troublesome to be deprived of the hope of everlasting good things, and to reject the highest Felicity.* They also saw that this was that [c] *quo dempto quis tam esset amens qui semper in laboribus & periculis viveret*, which being once removed, no Man could be so mad as to live here in Labours and Perils; and that no Man can die for his Country, *sine magna spe immortalitatis*, without a great hope of Immortality; so *Cicero*. Hence he enquires *why any good Man should impose these hard Laws upon himself, as to endure any Torment rather than neglect his Duty, or betray his Trust*, [d] cum quamobrem ita oporteret nihil haberet comprehensi percepti,

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[b] Non posse suaviter vivi. p. 1105, 1106. [c] Tusc. qu. l. 1. n. 27. [d] Acad. qu. l. 2. n. 25.

when

when he had nothing certain to move him so to do; and adds, *that 'tis impossible for any to have that esteem for Faith and Equity, as to endure the most dreadful Punishments to preserve them*, nisi iis rebus assensus sit quæ falsa esse non possunt, *unless he be assured that the things he hath assented to cannot be false:* And [e] *Dionysius Halicarnassæus* well observes, that *if the Soul doth perish with the Body, it is not easie to discern* πῶς μακαρίους χρὴ καλέσω τοὺς μηδὲν ἀπολαύσαντας τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀγαθὸν δι' αὐτὴν ἢ ταύτῃ ἀπολωλυίους, *how they can be deemed happy who receive no fruit of their Virtue here, but perish by it.*

2*dly*, They also saw that the Doctrine of future and eternal Punishments tended strongly to deter Men from a vicious Life: For tho', saith [f] *Cicero*, *the Troubles it createth to the Soul may do it*, fieri tamen magna accessio potest si aliquid æternum, & infinitum malum impendere nobis opinemur, *'twill be a great accession to it to conceive some infinite and eternal Evil will be the issue of it.* And that the denial of these future Punishments did yield a great encouragement to Men to go on in their evil ways, was as apparent; for *if death*, saith [g] *Socrates*, *be the extinction of the whole, or a freedom from all Evils*, ξημίαν ἂν εἴη τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανεῖσι,

[e] Hist. l. 8. p. 529. [f] De fin. bonor. l. 1. n. 44. [g] Apud Plat. Phæd. p. 80. A.

this will be good news to the wicked when they die, that they have nothing to suffer: And therefore tho' these things, before *Christianity* appeared, were represented by *Philosophers* as Fables, yet when it had brought them to light, they found admission from the very *Heathens*; and even [h] *Celsus* saith, *You Christians believe eternal Punishments, and so do also they who initiate us into our Mysteries; they also hope their Souls will be eternal; and this I say, that they rightly think, who say, that they who live well will be happy, and they who are wicked will be subject to eternal Evils, and from this Doctrine let neither they nor any one else recede.*

And is not this a great advantage to the *Christian* Revelation, that when it was first imparted to the World, they found it necessary to be embraced, and to pretend, tho' against all the Sentiments of their Predecessors, that they also taught the same, and that it was a truth from which no Man should recede?

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[h] "Ωσθ' σὺ κολάσεις αἰωνίους νομίζεις ἔτω καὶ οἱ τῶν ἱερῶν λεόντων ἀκήκοθ τῶν τε καὶ μυσταγωγοί, Apud Orig. l. 8. p. 408. Τῷ ψυχῷ ἢ τὰ νῦν ἐλπίζουσιν ἔχειν αἰώνιον, καὶ τοῦτο μόνοις ὀρθῶς νομίζουσιν, ὡς οἱ μὲν εὖ βιώσαντες εὐδαιμονήσουσιν, οἱ δ' ἄδικοι πάσχουσαν αἰωνίοις κακοῖς συνέξουσι, τότε τὸ δόγμα καθ' ἕτοι μηθ' ἕτερον ἀνθρώπων μηδένα ἐκστῆναι δεῖ, p. 409.

This

Tho' therefore both *Plato* and *Tully* are pleased to represent Philosophy as the greatest Blessing God ever gave to the World, and tho' it had usurped the name of Wisdom, yet hath the Spirit of God declared this Wisdom to have been μωρία παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ *folly in the sight of God*; the issue of it, as appears from what hath been discoursed in this long Chapter, being this, that it either overthrew all the Foundations of natural Religion, or render'd 'em uncertain and precarious: For,

1*st*, Since Hope and Fear are the two radical and leading Passions of the Soul; since the expectations of Reward or future Good, and dread of future Evils, are the two sovereign inducements to the renouncing of our Lusts, or the embracing of a virtuous Life; to question Providence, and say 'tis unconcern'd in the Affairs of Men; to represent God as a Being who hath neither favour nor displeasure on the account of any of our Actions, no affection to, or concern for us, whatsoever we may do, to set up Fate and evil Dæmons, Stars and Matter, to controul and over-rule him, or to make the expressions of his Goodness necessary, and therefore such as lay no obligations on us to returns of love and duty, as this *Philosophy* hath done, is in effect to overthrow Religion and the worship of a

Deity, becauſe theſe apprehenſions cut off all Motives to them.

2*dly*, Since God is an all-powerful Being, and therefore able to diſpenſe Rewards and Puniſhments according to our Works, whatever can induce me to believe he will not do it, muſt alſo force me to conclude that he is wholly unconcerned in theſe things, that he doth not love that Virtue which he will not crown, defend and cheriſh, nor hate that Vice which he will not reſtrain and puniſh; it being the moſt natural reſult of hatred to ſhew a great diſpleaſure, and where our Power is equal to our Will, to leave ſome tokens of our diſlike of and oppoſition to it, by our endeavours to ſuppreſs and cruſh it; as on the other hand it is the genuine effect of love to wiſh, and to endeavour, where our Power meets with nothing to controul it, the preſervation and welfare of the Object loved; and therefore it is folly to conceive that Gratitude ſhould lead me to the perſuance of that Virtue which will not be grateful, or the forbearance of that Vice which cannot poſſibly diſpleaſe that Being to whom I am deſirous to expreſs my Gratitude.

3*dly*, Since 'tis evident that all things here do come alike to all, and *there is one event to the juſt and unjuſt*; ſince 'tis not only the experience but the complaint and

ſcandal

scandal of the World, that *wicked Persons flourish in it like a green Bay-tree*, that *they are fat and well-liking*, and often have a late and quiet passage to the Grave; in a word, since here we find no dispensations of Rewards or Punishments, according to the good or bad demeanors of Mankind, it follows that these Doctrines which deny the future Being of the Soul, and make its Bliss or Misery conclude with its existence in the Body, must render Piety and Virtue not only useless, but oft destructive to the Interest both of the Soul and Body, and upon that account repugnant to the Reason of Mankind.

4thly, Since the Will is guided by the convictions of the Judgment, where that is still uncertain and unstable, its influence upon the Will, when 'tis tempted to oppose its trembling decisions by the strongest Passions, by direful Fears, and charming Pleasures, must be inconsiderable, as was before observed.

And, *lastly*, since what is not in my power cannot be my duty to avoid, and what follows from the Laws of Fate and those extrinsick Causes whose Operations are immutable, is also unavoidable, it follows that those Doctrines which make our sinful Actions to proceed from such a Cause, must make it cease to be my duty to avoid them.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

The CONTENTS.

The Unity of the Godhead is prov'd by many Arguments, §. 1. *Tho' most of the Philosophers owned one supreme God, yet had they also their celestial, aerial, terrestrial, and infernal Gods, who by their Doctrine were all to be worshipped according to the Rites of every Country,* §. 2. *The* Platonists *and* Stoicks *held the World was a God,* §. 3. *The Sun, Moon, and all the Stars, were generally owned to be Gods,* §. 4. *And the Earth,* Ibid. *Most of their Gods were Men deify'd by themselves,* §. 5. *They worshipped evil Spirits as well as them whom they supposed to be Gods,* §. 6. *The excellence and advantage of the Christian Faith, in reducing us from all this false Worship, to the Worship of the one true God alone,* §. 7.

I Proceed now, in the last place, to the consideration of those great miscarriages in the religious Worship of the Heathen World, which rendred them unworthy of the favour of God, and even uncapable, upon their own avowed Principles, of the Communications of his especial Grace and Goodness, and also obnoxious to his high

Dis-

Displeasure, and the severest of his Judgments.

§. I. The Crimes for which the Scripture condemns the religious Worship of the Heathen World, are,

1*st*, That they did not know the true and only God, or did not *worship him as God*, and so they robb'd him of his Worship.

2*dly*, That [i] they worshipp'd them *which by Nature were no Gods*, that they worshipp'd *the Creature instead of the Creator*; that *they sacrificed to Devils*, or to evil Spirits; that *the living sought for help to the dead*; that they worshipped *the Sun, Moon and Stars, and all the Host of Heaven*, and even *dumb Idols*.

3*dly*, That the Worship they paid to these false Gods was [k] ἀθέμιτος εἰδωλολατρεία *abominable Idolatry*, as being attended with divers abominations, *viz.* with Drunkenness, all manner of Uncleanness, with Homicide, and unnatural Cruelties to their own Children.

Now the true notion of a Deity, delivered very frequently in *holy Scripture*, is this, that he is that Being *who made the Heaven and the Earth, the Sea, and all that*

[i] Gal. 4. 8. Rom. 1. 25. 1 Cor. 10. 20. —12. 1. 1 Thes. 1. 10. [k] 1 Pet. 4. 3.

in

in them is, and who doth providentially govern and order all things in them *according to the Counſel of his Will*; which notion of a Deity doth evidently deſtroy all the whole rabble of thoſe Creature Gods the *Heathens* worſhipp'd.

What great ſtreſs the *Scripture* puts upon the knowledge of the Unity of the Godhead, we learn from theſe Expreſſions of the Old and the New Teſtament, *I am the Lord thy God, thou ſhalt have no other God but me*; *He that ſacrificeth to any other God, ſhall be cut off*; *This is life eternal, to know thee the only true God*; and the reaſon is, becauſe the true God being only One, the Worſhip of him muſt depend on the acknowledgment of his Unity, according to theſe Words, *Hear, O Iſrael! the Lord thy God is one Lord*; *and thou ſhalt worſhip the Lord thy God with all thy Heart, and with all thy Spirit, and with all thy Might.* For,

1ſt, If this Maker and Governour of the World be not eſſentially and neceſſarily One, there may be many who did concur to the Creation, and do concur at preſent to the Government of it; they may be 30000, as ſome conceived, or may be numberleſs, as [1] *Cicero*,

[1] Nominum non magnus numerus, ne in Pontificiis quidem noſtris, Deorum autem innumerabilis. De Nat. Deor. l. 1. n. 58.

Maximus

[m] *Maximus Tyrius*, and others thought; for when once we acknowledge more than One, how many they may be no natural Reason can determine, and so we cannot know whom we are to love, fear and obey, on whom we are to trust and depend, and to whom we are to render our praises for any of the Mercies we receive, or who it is we do offend by our Transgressions, or to whom we must repair for pardon of them, to whom we must address for any Mercies that we want, or for deliverance from any Evils that we labour under; we know not which of them we are to imitate, or whether by obeying one we do what's grateful to the rest.

Moreover, it either may be known by the Light of Nature that there is One God alone, or that there be, or may be more; if the first, then is the owning of that God alone a Precept of the Law of Nature; if Reason saith, either there are or may be more, then *Polytheism* must be prescribed by the Law of Nature, since that must teach me, that it is Wisdom to worship that which may challenge and deserve Worship from me, as that which is my God most certainly may do.

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[m] Οὐ γὰρ τετιμήκασι μόνον θεοὶ θεῶν παῖδες, καὶ φίλοι, ἀλλ' ἀλλήλοις ἀεὶθυσῶ, Dissert. 1. p. 15. Varro 300. Tertul. Apol. c. 14. Theoph. ad Autol. l. 3. p.

Again

Again, if there may be more than one, then can no Man be certain whether he worſhips all the Deities he ought to worſhip, becauſe he cannot know by the Light of Nature how many they may be, and then no Perſon can be ſatisfied that he hath done his duty, and ſo can have no inward peace, becauſe he cannot know that he hath worſhipped all theſe Deities which are concerned in his Protection, or that he hath injured or offended none of them by his neglect to worſhip them; for, as *Tertullian* truly ſaith, the neglect to worſhip any of them, may be an offence, ſeeing, *præfatio unius ſine contumelia alterius eſſe non poteſt*, the preference of one is a contumely to the other: And hence we find in [n] *Heathen* Stories ſo many Gods complaining of this neglect of worſhip, and puniſhing that neglect with ſevere Judgments.

Beſides, if more concurr'd to the making, or concur to the providential Government of the World, they were, and are, either total or partial Cauſes only of that Creation, and in this Government: To be all total Cauſes of one and the ſame Effect, is a thing impoſſible; for where the Effect is one only, the total efficient Cauſe can be

[n] Vide Diodor. Sicul. l. 20. p. 756. Nat. Com. l. 5. c. 20. p. 521.

but

but one; so if my Soul were wholly created and infused into me by one God, nothing of it could be created by another: If then they be all total Causes, they must all act by the same Power, Wisdom, and Will, and consequently the same Nature, seeing these Attributes spring from the very essence of the Being to which they do belong, and especially in Divine Beings, are identically the same with it: If they were only partial Causes, they can only deserve our worship and service according to that part they bore in the Creation, and do still bear in the Government of the World; which being impossible for Man to know by the Light of Nature, he must be left uncertain what service he should pay to any of them, and on what account; for either he must know that the worship, obedience, and other parts of worship which he pays to any one of them, will be accepted as if paid to all, which never can be known by the Light of Nature, unless it doth assure us that the Will, Power and Wisdom of the one, is the Will, Power and Wisdom of them all; whence we may rationally conclude they are all one in Nature: Or, he must be persuaded that they all require the same internal and external Worship, *i. e.* to be every one loved, feared, and obeyed above all others, and so they must require what is impossible to be performed;

or

or elſe muſt judge they only do require a partial Affection and Obedience, according to that part they have ſuſtained in the Creation, and do ſtill bear in the Government of the World; and then we cannot be obliged, or able to pay them any ſervice, becauſe we cannot know either what ſhare they had in the Creation, or have at preſent in the Government of things below.

In fine, whatever is a God muſt be eternal, and the firſt of Beings, or elſe muſt have begun to be, and ſo muſt have ſome cauſe of its Being, and ſo can be no God; it muſt be either *Ens a ſe*, a Being from it ſelf; or *Ens ab alio*, derived from another, and ſo again can be no God: He muſt be either a neceſſary and independent Being, or elſe may ceaſe to be, becauſe he doth depend in Being on another, and ſo again can be no God. Now if you aſſert more Beings of this nature, they muſt be either all infinite in Wiſdom and Power, and ſo muſt all, excepting one, have Power and Wiſdom unneceſſary and ſuperfluous to the Production and Government of the World, ſeeing one God of infinite Power and Wiſdom muſt be ſufficient for thoſe ends; whereas if there be no ſuperfluous and unneceſſary Faculties in any Creature, and if ſuperfluous Parts be deemed monſtrous, or an imperfection in them, they muſt be much

much more so in the most perfect Beings; or else their Power and Wisdom must be finite, and then they neither could create, nor can they govern the whole World, since both apparently require a Power and Wisdom which is infinite. In a word, infinite Power and Wisdom can only be in an Essence that is infinite, *i. e.* hath all Perfections possible, and then it is impossible that any other Being should have an Essence equal to it, since that must make two Infinites, which is a contradiction; for if they do agree and are united in Essence or Perfections, they are not two, because there can be nothing in which they differ; or if they differ in Essence, Power or Wisdom, that must be wanting in one of them by which they differ, and so that Being cannot be infinite in Perfection: So clearly doth the denial of the Unity of God destroy his Nature and his Worship.

§. II. Now tho' most of the *Heathen Philosophers* profess'd that there was one supreme Being, or first Cause, yea one God, who was *Deorum omnium Deus*, the God and Father of all the other Gods they worshipped; yet did they do this so imperfectly, and with the addition of so many Creature Gods, who were all to be worshipped with the Worship due to God alone, and according to the Rites of every Country, and the

direction of their *Heathen Prieſts* and *Oracles*, that they became, by theſe aſſertions, both Patrons and Eſtabliſhers of all that Idolatry which had obtained in the *Gentile* World: Hence God plainly ſaith of them, that *the* [*] *World, with all its Wiſdom, knew not God*, that they were ἄθεοι *Atheiſts* as to the true God in the World, and that their *Philoſophers profeſſing themſelves wiſe, became fools, vain in their imaginations of him, and their fooliſh heart was darkned*, and that therefore God ſaw it neceſſary to reveal the Goſpel for the Salvation of them that believed. And,

1*ſt*, They had their *Celeſtial Gods*, and theſe were either the Heaven, and all the Hoſt of Heaven, the Sun, Moon and Stars, to whom they aſcribed the Attributes of God, and all the Benefits derived from him, and ſo the Worſhip due to him alone: Or, 2*dly*, The Gods whom the *Poets*, and their Predeceſſors, had placed in Heaven, and which they reckoned Twelve, whom *Ennius* put into this Diſtich;

Juno, Veſta, Minerva, Ceres, Diana, Venus, Mars
Mercurius, Jove, Neptunus, Vulcanus, Apollo.

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[*] 1 Cor. 1. 21. Eph. 2. 12. Rom. 1. 21, 22.

2*dly*, Their

2*dly*, Their *Aerial Gods*, (not excluding that insensate Element) and they were either *Dæmons* or *Genii*, stiled by the *Romans Dii medioxumi*, *i. e.* spiritual Beings made by the chief God, but never united to humane Bodies; or, 2*dly*, The Souls of Men departed, and by them deify'd.

3*dly*, *Terrestrial Gods*, (the Earth it self being accounted the most ancient God) such were their *Lares*, their *tutelar Gods*, and innumerable others, relating to their Gardens, Corn, Sheep, and every other thing belonging to them. And,

4*thly*, Their *Infernal Gods*, such as were *Pluto*, *Neptune*, and the like. And,

5*thly*, They divided the τὸ θεῖον or Divinity εἰς τὸ βλαπτικὸν καὶ τὸ ὠφελοῦν, into hurtful and plaguy Gods, as *Fiends* and *Furies*; or into beneficial Gods, as *Jupiter*; into good Gods, as *Oromasdes*; and evil Ones, as *Aremenius*; and into Male and Female, fix of their Celestial Gods being Female: And *de omni ista ignobili deorum turba, quam longo ævo longa superstitio congessit*, of all this rabble of ignoble Deities, as [p] *Seneca* well stiles them, I come now to speak.

§. III. And, *first*, The World was by the *Platonists* and *Stoicks* deem'd a God,

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[p] Sen. apud Aug. l. 6. c. 10.

but with this difference, ſaith [q] *Origen*, that the *Platoniſts* held it was a ſecondary God, the *Stoicks* that it was the chief God, *becauſe with the Syſtem of the World they joined the νῦς or Mind that made it, as the Soul of that great Body*; ſo [r] *Diogenes Laertius*, [s] *Plutarch*, [t] *Seneca*, and others. The *Platoniſts*, who meant this of the material World, ſaid of the ſupreme Being, that [u] τοῦτον ἔποιῆ θεὸν γλύπλιον, καὶ εὐδαίμονα θεὸν, *he made it a begotten and a bleſſed God*; and *Cotta*, in [w] *Cicero* therefore concludes it to be God, becauſe *mundo nihil excellentius, nihil melius*, nothing is better, or more excellent: Now this, ſaith *Velleius* in [x] *Cicero*, was the opinion *non differentium, ſed ſomniantium Philoſophorum*, not of diſcourſing, but dreaming Philoſophers, and that which ſubjects the Members, or the Body of God, to all the Pains and Sufferings, thoſe Rendings and Burnings, and that Mortality to which the Parts of the World are ſubject;

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[q] Ὅλον τὸν κόσμον λέγουσιν εἶναι θεὸν, Στωικοὶ μὲν τὸν πρῶτον, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος τὸν δεύτερον. Adv. Celſ. l. 5. p. 235.

[r] Τὸ καθαρώτερον τῆς αἴθερος καὶ τὸν τοῦτο τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν λέγουσι, l. 7. ſeq. 137, 146.

[s] Θεὸν καὶ κόσμον καὶ ἀστέρας καὶ τὸν γλυκὺν λέγουσι, τὸν δὲ ἀναβάτου πάντων νῦν ἐν αἴθρᾳ, de plac. Philoſ. l. 1. c. 7.

[t] Totum hoc quo continemur & unum eſt, & Deus eſt, Ep. 94.

[u] Plat. Tim. p. 1049. E. F. 1090. A.

[w] De Nat. Deorum, l. 2. n. 33, 34. l. 1. n. 14.

[x] Dei membra partim ardentia, &c. n. 19.

and

and seeing the worship of the whole, as [r] *Lactantius* argues, must be the worship of all its parts, this opinion makes the Beasts of the Field, the Birds of the Air, and the Fishes of the Sea, the Subjects of religious Worship. *Lastly*, Either the World is governed by a Providence, or not; to say it is not, is to subvert all Religion; to say it is governed by a Providence, is to own that it cannot govern or provide for it self, but hath a Ruler and Governour; who is not in it as the Soul is in the Body, but as the Pilot in the Ship, or the Prince in a Commonwealth.

§. IV. *2dly*, The Sun, Moon and Stars, and all the Host of Heaven, were both the first and the most ancient of the Heathen Gods, and as such were generally own'd both by the *Greeks* and the *Barbarians*, by the Vulgar, and all the Sects of the *Philosophers*, excepting only that of *Epicurus*, who never could digest the notion of *a round God always rowling through the Heavens in a rapid motion, or without sense*, as they supposed all the Stars to be: And as these round Gods, and these θεοὶ πυρινοὶ *fiery Gods*,

[r] Jumenta, pecudes & cætera genera bestiarum & avium & piscium, quoniam & mundi partes sunt, l. 2. c. 5. p. 167. & l. 7. c. 3. p. 654, 655.

as [z] *Plato* ſtiles them, were deſervedly laugh'd at by *Velleius* the Follower of *Epicurus* in [a] *Cicero*; ſo doth he from the ſhining Light of Nature enquire, *ſi intelligi poteſt nihil ſentiens Deus*, how any one can conceive of a God without ſenſe; yet it is certain that theſe were the firſt and the chief Gods, which every where obtained in the World: Hence [b] *Sanchuniathon* ſaith of the moſt ancient *Barbarians*, and eſpecially of the *Phœnicians* and *Egyptians*, that Φυσικὰς ὑ Ἥλιον κ᾽ Σελήνην κ᾽ τὰς λοιπὰς πλανήτας ἀστέρας κ᾽ τὰ στοιχεῖα θεὰς μόνας ἐγίνωσκον, *they owned only the Sun Moon, Planets and Conſtellations, as natural Gods:* And [c] *Plato* declares it his opinion, that οἱ πρῶτοι τ ἀνθρώπων οἱ περὶ τ Ἑλλάδα τούτους μόνους ἡγοῦντο θεούς, *the firſt* Grecians *held theſe only to be Gods*, as many of the *Barbarians* in his time did, *viz.* the Sun, Moon, Earth, Stars and Heaven: And [d] *Plutarch* reckons the *Epicureans*, who denied the Sun and Moon to be Rational Beings, among thoſe who deſtroy'd Providence, becauſe *they bereft them*

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[z] Diog. Laert. l. 3. p. 211.

[a] Quæ vero vita tribuatur iſti Rotundo Deo, nempe ut ea celeritate contorqueatur, in qua non mens ſana & vita beata poſſit conſiſtere, De Nat. Deor. l. 18. n. 27.

[b] Apud Euſeb. præpar. Evang. l. 1. c. 9. p. 32, 33. V. l. 3. c. 4. & Cyril. Alexand. contr. Jul. l. 6. p. 205.

[c] In Cratyl. p. 273. F.

[d] Adv. Colot. p. 1123. A.

of sense οἷς πάντες ἄνθρωποι θύουσι, καὶ προσεύχονται καὶ εὔχονται, *whom all Men worshipp'd, prayed and sacrificed to:* And *Plato*, speaking of the opinion of *Anaxagoras*, that the Sun was [e] μύδρος διάπυρος, as *Diogenes Laertius* speaks, or λίθος διάπυρος, i. e. *a Burning Iron*, or *Stone*, and that the Moon was *habitable Earth*, represents it as very dangerously reflecting on the Deity of the Sun and Moon, which, saith he, have προσκυνήσεις Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων πάντων, *the Adorations of all* Grecians *and* Barbarians *both in Prosperity and Adversity:* Thus *Plato*; forgetting that in the same place the Earth we tread on, burn and tear up, is by him made a God; and to render these things the more plausible, he ascribes two things to the Heaven and the Stars which are the Properties of God alone, saying, that we must pay a more excellent Worship to the Heaven, than to the other Gods, because [f] τῶν ἄλλων αἴτιον ἀγαθῶν πάντων ἡμῖν αὐτὸν γεγονέναι πάντες ἂν ὁμολογοῖμεν, *we all confess it is the cause of all the good things we enjoy.* And, *2dly*, That these visible Gods are chiefly to be honoured as the first and greatest Gods, [g] καὶ δεύτατον ὁρῶντας πανταχῇ, *who most*

[e] L. 2. p. 80. Vide Men. ibid. De. leg. l. 10. p. 946. B. F. 954. Xenophon. Mem. l. 4. p. 644.

[f] Epin. p. 1006. A.

[g] P. 1011. F. p. 1012. C.

clearly discern all things every where; whence he pronounceth them κακίστους *the worst of Men*, who do not thus worship them: [h] *Aristotle* adds, that it was a Doctrine delivered by the most ancient of their Ancestors, ὅτι θεοὶ τὶ εἶσιν ἔστοι, *that these are Gods*, and this, saith he, is divinely said, θεὸς ἦν τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας, that these *prime Essences are Gods*; so that this was agreeable to the Doctrine of the *Peripateticks*. The Doctrine of *Pythagoras* and his Followers, saith [i] *D. Laertius*, was also this, Ἥλιον καὶ Σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀστέρας εἶναι θεούς, *that the Sun, Moon and Stars were Gods*; and this also was the Doctrine of the *Stoicks*; for of *Cotta* the *Stoick*, [k] *Cicero* saith, *singulas stellas numeras Deos*, thou makest all the Stars Gods; and he himself says, *in Deorum numero astra esse ducenda*, that they were to be numbred among the Gods, they being worshipped by all Men. Now tho' all these Sects of *Philosophers* had apprehensions of these heavenly Bodies, that they were rational, and, as *Plato* saith, quick-sighted and discerning Beings, yet this opinion being irrational and absurd, and proper to Philosophic Heads, could never free them from that Idolatry which

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[h] Metaph. l. 14. c. 8. p. 1003. D. [i] L. 8. p. 509.
[k] De Nat. Deor. l. 3. n. 27. l. 2. n. 30. l. 3. n. 36.

they

they committed in paying their religious Worship to Creatures, made, according to their own confession, by the great Creator of the World, since they did indeed worship things without Life, and even that very Earth they trod on, things which are limited and determined in all their motions, and have no freedom in any of their actions, which are God's Creatures made for our benefit and use, and so cannot be worshipped with religious Worship, without giving that Worship to the Creature which is due only to their great Creator; things, lastly, which for multitude are numberless, and so cannot be deified, but we must introduce an innumerable multitude of Gods or Beings to whom we are to offer up our Prayers and Sacrifices, and all the other parts of our religious Worship.

And which is yet more senseless, the Earth they trod on was by them not only the first of their Gods, and as such made the object of their Prayers, but also the most [1] ancient of their heavenly Gods, and that because, saith *Servius*, she was *mater Deorum*, the Mother of the Gods. Thus

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[1] Prima & tellus, Virg. Æn. 4. 166. primamque Deorum tellurem — precatur. Æn. 7. V. 155, 156. γῆν δ' πρεσβυτάτην τῶν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ θεῶν. D. Laert. l. 3. p. 211. Antiquissimam Deorum qui intra Cœlum gignerentur esse voluit. Cic. de univ. n. 46.

did

did they blend both Heaven and Earth together, and made all the celeſtial Gods to be the product of vile Earth.

§. V. *3dly*, The Heathens very anciently and generally worſhipped thoſe Men who had been beneficial to the World, or who had valiantly fought for their Country, with religious Worſhip; and when they left this World, gave them an *Apotheoſis*, and placed them among their Gods. Thus [m] *Cicero* informs us that in *Greece*, *multos habent ex hominibus Deos*, they had many Gods who before were Men, and that they had filled the Heavens with them; and that *majorum Gentium Dii*, the Gods of moſt Nations were ſuch whoſe Sepulchres they could ſhew on Earth, and that the *Romans* believed *Romulum alioſque complures*, *Romulus* and many other new Gods to be received up into Heaven; that it was the common cuſtome, *ut beneficiis excellentes viros in Cœlum fama & voluntate tollerent*, to advance them by fame and by conſent to Heaven, who had been beneficial to Men upon Earth; and that in many Cities, to augment Virtue, and encourage Men to undergo Dangers for the Commonwealth,

[m] Tuſc. qu. 1. n. 24, 25. De Natura Deor. l. 3. n. 27. ibid. l. 2. n. 45, 46. Plutarch. de pl. Philoſ. l. 1. c. 6.

they

they adorned the Memory of valiant Men, [n] *Deorum immortalium honore*, with the honour of the immortal Gods; and because all Men worshipped them as Gods, he thinks it reasonable to confute them who said, *they were Gods rather in opinion, than reality.* It was alone on this political account this Doctrine obtained both among the *Greeks* and *Romans*, that *they who died in their* [o] *Wars, were to be worshipped as Dæmons.* The *Egyptian* Priests, as [p] *Plutarch* informs us, owned that they had mortal Gods, whose Bodies they preserved and worshipped at their Sepulchres, τὰς δ' ψυχὰς ἐν οὐρανῷ λάμπειν ἄστρα, *but their Souls shined in Heaven, and were converted into Stars*: This *Cotta*, in [q] *Cicero*, shews of all their twelve celestial Gods, and then enquires of *Balbus*, *num censes subtiliori oratione opus esse ad hæc refellenda?* Does it require any subtle Reason to refute these things? And whereas some *Philosophers* said these were Gods, *non re sed opinione*, not in reality but

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[n] Ibid. l. 3. n. 35. Ibid. n. 37.

[o] Τῶν δ' ἀποθανόντων ἐν πολέμῳ — οὓς Δαιμόνων ἄγειν θεραπεύομεν. Plato de Rep. l. 5. p. 662. D. E. Τίς δ' ἐκ οἶδε — ὅτι τὰς μὲν ἐν πολέμοις ψυχὰς σιδηρῷ τῷ σώματι ἀπολυθεῖσας τὸ καθαρώτατον στοιχεῖον αἰθὴρ ξενοδοχῶν ἄστρων ἐγκαθεδρεύει, δαίμονες δ' ἀγαθοὶ γ' Ἥρως εὐμενεῖς ἱδίοις ἐπῳδαῖς ἐμφανίζονται. Titus apud Joseph. de B. Jud. l. 7. c. 4.

[p] De Isid. & Osir. p. 359. [q] De Nat. D. l. 3. à n. 37. ad 43.

in

in opinion, which only placed them in the Heavens, and were indeed, *rerum naturæ*, Names only given to natural things, as Fire, Air, the Sea, the Earth; this, ſaith he, doth not mend the matter, they being Deities, [r] *quos auguſtè omnes ſanctéque veneramur*, whom we majeſtically and ſacredly do worſhip, and ſo they muſt worſhip thoſe who in reality were no Gods, and pay their adorations to inſenſate Creatures, according to this opinion: In a word, this is confeſs'd touching the *Apotheoſis* of their *Kings*, and *Heroes*, and *Emperors*, which made the greateſt number of their celeſtial and aerial Gods. Now they themſelves ſaw the abſurdity of worſhipping theſe humane Deities; and hence *Velleius* in *Cicero* inquires, [s] *Quid abſurdius quam homines jam morte deletos reponere in Deos?* What is more abſurd than to turn dead Men into God? Nothing ſure can be more ſo, according to the Doctrine of *Epicurus* and the *Stoicks*, who maintained the mortality of the Soul; whence even *Cotta* ſays, that [t] *they who ſaid the Valiant, the Excellent, the Men of Power, did after death be-*

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[r] N. 45. n. 37. [s] De Nat. Deor. l. 1. n. 29.

[t] Quid qui aut fortes, aut claros, aut potentes Viros tradunt poſt mortem ad Deos perveniſſe, eoſque eſſe ipſos quos nos colere, precari, venerarique ſoleamus, nonne expertes ſunt Religionum omnium, ibid. n. 82, 83.

come

come Gods, and were the very Gods they worshipped, were void of all Religion: And [u] *Plutarch*, speaking of the forenamed opinion of the *Egyptians*, saith, that the introduction of such mortal Gods doth ἀκίνητα κινεῖν *subvert what ought not to be moved, and fight against Antiquity, and the generality of Men and Nations,* τοῦτο τὸ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ταύτους ὁσιότητι καὶ ἀδεῖν ἀπολιπονλας, *who desist not from their Piety towards these Gods,* and tended to bring them down from Heaven to Earth, and to disturb and overthrow the honour καὶ τὴν πίστιν ὀλίγου δεῖν ἅπασιν ἐκ γενετῆς γλυέσως ἐνδιαιτεκείαν, *and the persuasion which almost all Men had of them from their very births, and to open a great Gate to Atheism, and to the Doctrine of* Euhemerus *the* Messenian, *who held that all those they called Gods were formerly the Names of ancient Emperors, and Kings, and Patrons of Ships; by which Doctrine,* saith he, ἀθεότητα διεσκεδάννυσι τὸ οἰκουμένης, *he dispersed Atheism through the Earth;* it being discernible, by the Light of Nature, to be a great absurdity to desert the living God to have recourse unto dead Men, and to make them usurp the honour of the Deity, who were created to pay their Veneration to him.

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[u] De Isid. & Osir. p. 359. F. 360. A.

§. VI.

§. VI. *4thly*, They worshipped evil Spirits, as well as them whom they supposed to be good: I have already shewn in the Discourse of Providence, how generally the notion of a good and evil God obtained in the World, and also in the foregoing Sections, that they divided their Gods into profitable and hurtful Gods, to whom they offered Sacrifices that they might not hurt them; they did not only give the Names of Deities, *perniciosis rebus*, to things pernicious, *sed etiam sacra*, but also offered to them their Sacrifices, [w] ἀφοσιωμένοι ὡς χαλεπὰς ὄντας καὶ βιαίους, *averting their Wrath as being cruel and violent:* This also, saith [x] *Plutarch*, was the Doctrine of the *Chaldeans*, who held the Planets to be Gods; for they held, δύο μὲν ἀγαθοεργοὺς, δύο δὲ κακοποιοὺς, *two of them be beneficial, and two of them to be hurtful*, and the rest indifferent. The *Latins*, saith [y] *Agellius* had their *Joves* and their *Vejoves*; the first had his Name *à Juvando* from helping Men, the other from their power to hurt, whom therefore they appeased by Sacrifices that they might not hurt; to the one they offered, εὐχαῖα καὶ χαριστήρια, *their Praises and Thanksgivings for good things*; to the other, ἀπερρήτοια καὶ σκυ-

[w] Plut. de pl. Philos. l. 1. c. 6. [x] De Isid. & Osir. p. 370. C. [y] L. 5. c. 12.

θρωπὰ,

θεφπὰ, *their Sacrifices for the averting of evil and sad things*; the one they therefore called *dextra* prosperous, the other *læva numina* unlucky Deities. [z] *Porphyry* says this was the common persuasion touching all Dæmons, *that they would hurt and be angry if neglected, and would do good if mitigated by Prayers and Sacrifices, and that many not only of the Vulgar,* ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διαλογιζόντων ἔνια ὀλίγοι, *but also of those who were versed in Philosophy, were of the same mind*, and yet he gives it as a certain Character of evil Spirits, who, saith he, live by the steams of Sacrifices and Libations, *to be pleased with them*; and yet [a] elsewhere he saith, we are to offer to the celestial Gods, τὰ ἀκρὰ τῶν ἱερείων λευκῶν, *the tops or lighter parts of white Sacrifices*, because they were the givers of good things; but to the *terrestrial* and infernal Deities, according to the Oracle of *Apollo*, *black Beasts* and *Birds*, as being τῶν κακῶν κωλυτῆρες, *the Averters of evil things*; and [b] *Eusebius* well infers, that all their Gods must be evil Spirits, because they were every where worshipped by the Sacrifices of living Creatures,

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[z] Ὡς ἄρα βλαπτοῖεν καὶ χολωθεῖεν ὅτι τὰ παρορᾶσθαι καὶ μὴ τυγχάνειν τῆς νενομισμένης θεραπείας, καὶ πάλιν εὐαρεστοῖεν ἂν τῇ εὐχαῖς καὶ λιβανέαις καὶ θυσίαις ἐξιλασκόμενοι. De Abst. l. 2. §. 37, 40, 42.

[a] Apud Euseb. præpar. Evang. l. 4. c. 9. p. 147.

[b] Ibid. c. 10. p. 148.

and

and much more becauſe they were delighted with humane Sacrifices, and moſt of all becauſe their Gods being adjured by the *Chriſtians*, were forced to confeſs they were but Devils, and ſo confirmed the Sentence the *Scripture* had pronounced againſt them.

§. VII. Now hence we learn the excellency and advantages of thoſe Revelations God hath imparted to the World.

1*ſt*, In that they fixed the object of our Worſhip, reducing Men from thoſe innumerable Beings which diſtracted them in their religious Worſhip, to the one true God, who made and governs all things, and to whom only it was therefore due; whereas before they were not only divided and diſtracted by the multiplicity of the Gods they worſhipped, but ſtill uncertain when they had paid the homage requir'd, and in continual dread of Puniſhments for the neglect of that which poſſibly might expect their homage; and hence in times of danger they erected Altars to unknown Gods, and often were by the *Prieſts* and *Oracles* informed that *they ſuffer'd for neglect to worſhip ſuch a God*, yea even [c] *Priapus*; and that ſome of them were incenſed, and

[c] Lampſaceni ob Priapi expulſionem. Natalis Comes, l. 5. c. 20. p. 521.

ſent

sent down Judgments on them for their neglect of [d] *humane Sacrifices.*

2*dly*, In that those Revelations so entirely reduced them from the worship of so many insensate Creatures, which must be vain and fruitless Worship, and contrary to the clearest Light of Reason, there being nothing more absurd and contrary to common sense, than a God without Sense, as they themselves acknowledged. Now of this all the *Heathens* were notoriously guilty, in worshipping by Supplications and Sacrifices, the Sun, Moon and Stars, and all the Host of Heaven; which as they were their first, and to many their only Gods, so were they worshipped by *Greeks*, and by *Barbarians*, saith *Plato*; by all Mankind, saith *Plutarch*; for tho' the *Philosophers* (excepting the *Epicureans*) held that these Creatures were endued with Reason and Intelligence, yet seeing this was an absurd and fond Imagination that οἱ πυρινοὶ θεοὶ or Beings which were only Fire, should have either Reason, or freedom in their Actions, it could not possibly exempt them from the guilt of vain, fruitless, and idolatrous Worship.

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[d] Carthaginenses ob humanas hostias Saturno ut prius non immolatas. Diod. Sicul. l. 23. p. 756. aut 739.

3dly, In that it did convert them from the worſhip of dead Men, to the worſhip of the living God; this was a general practice, defended by *Cicero* on this ſole account, that after death they became Deities, *quos auguſte omnes ſanctèque veneramur*, whom all Men worſhip with religious Veneration; and yet they by the Light of Nature ſaw that nothing could be more abſurd, *quam homines jam morte deletos reponere in Deos*, than to make Gods of dead Men, and that this was indeed to overthrow the honour due to the Gods, and to diſperſe *Atheiſm* through the World, as *Plutarch* hath obſerved; there being nothing more abſurd than not to go to the living God, but to dead Men, for help, *i. e.* to them who neither can be rationally ſuppoſed to have any knowledge of what is done on Earth, or any power to aſſiſt us, or to make them uſurp the honour of the Deity when dead, who, when living, were themſelves obliged to worſhip him. But,

4thly, Eſpecially in that it turned the World from Satan, or from the worſhip of evil Spirits, to God. For, (1.) Whereas the *Heathens* lay under the terror of ſome evil and pernicious Beings which were inclined to hurt them, and it ſeems knew no God who had both Power and Will to preſerve them, the Revelation both of the *Jew* and *Chriſtian* gives ſecurity to all that

fear

fear God from all the malice of Satan and his curſed Crew. And, (2.) Whereas the *Jewiſh* Revelation only declared that the Gods of the *Heathens* were Devils, Ghoſts, and evil Spirits; *Chriſtianity* not only did ſo, but in a wonderful manner ſhew'd this to be true by that power the meaneſt *Chriſtian* exerciſed by virtue of the Name of *Jeſus*, to expel them from their Temples, Oracles, and from the Bodies which they had poſſeſſed, and even to force them, before their Prieſts and Votaries, to confeſs that they were evil Spirits; and for the truth of this they frequently appealed to the Senſes and Conſciences of *Heathens*, and the effects which theſe things had on many to engage them to embrace *Chriſtianity*, as hath been fully proved, *Preface to the Epiſtles*, §. 10.

CHAP. VII.

The CONTENTS.

The Worſhip which they paid to theſe falſe Deities was exceeding bad, they worſhipping them, (1ſt) with the Oblation of humane Sacrifices, yea of their Sons and Daughters unto Devils, §. 1. Theſe Sacrifices were wicked upon ſuch accounts as

do not in the leaſt agree to our Lord's Oblation of himſelf upon the Croſs, §. 2. *The Wiſdom of that Diſpenſation*, Ibid. (2*dly*,) *The cutting themſelves with Knives and Launces, and the Eviration of their Prieſts*, §. 3. *The filthy Rites uſed in their Floralia, Bacchanalia, the worſhip of* Venus, *and of others*, §. 4. *The vile Objects of their worſhip not fit to be named*, §. 5. *Their ridiculous worſhip of their Gods by lamentations, imprecations, reproaches, and by threats*, §. 6. *This vile Worſhip was eſtabliſhed by the Laws of their Countries, confirmed by their Oracles, and by the rule of their Philoſophers enjoyning all to worſhip according to the Rites of their Countries*, §. 7. *The Philoſophers were ſelf-condemned, and acted contrary to their own Maxims, in eſtabliſhing and complying with theſe Rites*, §. 8. *The advantage of the religious Rites of Worſhip preſcribed by the Chriſtian Precepts, above thoſe embraced not only by the Heathens, but the Jews alſo*, Ibid.

I Paſs on, laſtly, to thoſe ways of worſhipping theſe Deities, by which, had they been true Gods, they could not be propitiated, but provoked, as repreſenting them the vileſt and the worſt of Beings. And,

§. I.

§. I. 1*st*, The Oblation of humane Sacrifices was very barbarous and inhumane, and yet it was so generally practised, that we find examples of it in most of the known Regions of the World: It obtain'd in *Carthage* the Metropolis of *Africa*, as both [e] *Justin* and [f] *Porphyry* inform us; and this barbarous custome they undoubtedly learnt from those *Phœnicians* from whom they had their Rise; for, saith *Porphyry*, πλήρης ἡ Φοινικὴ ἱστορία τ Θυσιῶν, *the Phœnician History is full of such Sacrifices:* At *Heliopolis* in *Egypt* they sacrificed three Men on a day to *Juno*, till *Amosis* took away τ τ ἀνθρωποκλονίας νόμον, *the Law of humane Sacrifices*, saith the same [g] *Porphyry:* In *Laodicea Syriæ* they sacrificed a Virgin to *Minerva*; and the *Dumatians*, a People of *Arabia*, yearly sacrificed παῖδα a *Youth*; and *Phylarchus* saith of all the *Grecians*, πρὶν ἐπὶ τὸς πολεμίους ἐξιέναι ἀνθρωποκλονεῖν, *that before they went to the Wars they sacrificed a Man*; and to omit, saith he, the *Scythians* and *Thracians*, at *Rhodes* they sacrificed a Man to *Saturn*, at *Salamis* to *Agraula*, and afterwards to *Diomedes*; that in *Chios* they sacrificed a Man to *Bacchus Omadius*, tear-

[e] Justin. l. 18. c. 6.
[f] De Abstin. l. 2. §. 56.
[g] Ibid. §. 55.

ing him in pieces, because he delighted in raw Flesh; that in *Tenedos* they did the same; and that the *Lacedemonians* sacrificed a Man to *Mars*; to *Diana Taurica* they sacrificed Strangers, whence [h] *Euripedes* justly blames her that *she would admit none to worship her who had killed a Man, or touched a dead Body, and yet delighted in the death of Men*; the *Gauls* and *Scythians*, saith [i] *Plutarch*, used these Sacrifices supposing that the Gods delighted in the Blood of Men, and that this was the most perfect Sacrifice; The *Gauls*, saith [k] *Athenæus*, sacrificed those Captives whom they took in War; this they did, saith [l] *Julius Cæsar*, in grievous Diseases, and great Dangers, and had the *Druids* to minister in those Sacrifices, *quod pro vita hominis nisi vita hominis reddatur non posse Deorum immortalium numen placari arbitrantur*, as thinking the immortal Gods could not be atoned for the life of one Man without the life of another; of the *Germans* [m] *Tacitus* saith, they chiefly worshipped *Mercury, cui etiam certis diebus*

[h] Τὰ δ' θεᾶ χ' μέμφομαι σοφίσματα
Ἥτις βροτῶν ἂν τὰς ἄλε) φόνε
Ἢ χ' λοχείας, χ' νέκρε δίχ' χεροῖν,
Βωμῶν ἀπέρξῃ, μύσαρον ὡς ἡμᾶμνον,
Αὐτὴ δ' θυσίαις ἥδε) βροτοκτόνοις. In Iphigen.

[i] Χαίρειν) ἀνθρώπων σφαττομένων αἵμασι χ' τελειοτάτην θυσίαν χ' ἱερεγίαν ταύτην νομίζοντας, De Superst. p. 171. B.

[k] Deipnos. l. 4. p. 160. [l] De bello Gall. l. 6. §. 16.

[m] De Mor. German. p. 634.

humanis

humanis quoque hostiis litare fas habent, whom also upon certain days they worship with humane Sacrifices: And lastly, even [n] *Porphyry* saith, it was well known that even to his time a Man was sacrificed even in *Rome*, to *Jupiter Latiaris*; and [o] *Plato* saith that this custome of sacrificing Men continued in his time in many places; and yet the wiser Heathens by the Light of Nature condemned this practise as Irreligious and Atheistical; [p] *Justin* saith of the *Carthaginians*, that they did, *scelere pro remedio uti, pacem Deorum sanguine eorum exposcentes, pro quorum vita Dii rogari maximè solent*; and [q] *Cicero* saith, *there can be nothing holy or religious among the* Gauls, *because they used this barbarous and cruel custome of sacrificing Men.* And [r] *Plutarch*, speaking of the same *Gauls* and *Scythians*, saith, it was better μήτε ἔννοιαν ἔχειν τῶν θεῶν, *to have had no knowledge of the Gods at all, than thus to have*

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[n] Ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν τὶς ἀΐνοεῖ καὶ ἀμελέλλω πάλιν τῆ τὲ Λατιαρεῖ Διὶ ἐορτῇ σφαζόμενον ἄνθρωπον. De abst. l. 2, §. 56.

[o] Τὸ γὰρ μὴν θύειν ἀνθρώπους ἀλλήλοις ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὦφθαι πολλοῦ ἐφ' ὧν πολλοῖς. De leg. p. 875. [p] Ubi supra.

[q] His quidpiam Gallis sanctum & religiosum videri potest, qui etiam si quando aliquo metu adducti Deos esse placandos arbitrantur, humanis hostiis aras funestant, ut ne Religionem quidem colere possint nisi eam ipsam priùs scelere violaverint, quis enim nescit eos usque ad hunc diem retinere illam immanem & barbaram consuetudinem hominum immolandorum. Orat. pro Fonteio. n. 17, 18.

[r] De Superst. p. 171. B.

ſacrificed to them; and the Poet in [s] *Stobæus* repreſents him as κακὸξ καὶ *a vile Wretch*, who thought God could be delighted with the ſlaughter of Men.

But, 2*dly*, In the ſacrificing of their own beloved Off-ſpring to the Gods, they were, even in the judgment of the ſober *Heathens*, unnatural, as well as barbarous and cruel. This was done by the *Syrians* and *Phœnicians*, as both the Scriptures and profane Authors, [t] *Poets*, [u] *Philoſophers*, and *Hiſtorians*, do fully teſtifie. From *Tyre*, an Iſland in *Phœnicia*, this cuſtome was derived to the *Carthaginians*, (their City being built by the *Tyrians*) who ſacrificed not only one of their Children, as [w] *Curtius* and *Porphyry* ſeem to hint, for [x] *Juſtin* ſaith they ſacrificed *impuberes* young Children in the plural, ſuch as even Enemies would be merciful to; and *Plato*, that they ſacrificed their Sons: *Diodorus Siculus* ſaith, that they apprehended *Saturn* to be angry with them, becauſe they formerly having ſacrificed the beſt of their Sons, afterwards ſa-

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[s] Serm. 9. p. 101.

[t] Pœni ſunt ſoliti ſos ſacrificare puellos, Ennius.

[u] Φοίνικες ἢ ἐν τῷ μεγάλῃ συμφορᾷ ἢ πολέμων ἢ αὐχμῶν ἢ λοιμῶν ἐθύοντο τῶν φιλτάτων τινὰ ψηφίζοντες τῷ κρόνῳ. Porph. l. 2. de abſtin. Animal. §. 56.

[w] Ut ingenuus puer Saturno immolaretur, l. 4. c. 3.

[x] Juſt. l. 18. c. 16. Χαρχηδόνιοι θύσιν ὡς ὅσιον ἐν νόμιμον αὐτοῖς ἔθυον καὶ ταῦτα ἔνιοι αὐτῶν ἰσοῖς τῷ κρόνῳ. Min. p. 565. C.

crificed

crificed such as they bought, and privately bred up; to correct which fault, [y] ἑξακοσίους μὲν τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων παίδων προκρίνοντες ἔδυσι δημοσίᾳ, *chusing out two hundred of their best Children, they sacrificed them publickly*; and others being in Calamity, sacrificed no less than *three hundred*. *Plutarch* doth not only say that they offered their own Children, and that οἱ ἄτεκνοι, *they who had none, bought the Children of the Poor to offer*, but also that the Mothers of the Children offer'd by them stood by without any Tears or Groans, making a noise with Pipes and Drums that the Cries of the Children might not be heard: Now this, saith *Curtius*, was *sacrilegium magis quam sacrum*, Sacrilege rather than Sanctity; and *Plutarch* saith, it was better to own no Gods than thus to worship them: That therefore such a barbarous custome should obtain among the *Athenians*, so celebrated for their Wisdom, that, as [z] *Eusebius* informs us, they should send yearly, παίδων ἄρρενας ἑφήβους ἑπτὰ, καὶ θηλειῶν ἰσαρίθμους παρθένους, *seven Boys, and as many Virgins, to be sacrificed in Crete*, is an evidence of the prevailing force of Superstition; and that the *Pelasgi*, as *Dionysius Halicarnasseus* informs us, should be commanded by an Oracle to offer the First-

[y] L. 20. p. 756. D.

[z] Præp. Evang. l. 5. c. 18.

fruits

fruits of their Bodies to the Gods, is a ſufficient demonſtration that the Deities, from whom ſuch Oracles proceeded, muſt be evil Spirits.

§. II. But here it may, perhaps, be ſuggeſted by the *Deiſt* and *Socinian*, that if it deſervedly be thought a barbarous and inhumane thing to offer humane Sacrifices, and even their own Off-ſpring, to the Deity, and irreligious and wicked to imagine the Gods could either require or be delighted with ſuch Sacrifices, it ſeems ſtill more abſurd and wicked to aſſert, that the true God ſhould have required the Sacrifice of his own innocent and well-beloved Son to reconcile him to Mankind, and to procure the pardon of their Sins, and their deliverance from his Wrath; even [a] *Cattà* repreſents this as a great abſurdity in the caſe of the two *Decii*. Now to this I anſwer, That the ſacrificing of Men, and offering Sons and Daughters by the Heathens to their *Deities*, was unreaſonable and wicked upon ſuch accounts as do not in the leaſt agree to the Oblation of our Saviour for our ſakes. For,

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[a] Tu etiam Deciorum devotionibus placatos Deos eſſe cenſes; quæ fuit eorum tanta iniquitas ut placari populo R. non poſſent niſi Viri tales occidiſſent? Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 3. p. 10.

1ſt, They

1*st*, They were cruel Murthers of Men, over whose Lives they, who thus sacrificed them, had no just power, and who scarce ever did consent to suffer for their sakes; or Murthers committed against natural Affection, as when they offered their Sons and Daughters to appease their Deities, and so they only did endeavour to appease God by transgressing those Laws of Nature he had implanted in them; but then when *Curtius* and the two *Decii* among the *Romans*, and *Codrus* King of *Athens* voluntarily gave up their own Lives for their own Country, and *Erectheus* offered up his Daughter to *Proserpina* to preserve *Greece*, how celebrated was their Piety, how glorious their Fate esteemed among the *Heathens*, who thought that it became them, τὸ ἰωτῆς σωτηρίας τὸ τῶ συνήμασι προκρίνειν, *to prefer the safety of the Publick before the preservation of themselves*, and said he was θεοφιλὴς *one highly favoured by God* who did so? Now this was our Lord's case; He, out of Love to his Sheep, gave his Life freely for them; and tho' he laid it down in compliance with his Father's will, yet was he not slain by the immediate Hand of Heaven, but only providentially given up into the Hands of wicked Men, who were severely punished for murthering the Lord of Life; it therefore was his great Affection to the Sons of Men, and his ready Obedi-

ence

ence to his Father's will, which made this Sacrifice ſo pleaſing to God, and ſo propitiatory for us.

2*dly*, The Oblation of humane Sacrifices, the Burning of their Children to *Saturn* and to *Moloch*, was therefore ſo unreaſonable in it ſelf, and ſo abominable in the ſight of God, becauſe it repreſented God as cruel and inhumane, one who required Men to butcher one another, and to deſtroy their Off-ſpring that he might be delighted and even glutted with their Blood, and would be angry with them when they neglected to ſerve him in this unnatural and inhumane manner, and ſo it tended to beget in Men unworthy apprehenſions of God, as barbarous and cruel to Mankind. But in the inſtance of our Saviour's Paſſion, God requires no Man's life at our hands, but out of his great mercy, pity, and compaſſion to the Sons of Men, obnoxious to death and miſery, doth himſelf ſend and freely give up his own Son to ſuffer by the hands of wicked Men, for the Salvation of Mankind, and to procure them a deliverance from the Wrath to come; which was ſo plain an indication of his great Love, rich Grace and Mercy to the Sons of Men, as naturally tendeth to beget in us the beſt, the kindeſt, and the moſt comfortable thoughts of the divine Majeſty. Hence that our Lord thus ſuffered by the will

will of God, thus *tasted death for every Man*, thus *died for all when all were dead*, is through the tenor of the [b] New Testament still represented as the highest instance of the free love of God the Father, and of the riches of his Grace in which he hath abounded to us; and in this God is said emphatically to have commended his love to us, in that *when we were sinners, Christ died for us.* Moreover here only one once suffer'd from the foundation of the World for all Mankind, and then entred into his Glory; whereas the *Heathen* Sacrifices were many, and were as oft to be repeated as they were subject to Calamities.

3dly, Whereas nothing could be learnt from these instances of humane Sacrifices for our instruction, unless it be that all Men passionately desire, and will give all they can, to preserve their lives, or that a general Tradition had obtained among them, that they were to offer Sacrifies for the remission of their Sins, and that they were to give ψυχὼ ἀντὶ ψυχῆς, *life for life* (these humane Sacrifices being rather apt to teach Men Barbarity and savage Cruelty, and to thirst after humane Blood for the appeasing of their Rage) this example furnishes us with the most noble Pattern of, and the

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[b] John 3. 9, 10. Eph. 1. 7, 8. Rom. 5. 5, 8.

most

most powerful Inducements to, the performance of our whole duty both to God and Man, *viz.* Of that entire love to God which is the great Commandment, and comprehensive of all the other Duties which we owe unto him. (2.) Of Obedience to him in the severest instances, which is the highest test of Love, *I love my Father*; saith he, *and as he hath given me a Commandment so I do*, being *obedient to the death, even the death of the Cross*, John 14. 31. (3.) Of entire resignation to, and acquiescence in, the will of God, he saying, in his most bitter Agonies, *not my will, but thine be done.* (4.) Of perfect Patience and Meekness under all our sufferings; for *he went as a Lamb to the Slaughter, and as a Sheep before the Shearer was dumb, so he opened not his mouth; when he was reviled he reviled not again, when he suffered he did not threaten.* (5.) Of humble trust in God even when he seemed to forsake him, for he expired with this fiducial Expression, *Father, into thy hands I commend my Spirit.* (6.) His fervent love to the Souls of Men was wonderful, for *he loved us, and gave himself for us*; now *greater love than this hath no Man, than that he lay down his Life for his Friend*, whereas he did it for his Enemies, even for them who thirsted for his Blood. (7.) He gave us a most glorious example of forgiving Injuries,

juries, in his forgiveness of those who after his continual kindness to them, treated him so barbarously, and cryed so loud to *Pilate* to crucifie him; yea he not only did himself forgive them, but expired with this Prayer, *Father forgive them, they know not what they do.* (8.) He shewed his great Humility; for tho' he was our Lord and Master, yet *he came to minister to us, and gave himself a Ransom for many; he humbled himself to the death, even the death of the Cross,* for our sakes: Who therefore, after this Example, can think himself too high, too great, too good to minister to the Necessities and Welfare of his *Christian* Brother? All these, and many other Christian Virtues, we learn from the example of our suffering Lord, and they are so many Indications both of the Wisdom and Kindness of that God who permitted him thus to suffer, that he might be an *example for us to follow his steps.* Now, if the Providence of God, without any shew of Cruelty or Injustice, may permit and order good Men to suffer in all Ages only to be examples to others of Faith, Patience and Submission to the Will of God; if even an Heathen *Seneca* thought this a good Apology for Providence exposing a good Man to the severest Sufferings, that he was, [c] *natus ad examplar ut etiam*

[c] De Provid. c. 6.

alios

alios pati doceat, born to be an example of Sufferings, and that they were, [d] *documenta fidei, documenta patientiæ*, Inſtructions to others of Faith and Patience; why ſhould it be eſteemed unworthy of divine Providence to permit the Holy *Jeſus* thus to ſuffer both as an example of theſe and many other *Chriſtian* Virtues, and for the greateſt benefit of all Mankind? Eſpecially if we conſider that Exaltation and that Crown of Glory he ſoon received in that humane Nature which was the ſubject of theſe Sufferings, as the reward of what he ſuffered, by which we are aſſured of the great love of God to thoſe who ſuffer according to his will, and for his ſake, and of the glorious Rewards they alſo may expect, which is ſufficient, ſaith the *Apoſtle*, to make us *ſtedfaſt and immoveable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, as knowing that our labour ſhall not be in vain in the Lord*, 1 *Cor.* 15. 28.

Obj. But it may be enquired ſtill what was it that could move a righteous God, and loving Father, to ſuſpend our Pardon, Peace with, and Reconciliation to him, upon the death of his beloved Son, and to admit of no atonement for our Sin but through the Blood of the innocent and holy *Jeſus*, ſeeing it ſeemeth at firſt ſight unjuſt

[d] Cap. 3.

that

that an innocent Person should suffer or be punished for the Sins of others? Now to this I answer,

1*st*, That it seems absolutely necessary in this case that the substitution of another willing to suffer in our stead, should be admitted, or that we our selves should suffer what the Law hath threatned, and our Sins deserved, or that a full and free pardon of our Sins should be granted to us without any suffering of our selves or any other in our stead. The admission of another to suffer in our stead is the thing in dispute; if therefore that be granted, the Wisdom and Justice of God in this Dispensation must be owned; if we our selves must be obliged to suffer the threatned Penalty and due Reward of our Iniquity, that being Death under the divine Displeasure, that Death from which we could not hope for a recovery, all Mankind must have been inevitably subject to that Punishment, *all having sinned and fallen short of the glory of God*, Rom. 3. 23. 2*dly*, Should God have issued out a general Indemnity, and given us a full Remission of our Sins, without any thing required by way of reparation for the violations of his Law, he must have pardoned all Sinners without any demonstration of his Holiness and Justice, or of his hatred to Sin, or of his purpose to punish the transgressors of his Law, or to

deal with Men according to their Works, and so without sufficient motives to deter us from Sin for the future, which as it seems not well consistent with his Holiness and Justice, so it is less consistent with that relation which he bears to us as our Governour and great Lawgiver, which plainly seems to require the vindication of his Honour and the preservation of those Laws he hath established from contempt. As improbable therefore as it is, that God should give encouragement to Sin by a too easie forgiveness of it, or that an infinitely holy God, who bears the greatest hatred to Sin, should not effectually discountenance and discourage it, and should not leave Men sensible of the great evil of it, and afraid to offend for the future; so improbable is it that God should have absolutely pardoned Sin without any Punishment inflicted, or Satisfaction made to the Honour of his Justice.

If it be said, he might have issued out a Pardon upon condition of Repentance, 'tis obvious to reply,

1*st*, That in no Government by Law hath this been thought sufficient to vindicate the Honour of the Governour, and to deter Men from the violation of his Laws, all Nations having judged it fit, that Offenders should not be only sorry for the violation of them, and promise to offend

no

no more, but also that they should be punished, both to deter themselves, and others, from the like Offences; and the general Practice and Tradition which obtained among all Nations of offering propitiatory Sacrifices for their Offences done against the Deity they worshipped, shews that it was universally received among them, that something more than bare Repentance, even the substitution of some other to suffer in their stead, was to be done for reparation of their Offences against God, I answer,

2*dly*, That if it be necessary to require this Repentance to preserve Men from violating the Laws of God, 'tis suitable to divine Wisdom to order this should be done in a way most effectual to reform them, and keep them from offending for the future, because this best answers the design of the Law, by securing the observance of it. Now this is done exactly by this Dispensation, in which God hath both given us the most effectual Example in our *Saviour*'s Sufferings to deter us from Sin, and hath suspended all the benefit arising to us from his Sufferings on our Repentance and engagement of Obedience for the future; whereas had God required only Repentance, and threatned Death to the Impenitent, they might have hoped that he who once had freely pardoned the Death he threatned to the Sinner without exacting any

Puniſhment or Suffering from the Offender, might alſo freely pardon the Impenitent, and never execute upon him the Death threatned; it being an act of Wiſdom not to afford a full remiſſion of our Sins without requiring any thing by way of Satisfaction for the violation of his Laws, it muſt be both an act of Grace and Wiſdom to admit another to ſuffer in our ſtead.

3*dly*, Conſider that by the Obedience of our Lord *Jeſus* to the Death in our ſtead, all the great ends of Puniſhment deſigned by wiſe Governours were ſignally obtained, and that with more advantage to God's Glory, than if the Puniſhment of our Offences had been inflicted upon us, and ſo God by it may be truly ſaid to have been ſatisfied, ſeeing that Juſtice which conſiſts in puniſhing for the tranſgreſſion of a Law, is truly ſatisfied, when all thoſe ends for which the Puniſhment of Offenders could be deſired, are obtained. Now the ends of Puniſhment are theſe three,

1ſt, Παράδειγμα, That they who ſuffer may be Examples to others, and may by what they do endure, deter them from the like Offences.

2*dly*, Νουθεσία, Inſtruction, That the Offender may learn Wiſdom by the Rod, that the remembrance of what he is to ſuffer for it, may prevent the repetition of his Sin, and that he may be fitted to embrace the

Counſel

Counsel of our Lord, *Sin no more, lest a worse thing happen to thee.*

3*dly*, Τιμωρία, The vindication of the Honour of the Governour, and the preservation of the Laws he hath established from contempt. Now,

1*st*, God by this Dispensation hath given us the most effectual Example to deter us from Sin: For, (1.) By what our Saviour suffered for Sin, we see that God is certainly in earnest when he threatneth Death to Sinners, and that he is fully resolved upon the punishment of Sin, since he inflicted so great Punishment on the beloved of his Soul when he became our Surety; for if on this account *he spared not his Son*, we may be sure he will not spare his stubborn Enemies. Moreover, this Example shews how insupportable the Punishment will be which Justice will inflict upon the Sinner; for if the apprehension of the Sufferings due to Sin, produced such Agonies and Consternations in the Soul of Christ, that God saw need to send an Angel to suport him, how must the Sinner sink under the Burthen, when it is laid upon his Shoulders?

2*dly*, Whereas inevitable Ruin must have followed upon the execution of the deserved Punishment on the offending Persons, God by this way hath taken a fit method for the reformation of the Sinner,

which was the second end of Punishment; for what can be a more effectual Motive to abstain from Sin than this Example, which represents the greatness of the Provocation in the greatness of the Punishment, and shews that the guilty Person neither can avoid the stroke of God's vindictive Justice, nor bear the weight of those Sufferings which God hath threatned to the Sinner.

3*dly*, God by this Dispensation hath sufficiently consulted the vindication of his Honour, and the reverence and observation of his Laws, which was the third great end of Punishment; for by declaring he would not pardon our Offences without a reparation made for the violation of his Laws, he hath fully vindicated his Institutions from contempt, seeing by this Example he hath let all Men know, that tho' he be a God of mercy and long-suffering, he will by no means suffer the violation of his Laws to go unpunished. Again, God by thus punishing our Sin, even in his own beloved Son when he became our Surety, hath shewed his hatred of, and great displeasure against Sin, for the greater is the inducement to remit the Punishment, the greater must be his hatred of it, that therefore this consideration that he who was to suffer was his only Son, would not induce him to remit that Punishment, and

deliver

deliver his Beloved out of the hands of the ungodly, must be the strongest demonstration of his most perfect hatred of all Iniquity.

But, on the other hand, suppose that God pardoned all Mens past Sins against him without any valuable Consideration, and with an absolute Freedom forgave Men all the Punishments his Law had threatned to them, and ceased from all his Anger and Displeasure against Sinners without any Atonement required; how will it appear he was at all concerned to vindicate the honour of his Laws, or shew his hatred against Sin? For if God could freely pardon the Sins of the whole World without any Satisfaction made to his offended Justice, there can be nothing in the Nature of God, or in his Attributes, his Truth, Holiness or Justice, or even in that relation he bears to us, as Rector of the Universe, which requires he should punish Sin, or shew any displeasure against it, and so the Punishment of the Sinner must depend purely on his arbitrary Will, and it must be as agreeable to his Nature, and as consistent with his Government, to let the Sinner go unpunished, and remit all his Threats against him; which supposition must therefore be absurd, because it gives so great encouragement to all Men to continue still

in their Iniquities without fear of Puniſhment.

Since then no Lawgiver requires the puniſhment of the Offender himſelf, rather than of another for him, who is willing to be his Surety, and ſuffer in his ſtead, on any account but this, that the Sufferings of the Offender himſelf will only or better anſwer the forementioned ends of Puniſhment, when that can equally be done by what another ſuffers, as I have ſhew'd in this caſe it was, the Lawgiver muſt equally be ſatisfied, becauſe the ends of his Law are equally obtained.

'Tis indeed certain that a wiſe and prudent Governour will never thus accept the ſuffering of another, but when he ſeeth a juſt and reaſonable cauſe ſo to do; that is, when it is not unreaſonable or unjuſt to let him ſuffer in the other's ſtead: Now then it ſeems unreaſonable to admit the puniſhment of another for the Criminal, when that other Perſon hath not in that caſe power over his own Will, or freedom to conſent to ſuch a Puniſhment, nor can he ſerve the ends of Juſtice or Mercy by ſo doing; we therefore cannot chuſe, nor can the Magiſtrate reaſonably admit us to die for other Criminals, when they in Perſon may be puniſhed, becauſe we have no power to diſpoſe of our own Lives, but are obliged to preſerve them till Providence ſees fit to call

call us hence; the Life we may be willing to lay down for others, we have no power to take up again, nor can we hope for a reward from God for suffering without his order for the sake of Evil-doers, nor is it visible how we can serve the ends of Justice or of Government by so doing, more than the Criminal would do himself by his own Sufferings; but in the instance of our blessed Lord all things are otherwise: For,

1*st*, He was a willing Sufferer; *None*, saith he, *takes away my life, I lay it down of my self*, John 10. 18. ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, not God the Father by any act of his Dominion, or an immediate Stroke, but only by his providential Dispensation; not Man, by any force he could have exercised upon him, had he not been willing of himself to lay down his Life; and when a Body was prepared in which he was to suffer, said, *Lo! I come to do thy will, O God.*

2*dly*, He had that power over his Life which we have not; *I have power*, saith he, *to lay it down:* And,

3*dly*, What he thus laid down he had power to take up again, yea he was sure to do it before his Body saw Corruption, *Acts* 2. 24.

4*thly*, He was assured of an ample compensation for, and glorious reward of all his

his Sufferings, and therefore *for the joy that was ſet before him endured the Croſs*, Hebr. 12. 2. Now ſince *Philoſophers* thought the Gods expected they ſhould retain their Virtue with the loſs of Life, ſince 'tis not thought unjuſt in God the Father, or the Son, to require *Chriſtians* to be faithful to them to the death in expectation of that Crown of Life which fadeth not away, or to lay down this temporal Life, that we may find it happily improved into Life eternal; why ſhould it be conceived hard in God the Father to require his Son to lay down that Life for a little ſeaſon, for the Salvation of Mankind, which would ſo ſoon be recompenſed, not only with a glorious Reſurrection, but alſo with his Seſſion at the Right-hand of God, and ſuch a glorious Name and Exaltation, that *at the name of Jeſus every knee doth bow, of things in heaven, and in the earth, and under the earth?* Hebr. 2. 9. Phil. 2. 10.

Laſtly, Since by his Sufferings he ſerved the ends of Mercy in our deliverance from Death, and all the ends of Government and legal Juſtice were ſo eminently obtained by his Vicarial Puniſhment, as hath been ſhewed already, there ſeems ſufficient reaſon why the great Rector of the World with equal Wiſdom, Juſtice and Mercy ſhould thus admit his Son to ſuffer in our ſtead.

stead. From this prolix, but I hope not unprofitable Digression, I return,

§. III. *3dly*, To other instances of the Cruelty and Inhumanity which obtained among the *Heathens*, as part of that religious Worship which they thought due unto their Deities, as *v. g.*

1*st*, The cutting of themselves with Knives and Lances, till the Blood gushed out upon them, as did the Priests of *Baal*, 1 *Kings* 18. 28. This was a [c] Rite used, saith *Herodotus* to *Isis*; saith *Apuleius* to the *Mother of the Gods*; to *Bellona*, saith *Lampridius*: And like this was,

2*dly*, The Eviration of those *Priests* which served the *Mother of the Gods*; of which, to omit *Horace*, *Juvenal*, *Lucan*, *Tibullus*, among the Poets, we have an account in [f] *Herodotus*, [g] *Pliny*, *Seneca*, and

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[c] In Isidis sacris Cardo τὰ μέτωπα τύπτουσι μαχαίραις. Euterp. c. 16. Lacerant lacertos, veterum vulnerum referant Cicatrices. Jul. Firm. p. 4. Ancipiti ferro quod gerebant sua quisque brachia dissecant, Metamorph. l. 8. p. 214. Τάμνονται δὲ τοὺς πήχεας, Lucian. de Dea Syr. p. 419. Bellonæ servientes vere exsecare brachium præcepit studio crudelitatis. in Vita Commodi, p. 278.

[f] De Gallo Phrygiæ fluvio ἀφ' οὗ δὲ τὴν ἐπονομίην φέρουσιν οἱ τῇ θεῷ τομίαι ἱερώμενοι, l. 1. c. 20. ἀπ' ἐκείνου δὲ τοὺς τεμνομένους τὰ αἰδοῖα γάλλους καλέουσι. Steph.

[g] Samia testa Matris Deûm Sacerdotes qui Galli vocantur Virilitatem amputant, Plin. 35. c. 12.

others,

others. Now the Reflection of [h] *Seneca* upon theſe Practices is this, *how will they dread the Gods when angry, who thus ſerve them when they are propitious?* and ſaith [i] *Quintilian*, if the Deity compel them to do this, he is angry.

§. IV. 2*dly*, To paſs on to their obſcene and filthy Rites, they were ſo many, that it is not eaſie to recount them; they obtained ſo generally, that ſcarce a Nation or City was free from them; and they had few of their celebrated Deities which were not worſhipped with ſome of them. And,

1*ſt*, The *Floralia*, among the *Romans*, as they had their original from the Whore *Flora*, ſo were they celebrated for four Days together by ſhameleſs Strumpets running up and down the Streets naked, and uſing many laſcivious and obſcene Geſtures and Speeches, ſo vile, that *Cato* could not bear the ſight of them. And [k] *Juſtin* informs us of the Adulteries committed at thoſe Games.

2*dly*, The *Bacchanalia*, or *Eleuſinian* Solemnities, as they were celebrated in the

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[h] Ille viriles partes ſibi amputat, ille lacertos ſecat, ubi iratos timent, qui ſic propitios merentur; apud Auguſt. de Civit. Dei, l. 6. c. 10.

[i] Optime igitur Quintilianus in Fanatico, iſtud ſi Deus cogit iratus eſt, apud Lactant. l. 1. c. 21. p. 117.

[k] L. 43. c. 4.

Night,

Night, so were they in the vilest manner Deeds of Darkness; they being so full of all manner of Lewdness, that *Varro* said, they could only be celebrated by Mad-men, they were, saith *Nazianzen*, ἀσχεῖ τοῖς σώμασι καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν, such as rendred Men impure in Body and in Actions; *Men in the dark then satisfying their Lust both on Women and young Children*, as [l] *Livy* doth inform us, on which account they were banished out of *Rome*; and the [m] *Scholiast* upon *Aristophanes* saith, this was a consequent of their Drunkenness at that Feast: Hence Wise-men gave this advice to married Women, [n] τοῖς ὠρίοσμοῖς καὶ μυστηρίοσμοῖς ἀπέχειν, *to abstain from the Feasts of* Bacchus *and of* Ceres, *or the Mother of the Gods, because they tended to Drunkenness and the Corrupting of chast Women*; and it was proverbially said of a chast Woman, that [o] (ἐν Βακχείοις ὅσ' ἐδιαφθάρησε), *she was one who could not be Corrupted at the Feasts of Bacchus*; and yet these were Solemnities observed not in *Greece* only, but in

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[l] Cum vinum animos, & nox & mixti fœminis mares, ætates teneræ majoribus, discrimen omne pudoris extinxissent, corruptelæ primum omnis generis fieri cœptæ, cum ad id quisque quo natura pronioris libidinis esset, paratam Voluptatem haberet, nec unum genus noxæ, stupra promiscua ingenuorum fœminarumque erant, l. 39. p. 487.

[m] Ἀκόλυθα τῷ Διονυσιακῷ πότῳ τὰ ἀφροδίσια, p. 384.

[n] Stob. Serm. 72. p. 444, 445.

[o] Ibid. Serm. 5. p. 66.

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most Nations of the World. And altho' these Solemnities were only celebrated in the Night, and kept so secret that it was death to divulge them, διὰ τ αἰσχυνὴν τ ἐν τ ζωσεσιας ἐπακολυθᾶς, *by reason of the shame of their vile practices*, saith *Diodorus Siculus*; yet was it a received opinion among them, that they who were initiated into these and such like Mysteries, and made ἔποπ) *Seers*, should [p] *dwell in the Islands or Region of the Blessed, and have a presidence there above others*, tho' this was a thing so plainly contrary to Reason, that [q] *Diogenes* laugh'd at it; and [r] *Plutarch* having cited *Sophocles* pronouncing them happy who died soon after they were initiated, and them miserable in *Hades* who were not, cautions his young Man against it, as a Saying which had filled πολλὰς ἀνθρώπων μυριάδας, *many Myriads with Despondency*, and therefore he confutes it with that Saying of *Diogenes*, that 'twas ridiculous to think that *Palæcion* the Thief should be happy because he was initiated, and *Epaminondas* miserable be-

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[p] Ἐν ᾅδᾳ περιδείπνοις οἱ μεμυημένοι τυγχάνουσιν. Ita Athenienses ad Diogen. Laert. l. 6. §. 39. Ubi vide Menag. & notas, & de Antisthene Orphicis Mysteriis initiato, ὅτι ἱερέως ἄπιθι ὅτι οἱ ταῦτα μυούμενοι πολλῶ· ἀμαθῶν ἐν ᾅδᾳ μείονσι, Ibid §. 4. Φιλόλιμός τε ἐστὶν ἐν ᾅδᾳ οἱ μεμυημένοι. Schol. Aristophan. p. 228.

[q] Γελοῖον γὰρ. [r] De aud. Poet. p. 21.

cause

cause he was not; which notwithstanding how much this Doctrine prevailed we learn from two grave Authors, *viz.* [t] *Isocrates* in his Panegyrick, and [u] *Aristides* in his *Panathenaica*, who represent these as the great advantages of this Initiation, *viz.* the pardon of all the miscarriages of their past life, a comfortable life, good hopes at death, and better hopes after death, *viz.* a freedom from that Darkness and Filthiness which others must expect; ἀμύητος, or one not initiated, in their Language signifying the same as a profane and wicked Person: In a word [w] *Juvenal*'s enquiry shews this was the common practice in their Temples, and [x] *Tatian* informs us from his own knowledge, that their Mysteries were performed chiefly by effeminate People, and *Hermophradites.*

At *Abydus*, *Samos*, *Ephesus*, and in many other places, they built Temples *Meretriciæ*

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[t] Τελεῖσθαι δὲ μετέχουσιν ὥστε τὸν ἅπαντα βίον τελεώτερον καὶ τὸν σύμπαντα αἰῶνα ἡδίους τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν. Isocr. p. 90.

[u] Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦ τε κέρδους καὶ πανηγύρεως — ἐκ αἰῶνος πρότερα χέγνε δυσκολιῶν λύσεις καὶ ἀπαλλαγαὶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥστε τελεσθῆναι ἡδέως ἔχειν τὰς ἐλπίδας ὡς ἀμείνονα διαδέξασθαι, καὶ ἐκ ἐν σκότῳ τέ καὶ βορβόρῳ κεισομένους, ἃ ὁ τοῦ ἀμυήτους ἀναμένει. Aristid,

[w] In quo non prostat fœmina Templo? Sat. 9. v. 24.

[x] Ταῦτα ἦν ἰδὼν ἔτι ὢν καὶ μυστηρίων μεταλαβὼν καὶ τὰς ὥστε πᾶσι θρησκείαις δοκιμάσας διὰ πλυθρείων καὶ ἀνδρογυνῶν σωρισαμένους. Contra. Gent. p. 165. A.

Veneri,

Veneri, *i. e.* for Whoredom, at which the *Phœnicians* and others proſtituted their Daughters before Marriage. The *Babylonians*, ſaith *Strabo*, were directed to do this by an [x] *Oracle*, and by this they were, ſaith *Herodotus*, made holy, ἱερωσαμένας τῇ θεῷ, *and conſecrated to the Goddeſs*; and a like Law, ſaith he, obtained among the *Cyprians*. The [y] Law of the *Armenians* obliged even the moſt noble Perſons to conſecrate their Virgins to *Annitis* by a long practice of this Sin.

This, ſaith [z] *Athenæus*, was the Practice of the *Lydians*, the *Locrians*, the *Cyprians*, καὶ πάνλων ἁπλῶς τῷ ἑταρισμῷ τὰς ἑαυτῶν κόρας ἀφοσιούντων, and of all who conſecrated their Virgins by Whoredom. The *Corinthian Venus* had, ſaith [a] *Strabo*, πλείους ἢ χιλιάς ἱερο-δούλους ἑταίρας, more than a thouſand Whores who miniſtred at once to her, and thoſe who came to worſhip her; by theſe they ſupplicated, ſaith [b] *Athenæus*, for Bleſſings, and vow'd that if they obtained their Petitions, they would encreaſe her ſtock of Whores. The *Cappadocians* had multitudes of like Women who proſtituted themſelves

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[x] Καλὰ τὸ λόγιον, l. 16. p. 745.

[y] Οἷς νόμος ἦν καλλιπρονοηθείσαις πολλοὺς χρόνον ἐπὶ τῇ θεῷ, μετὰ ταῦτα δίδοσθαι πρὸς γάμον. Strabo, l. 6. p. 332. [z] L. 12. p. 516. A. B. [a] L. 8.

[b] L. 13. p. 573.

in

in her Temple; and hence, saith *Strabo*, it was called, μικρὰ κόρινθος, *a little Corinth.* In the Temple of the *Egyptian Isis* the same nefarious practice obtained, her Solemnities being stiled by *Juvenal*, *Isiacæ sacraria lenæ*, the Sacra of the Bawd *Isis*: And [c] *Lucian* says, the Woman who would not shave herself at the Funeral of *Adonis*, was bound to prostitute her self for a Day to Strangers, καὶ ὁ μισθὸς Ἀφροδίτῃ θυσίη γίνεται, *and to sacrifice her Gain to Venus.* [d] *Valerius Maximus* informs us, that in *Sicca*, an *African* Colony, their Matrons prostituted themselves in the Temples of *Venus*; and [e] *Athanasius* saith of the *Phœnicians*, that their Women did prostitute themselves before their Idols, and dedicate their Gain to their Gods, νομίζουσι τῇ πορνείᾳ τὸν θεὸν ἑαυτοῖς ἱλάσκεσθαι, καὶ εἰς εὐμένειαν ἄγειν αὐτοὺς, *thinking by their Whoredoms to propitiate the Goddess, and procure her Benevolence.* *Julius Firmicus* informs us, that in the Temple of *Juno*, [f] *Sodomy was not only committed, but made the matter of their Glory.* The *Oracle*

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[c] De Dea Syria, p. 752.

[d] Siccæ est fanum Veneris, in quod se Matronæ conferebant, atque inde procedentes dotes corporis injuria conferebant, l. 2. c. 6.

[e] Orat. adv. Gentes, p. 27.

[f] Videre est in ipsis Templis viros muliebria pati, & hanc impuri & impudici corporis labem gloriosa ostentatione deregere, p. 7.

at *Delphos*, saith [g] *Theodoret*, praised the Wisdom of *Lycurgus*, who allowed the love of Boys; and the *Pythian* Oracle, saith [h] *Lucian*, the Wisdom of *Socrates*, who practised it as μάλιστα ὠφελοῦν *most profitable*; and the *Phœnicians*, saith [i] *Athanasius*, *thought it a grateful piece of service to the Mother of the Gods to play the Sodomites.*

§. V. 3*dly*, They had many Rites which made their Worship incredibly and almost beyond imagination vile as to the Object of it: For,

1*st*, What can strike a greater horrour into our Thoughts than this Consideration, that they worshipped τὰ ἄρρητα μόρια, what modesty will not permit us to mention, paying their worship to *Priapus*, and saying, τὸ μόριον τῆς γαμετῆς τὸ τῆς γενέσεως αἴτιον τιμᾶσθαι προσηκόντως, that Part of the Body was fit to be worshipped whence we received our Being. [k] *Diodorus Siculus* informs us it was not only worshipped among the *Egyptians* in the *Sacra* of *Isis* and *Osiris*, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐθνῶν ὀλίγοις καθιερωκέναι καὶ τὰς τελετάς, but in the Solemnites of many other Nations, and that he was there worshipped not only in the sacred *Offices of their Cities, but also*

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[g] Serm. 10. adv. Gr. p. 630. A. [h] De Amor. p. 233.
[i] Orat. adv. Gent. p. 165. [k] Diod. Sicul. l. 1. p. 78. ibid.

of

of their [l] *Villages and Gardens, not only in the Solemnities of* Bacchus, *but in all their other Sacra,* and kissed by them who came to the Solemnity, and to him their Choir of Singers chanted φάλλικα ἄσματα, *their lewd Songs.* And yet of this vile Deity it is to be observed from their [m] *Historians,* that he being expelled from the City *Lampsacum,* the Inhabitants were smitten with strange Diseases in their Secrets, from which the *Oracle* at *Dodona* told them they could not be relieved till they did honour to this God. [n] *Theodoret* adds, that in the *Eleusinian* Solemnities they worshipped *Pectem muliebre,* as the *Phallus* was reverenced in the Solemnities of *Bacchus.* And we know that *Ceres* was chiefly worshipped in *Sicily,* whence others derived her *Sacra.* Now of *Syracusa,* a chief City in *Sicily,* [o] *Athenæus* informs us, from an Historian of that place, that they in the *Thesmophoria* of *Ceres* formed ἑρτὰς γυναικείας, and carried them about in pomp. Now sure this is sufficient to justifie the saying of *Theodoret,* that

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[l] Τὰς δὲ τιμὰς ἐ μόνον κατ' πόλιν ἀπονέμουσιν τῷ Πειράτῃ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς, ἀλλὰ κὴ κατ' ἀγροικίας — ἐν τε τ θυσίαις ἐ μόνον τ Διονυσιακαῖς ἀλλὰ κὴ τ ἄλλας ἁπάσας ἔτ ὁ θεὸς τυγχάνει τιμῆς μᾶ γέλωτ κὴ παιδιᾶς παρεσκεύασεν ἐν τ θυσίαις. Ibid. l. 4. p. 214.

[m] Nat. Com. l. 5. c. 20. p. 721.

[n] Τὸν κλέναν μὲ ἡ ἐλάσις, ἡ φαλλαγωγία δ' ἀ φαλλόν, Serm. adv. Gr. p. 583.

[o] L. 14. p. 647. A.

in these Solemnities, πᾶν εἶδος ἀκολασίας ἀδεῶς ἐτολμᾶτο, *all kind of Impurity was freely tolerated*, and the severe Censure in [p] *Cicero, that by these practices they did not confirm but rather take away all Religion.* To conclude, [q] *Minutius Fælix*, and [r] *Origen* say of the *Egyptians*, that they worshipped a Fart.

§. VI. And, lastly, they used many Ceremonies which were exceedingly ridiculous, and such as no true Deity could be pleased with; among which we may reckon,

1*st*, The lamenting for those Gods which they adored; this was a part of that solemn Worship which they paid in *Egypt* to *Osiris* and *Adonis*, in which Myriads of them did at once [s] lament their God, and

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[p] Utrum his confirmâsse Religionem videtur, an penitus totum sustuliisse? Omitto Eleusinam sanctam illam & augustam, ubi initiantur gentes orarum ultimæ, prætereo Samothraciam eaque quæ omni nocturno aditu occulta coluntur Sylvestribus sepibus densa. De Nat. D. l. 1. n. 83.

[q] Nec Serapidem magis quam Strepitus per pudenda Corporis expressos, contremiscunt, p. 32.

[r] Καὶ ἔπω λέγω τοὺς τὸ Σώματος φυσαίας ἐν θύσαις φειδόμενον τῆ Ἀιγυπτίων. Adv. Cels. l. 3. p. 235. Eadem habent Clem. Recogn. l. 5. & Hieron. in Isaiam, l. 13. c. 46. F. 251.

[s] Τὰ ὄργια εἰς Ἄδωνιν ἐπιτελέουσι καὶ εἰς μνήμην τοῦ παθεος τύπτονται καὶ θρηνέουσι, sunt autem qui dicunt τὰ περθεα ἀκ εἰς Ἄδωνιν ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν Ὄσιριν ταῦτα ποιήσεως. Lucian de Dea Syria, p. 750 — 752.

beat

beat one another; and, saith *Herodotus*, *even cut themselves with Knives.* The like Ceremonies were used in the *Eleusinia Sacra*, in the Solemnities of *Ceres*, they [t] lamenting the Rape of *Proserpina*, whom *Pluto* had convey'd into the lower Regions; [u] her *Sacra* were the same with those of *Isis*, save only that they added to them [w] *obscene Words*, because they comforted the Goddess in her Sorrows; and in those of *Cybele* lamenting [x] *Attis* slain or emasculated, and in the Solemnities of *Bacchus* torn in pieces. Now the absurdity of this Worship, saith [y] *Plutarch*, *Xenophanes Colophonius* observed, and therefore said, εἰ μὲ θεοὶ εἰσι μὴ θρηνεῖτε αὐτὲς, εἰ ὃ ἄνθρωποι μὴ θύετε αὐτοῖς, *if they be Gods do not lament them, if Men do not offer Sacrifice to them*; and [z] he brings in *Lycurgus* admonishing the *Thebans*, in the like manner, if they esteemed them Gods, not to lament, or if they

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[t] Sacra vero Cereris Eleusinæ non sunt his dissimilia, nam sicut ibi Osiris puer planctu matris inquiritur, ita hic ad incestum Patris rapta Proserpina. Lact. l. 1. c. 21. p. 119.

[u] Mater magna instituit ut quotannis in Sacris ejus plangeretur Attis. Serv. in Æn. 9.

[w] Ἐθος ὃν ὅσιν αὐτοῖς ἐν ταύταις τῆ ἡμέραις αἰσχρολογεῖν διὰ τὸ τὴ θεὸν ἐπὶ τῆ τ κόρης ἁρπαγῆ λυπήσθαι γελάσαι διὰ τ αἰσχρολογίαν. Diod. Sicul. l. 5. p. 298. A.

[x] Lugete Attin, lugete Osirin, lugete Liberum, lugete Proserpinam, Adonis quasi maritus plangitur Veneris. Jul. Firmic. p. 14.

[y] De Superst. p. 171, Lacon. Apoth. p. 228. D.

[z] De Is. & Osir. p. 379. E. La-

thought they were only Men, not to worship them. Add to this,

2*dly*, Their absurd custome of worshipping their Gods by Imprecations and Reproaches, which both the [a] *Fathers* and the [b] *Heathen* Writers assure us was the custome, by which they paid their Devotions to *Hercules*, *because when he had taken away the Oxen of* Theodomas, *and killed them, he cursed him when he was eating them, which Execration*, saith *Philostratus*, *pleased Hercules:* And this [c] *Athenæus* seems to hint, when he informs us, that *at* Athens *no less than sixty Railers or sawcy Jesters resorted to his Temple.*

Such, lastly, was that impious custome of threatning the Gods they worshipped; and this, saith *Plutarch*, is ἀλογώτερον the more absurd on this account, that it is used by mean Men, not only towards *Dæmons* and *Heroes*, but ὥσπερ ὁ πρὸς βασιλεῖ ἥλιον καὶ ξέλλω ἢ τινὶ τῶν καθ' ἑρανόν, *to the principal Gods, the Sun, Moon, or any other of the celestial*

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[a] Ὡς καὶ μέχρι τῶνδε ἰσοφαδῶς τὸν Ἡρακλέα Δαίμονα λαμβάνειν μὴ τῶν ἀφῶν θυσίαν. Orig. adv. Celsi. l. 7. p. 368. Herculis sacra apud Lindum non εὐφημίᾳ sed maledictis & execratione celebrantur, Lact. l. 1. c. 21. p. 122.

[b] Χαίρει δὲ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς καὶ Λινδίοις δίδωσι καλαῤῥωμένοις τὰ ῥαθά. Philostr. l. 2. Icon. in Theodomante.

[c] Πλῆθος δ' ἐν τῷ Ἀθήνησι γελοποιῶν ἐν γᾷ Ἡρακλείῳ σωμῆρχον ἑξήκοντα οὗτες τὸν ἀριθμὸν. l. 14. p. 614. D.

Gods.

Gods. And *Plutarch* having told us that the Works, Words and Motions of the Superstitious were ridiculous, that their Purgations were impure, and their Ceremonies of Cleansing were polluting, and their Punishments of themselves, and their Reproaches of the Gods, were wicked; [d] he adds, that *these things made some openly to say, it were better to affirm there were no Gods, than to think they could accept of, or delight in such Worship.* Thus have we seen that many of the wiser Heathens condemned, as Wickedness and Sacrilege, and little better than mere *Atheism*, that way of Worship which obtained so generally in the *Heathen* World.

§. VII. And yet as bad as they confessed this Worship was, it was established not only by the Laws of those Nations where it obtained, and confirmed by their Oracles, but also by the Suffrage of those *Philosophers* who saw the vileness and the folly of it. For,

1*st*, They lay it down as a most certain Rule, *that every Nation was to worship the Gods according to the Laws, Rites and Customs of their Country.* Thus *Pythagoras*

[d] Ταῦτα δίδωσιν ἐνίοις λέγειν ὡς μὴ εἶναι θεὸς ἀμείνον ἢ εἶναι τοιαῦτα μὲ δεχομένους τοιούτοις ὄντα χαίρειν. De Superst. p. 171. B.

begins his Golden Verses with advice to all to worship the immortal Gods, νόμῳ ὡς δίκαιον, *as the Law requires*; which tho' *Hierocles* refers to the eternal Law of God, yet his own [e] Scholars held it respected the Law and Customs of their Country, *tho' they were worse than those of others. Socrates* being asked, whether Men might worship the Gods as they thought good, answered, οὐκ, ἀλλὰ νόμοι εἰσὶ καθ' οὓς δεῖ τοῦτο ποιεῖν, *no, but this is to be done according to the Laws. Plato* commands all Men, θεραπεύειν δεῖ θεοὺς κατὰ νόμους, *always to worship the Gods according to the Laws*, and will permit no Man θεοπολεῖν *to introduce new Gods*, or sacred Rites pronouncing them wicked who blame or recede from the Rites of their own Country. [f] *Aristotle* saith, ὅτι τὰ πάτρια ἔδει φυλάττειν πᾶσι δίκαιον ἦν, *that all Men counted it unjust to transgress the Laws of their Country in these matters*; and *Cicero* says that their Laws required that Religion should be observed according to the Rites of their Country; and [g] *Epictetus* gives it as a Rule, *that it became*

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[e] Τὸ μόνιμον ἐν τοῖς παλαιοῖς ἔθεσι τὲ καὶ νομίμοις ἐδοκίμαζον οἱ ἄνδρες ἐκεῖνοι κἂν ἦ μικρῷ χείρω ἑτέρων. Iamblic. de Vita Pythag. c. 30. p. 156.

[f] Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3.

[g] Σπένδειν δὲ καὶ θύειν καὶ ἀπαρχᾶς καὶ τὰ πάτρια ἑκάστοις κατὰ τὸν ἑκάστοις προσήκοντα. Enchir. c. 38.

all

all to offer Sacrifice, and bring their Firſt-fruits every where according to the cuſtome of the Country. *Porphyry* commends that Rule of [h] *Heſiod*, that every Man ſhould ſacrifice after the manner anciently obſerved in his City, as ſpoken εἰκότως *very fitly*, and [i] ſaith it was the Law of *Draco*, that *the Gods and Heroes ſhould be worſhipped*, ἐπομβρίως νόμοις πατρίοις, *after the Law of their Country*; and even [k] *Plutarch*, after all his complaints of the prevalence of Superſtition every where, and of the paucity of them who knew how to worſhip the Gods aright, tells the *Stoicks*, they ſhould have left the notions of the Gods, ὡς ἔχουσιν ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων ἕκαστοι καὶ ζωηθείας πρὸς τὸ θεῖον, *as every one hath received them by Law or Cuſtome*; whereas they had made it their buſineſs, κινεῖν τὰ πάτρια τῶν περὶ θεῶν δόξης, *to ſhake thoſe opinions concerning the Gods which all Nations had received*; and which, ſaith [l] *Cicero*, *all Men conceive they ought to retain.* And,

2*dly*, The great pretence to eſtabliſh this Opinion, was, that they thought it reaſona-

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[h] Ὅσκε πόλις ῥίζησι, νόμῳ δ' ἀρχαίῳ ἄεισῳ.

[i] De abſt. l. 2. §. 18. l. 4. §. 22.

[k] Adv. Stoicos, p. 1074. E.

[l] Omnes enim Religione moventur & Deos patrios ſibi retinendos eſſe arbitrantur. Orat. 5. in Verrem.

ble

to be [m] guided by their *Oracles* touching the Gods they were to worſhip, and the Rites with which they were to worſhip them; and by theſe *Oracles* they confirmed their Sentiment. Thus *Socrates* is introduced by [n] *Zenophon*, declaring that the *Gods were thus to be worſhipped*, ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς θεὸς, *for you ſee that the Oracle at Delphos*, when any one enquires how he ſhould acceptably ſerve the Gods, anſwers, νόμῳ πόλεως, *after the Law of the City.* [o] *Cicero* informs us that when the *Athenians* conſulted the *Pythian Apollo, quas potiſſimum Religiones tenerent*, what Religion they ſhould obſerve, the *Oracle* anſwered, *eas quæ eſſent in more majorum*, that of their Anceſtors; And [p] *Ariſtotle* ſaith, ὅτι τὰ μαντεῖα πάντα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις προσάπτει καὶ τὰ πάτρια ποιεῖσθαι τὰς θυσίας, that *all the Oracles required Men to offer their Sacrifices according to the Laws of the Country.* They were received, ſaith [q] *Plato*, ἐκ Δελφῶν ἢ Δωδώνης, ἢ παρ' Ἄμμωνος ἢ ἐκ παλαιῶν λόγων, *from* Apollo *at* Delphi, *or from* Jupiter *at* Dodona *or* Hammon, *or from Tradition*; and therefore he declares, that they who would not ſubmit to them, ought πάσας ἀσεβείας

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[m] Ἐκ Δελφῶν ἢ χρὴ νόμους θεῖ τὰ θεῖα κομισαμένους τέλοις χρῆσθαι. Plato de leg. l. 6. p. 860. D.

[n] Memorab. l. 1. p. 570.

[o] De leg. l. 2. n. 38.

[p] Rhetor. ad Alex. c. 3.

[q] De leg. l. 5. p. 846. C. l. 7. p. 886. F.

παρέχειν,

παρέχειν, *to be punished for their Impiety*; and that a wise Lawgiver, [r] μὴ τολμήσῃ καινοτομεῖν ἐπὶ θεοσέβειαν, *should permit no Man to innovate in these matters*, [s] they being received from the *Children of the Gods, who knew well their Progenitors, and therefore were to be believed, tho' they gave no reason for what they said, nor was any Man's reason to be heard against them.* And therefore, tho' the *Athenians* were afterwards noted for admitting *new Gods*, yet they [t] condemned *Socrates* for introducing καινὰ δαιμόνια, *new Deities*, and not thinking those to be Gods which the City own'd as such, and made the *Ephesians* swear, [u] ἱερὰ τὰ πάτρια τιμᾶν, *to honour the Gods of the Country.* And tho' the *Romans*, as many of the *Fathers* have observed, introduced into their Worship most of the Gods that they had conquer'd, yet this was still done by the consent of the Senate, the Law of the twelve Tables being this, [w] *separatim nemo Deos habebit neque*

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[r] Epin. p. 1011. C.

[s] Ἀδωίαλον ἓν θεῶν παῖσιν ἀπισεῖν καίτῳ ἄνευ τὲ οἰκείων ϗ ἀναγκαίων ἐπιδείξεων λέγουσιν, in Tim. p. 1053. E. A Philosopho rationem accipere debeo, Religionis majoribus autem nostris etiam nulla ratione reddita credere. Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. 3. n. 3—6. Mihi unum satis est ita nobis majores tradidisse, nec me ab ea opinione quam à majoribus accepi de cultu Deorum ullius unquam oratio aut docti aut indocti movebit. Ibid. [t] Diog. Laert. l. 2. p. 104. [u] Stob. Serm. 41. p. 243. [w] Cic. de leg. l. 2. n. 16.

novos,

novos, that no Man should have private or new Gods, because, saith [x] *Cicero*, *Deos aut novos aut alienigenas coli confusionem habet Religionis*, the worship of new or strange Gods would introduce Confusion in Religion.

§. VIII. And thus are all these *ignoble Deities*, as *Seneca* stiles them, and all these barbarous, obscene, ridiculous, and cruel Rites made like the Laws of *Medes* and *Persians*, or in the Words of *Draco*, Θέσμια αἰώνια, *eternal Decrees*, by *Lawgivers*, *Philosophers*, and by the *Oracles* themselves; no alteration of the worst of them being allowed by any of them, tho of most of them we have heard their judgment, that they were Rites of Worship which tended *to extirpate all Religion*, and to make wise Men think it better *to own no Gods at all*, than to worship them in such a barbarous and vile manner, and know of all them, that they only did dissemble in the worship of them, συμπεφερόμενοι τοῖς πολλοῖς, *to please the multitude*, as *Origen* objects against the *Peripateticks* and *Epicureans*, and as we know they must do, according to their own avowed Sentiments: For, how could *Aristotle* and his *Peripateticks* receive these

[x] Ibid. n. 27.

Gods

Gods and Rites of Worship on the account of *Oracles* and *Divinations*, when they declared that these *Oracles* had [y] nothing of truth in them, and that these *Divinations* were unprofitable? Or, how could the *Epicureans* comply with the common practice in sincerity, or without superstition and impiety, and yet believe with their Master, as by many passages of *Velleius* we see they did, that he was ἀσεβὴς, *ungodly*, [z] *not who removed the opinions of many from the Gods, but he who ascribed them to them*; or, not who took *away the Gods of the Multitudes*, but *they who thought such Beings could be Gods*? Whence [a] *Origen* represents both these Sects as Dissemblers in Religion; and against *Socrates* and the *Platonists* he objects, that after all the high Flights of the [b] τὸ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν *first cause*, they ἐυτελῆ καὶ μικρὰ φρονεῖν, *submitted to mean and base things*, going down to *Pyreum* to worship *Diana*, and offering a Cock to *Æsculapius*, which things no Allegories can justifie from Superstition, and a plain tendency to con-

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[y] Aristoteles & omnes deinceps Peripatetici τὰ βωμῶν χρησήια καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πᾶσι μυσηριώδεα μαντεῖα οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἀληθὲς ἀπήλεγξαν, ἀνωφελῆ τε εἶναι ἀπεφήναντο καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιβλαβῆ τυγχάνειν. Euseb. præpar. Evang. l. 4. c. 2. p. 136. A.

[z] Οὐχ' ὁ τῶν πολλῶν θεὸς ἀναιρῶν ἀλλ' ὁ τὰς πολλῶν δόξας τοῖς θεοῖς προσάπτων. ap. Diog. Laert. l. 10. p. 655.

[a] Adv. Celf. l. 7. p. 375. [b] L. 6. p. 277.

firm

firm others in it. [c] *Seneca* ſpeaks thus of the *Stoicks*, and their Wiſe-man, that *he will worſhip that fardle of ignoble Deities which long Superſtition for many Ages had introduced, as remembring that they were rather to be worſhipped out of cuſtom, than reality, not as things pleaſing to the Gods, but only as required by the Laws*; whence St. *Auſtin* truly ſaith of him, *colebat quod reprehendebat, agebat quod arguebat, quod culpabat, adorabat*, he worſhipped that which he blamed and argued againſt as unfit to be worſhipped: And of *Cicero*, [d] *Lactantius* makes this obſervation, that *he well underſtood they were falſe Gods which Men worſhipped, and he had ſaid many things ſufficient*, ad everſionem Religionum, *to overthrow the received Religions*, (as he that reads him cannot doubt) and yet not only ſuffer'd Men to go on in their falſe Religions, *but himſelf erred with them.* In a word, how fiercely do [e] *Plato* and [f] *Plutarch* inveigh againſt the Gods the *Poets* had introduced, and their Fables? And yet

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[c] Omnem iſtam ignobilem Deorum turbam quam longo ævo longa Superſtitio congeſſit ſic adorabimus, ut meminerimus cultum eum magis ad morem quam ad rem pertinere, hæc omnia ſapiens obſervabit tanquam legibus juſſa, non tanquam Dius grata, apud Aug. de C. D. l. 6. c. 10.

[d] L. 2. c. 3. p. 148.

[e] Plato in 10. p. 364. E. De Repub. l. 2. p. 596. D.

[f] Plutarch. Amal. p. 736. C.

theſe

these, saith *Plato*, are ἑρμηνεῖς τ θεῶν, *the Interpreters of the Gods*; these are the θεῶν παῖδες, those *Children of the Gods* who must be believed without Reason; and from these, say they both, *we have all our knowledge of the Being and Providence of the Gods*; so truly, saith [g] *Lactantius*, that *these wise and learned Men did persist wickedly in that Religion, of the vanity of which they were convinced*: That of [h] *Origen* being a certain truth, that *a truly pious Soul can admit of nothing which is adulterate, false, or hypocritical in the service of God*, and much less can he act thus through the whole tenor of his life: As will be still more manifest from the consideration of their received Maxims, touching the Nature and Worship of the Deity, they being such as these, *viz.*

1*st*, That if they who were called Gods [i] commanded any thing which was wicked, cruel or impure, that was a demonstration that they were no Gods. And upon this account, saith [k] *Plato*, the Gods introduced by the Poets were to be discarded, and

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[g] Videmus etiam doctos & sapientes Viros cum Religionum intelligant vanitatem, nihilominus tamen in iis ipsis quæ damnant colendis nescio quâ pravitate perstare.

[h] Οὐδὲν γὰρ νόθον χρὴ συμπάρχειν τῇ ψυχῇ τῆς ἀληθοῦς εἰς τὸ θεῖον εὐσεβείας. Adv. Cels. l. 7. p. 375.

[i] Εἰ θεοὶ τὶ ῥέζουσιν αἰσχρὸν, οὐκ εἰσὶ θεοὶ. Eurip.

[k] Plato de Rep. l. 2. p. 604.

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the Youth muſt not be ſuffer'd to read them, becauſe they ſpeak hard Words, and told the greateſt Lyes, ψεύδη τ μεγίσων, *aſcribing to the Gods things moſt unworthy of them.* And becauſe the Lyes they mix'd with their Narrations of them, ſaith [l] *Plutarch, were as bad as Poiſon mixed with our Meal*; whence even *Cotta* ſaith, that *Cupid and Venus cannot be Gods, they being* [m] vocabula vitioſarum rerum neque naturalium, *the Names not of things natural, but vitious*; tho' nothing was more worſhipped than they were.

2*dly*, The ſecond Aphoriſm they founded upon the natural Idea of a Deity, or of the beſt of Beings, was this, that *the beſt Worſhip we could perform to him, was to* [n] *imitate, and to be like him*; whereas 'twas evidently the vileſt and abſurdeſt thing that we could do, to be like thoſe barbarous and filthy Deities.

3*dly*, That God was to be worſhipped ſuitably to his Nature and his Attributes; and when Men worſhipped him otherwiſe, they fell into ſuch abſurd and ſuperſtitious ways of Worſhip, as were more [o] *diſhonoura-*

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[l] De Aud. Poet. p. 17. [m] De Nat. Deor. l. 2. n. 45.

[n] Ὡς γὰρ φησὶν οἱ πυθαγόρειοι τιμήσεις τ θεὸν ἄριστα ἐὰν τῷ θεῷ τ διάνοιαν ὁμοιώσης. Hierocl. in Pyth. Carm. p. 22.

[o] Plutarch. de Superſt. p. 170, 171. Adv. Epicur. p. 1101, 1102.

ble

ble to the Deity than even the neglect of his Worship: Now that to worship him with these barbarous, filthy, and ridiculous Rites of Worship before-mention'd, was worse than not to worship him at all, they have themselves declared.

4*thly*, They laid it truly down as a most certain truth, that only *pure, holy, and righteous Persons could have communion with God, or any expectation of his* [p] *favour and affection, and that he rather must be inclined to be an Adversary to, and punish those who were otherwise, and that without this purity and sincerity of Heart, all their Performances were little worth:* And yet, what Purity could be in those who worshipp'd him in this obscene and filthy manner? Whence [q] *Plato* confesseth that their Priests, by whom, saith he, all Men must be governed in these matters, taught the contrary.

Lastly, They truly added that our religious Deportment towards the true God,

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[p] Τῷ γὰρ θεοφιλεῖ — πάντα γίγνεσθαι ὡς οἷόν τε ἄριστα, πλὴν ὅσα τὰ ἀδίκου τεθνάναι τέτων δὲ διανοεῖσθαι. Plat. de Republ. l. 10. p. 760. D. Pythag. apud Iambl. p. 89. Stob. Eclog. Eth. p. 180. μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαρῷ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ ὲ θεμιτὸν εἶναι Hier. p. 4. καὶ γὰρ ἂν δεινὸν εἴη εἰ πρὸς τὰ δῶρα καὶ τὰς θυσίας ἀποβλέψουσιν ἡμῶν οἱ θεοὶ ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς ἃ ψυχὴ ἂν τις ὅσιος καὶ δίκαιος ἂν τυγχάνη, Plato Alcib. p. 459. De leg. l. 4. p. 842. C. l. 10. 945. B.

[q] Θεῶν παῖδες ποιηταὶ καὶ πρόφηται τῶν θεῶν ἡρμήνευσι ταῦτα ἅττως ἔχειν μιμήσεσιν. Plato de Rep. l. 2. p. 526. E. & p. 595. D. E.

or thoſe who truly did deſerve that Title, was a part of natural [r] Juſtice, and that in this conſiſted all Piety and Holineſs; whereas 'tis certain that it can be no part either of Piety or Holineſs to commit Murther, to deſtroy our own Off-ſpring, or to be guilty of Fornication, Adultery and Sodomy, in honour of the Gods we worſhip.

§. VIII. Let it then be conſider'd,

1*ſt*, That whereas the religious Worſhip required by the Law of *Moſes* was coſtly and expenſive, ritual and ceremonial, conſiſting, ſaith the Apoſtle, in *carnal Ordinances*, which did chiefly employ the Body, and was confined to one place, and therefore though it was well accommodated to the Temper of that People, yet was not ſuitable to the Nature of the Deity, as our Lord intimates, by ſaying, *The time is coming when the true Worſhippers ſhall worſhip the Father in Spirit; for God is a Spirit, and they that worſhip him muſt do it in Spirit and in Truth:* The Worſhip which our Saviour introduced, was ſo far from requiring thoſe humane Sacrifices which had ſo

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[r] Εὐσέβεια ἡ μέρος ἔσα τ διαιοσυνης ἡ ἀδικαλυθέσα. Stob. Serm. 9. de juſt. p. 125. Eclog. Eth. p. 170. Eſt enim pietas juſtitia adverſus Deos, Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. 1. n. 81.

long

long and so generally obtained among the *Heathens*, and by the wisest of them were accounted Sacrilege, and worse than *Atheism*, that it entirely abolished all carnal Sacrifices, and taught us to serve God in newness of Spirit, and to offer him the spiritual Sacrifices of Prayers and Thanksgivings, and to present our selves to him a living Sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, and so a Sacrifice not of unreasonable Beasts, but of our *rational Faculties*, and therefore suitable to the Frame and Reason of Mankind.

2*dly*, Whereas the religious Ceremonies which obtained in the Solemnities of the *Heathens*, were so vile and filthy, that the wise *Heathens* required chaste Women to abstain from them, and *Cicero* pronounces that they tended not to confirm, but to abolish all Religion; the *Jewish* Institutions would not permit the hire of a Whore to be offered to God; and the *Christian* not only doth pronounce Damnation to all that exercise these wicked Practices, but doth require of all who come to God the greatest purity in Heart and Life, in Body and Soul, and the greatest care to keep *their Vessels in sanctification and honour*, and to *cleanse themselves from all filthiness of Flesh and Spirit, perfecting holiness in the fear of God*, as knowing that *without Sanctification no Man shall see the Lord*.

And, laſtly, whereas the Religion of the *Heathens* had introduced ſo many ridiculous Ceremonies into their Worſhip, and even the *Jewiſh* Religion ſo much abounded in thoſe ritual Preſcriptions which were only good becauſe commanded, and was clogg'd alſo by the *Scribes* and *Phariſees* with a vaſt number of vain, cumberſome, fruitleſs, and ſuperſtitious Traditions, tending to make void the Commandment of God; The *Chriſtian* Inſtitution requires but two poſitive Rites, that of *Baptiſm* and the *Lord's-Supper*; both which are grave and ſolemn; conſiſting in a dedication of our ſelves to the ſervice of the Deity, and in a grateful commemoration of the Bleſſings conferr'd upon us by our bleſſed Lord, and ſo engaging us to the ſtricteſt Piety, and to the exerciſe of all *Chriſtian* Virtues, and therefore muſt be worthy of a good and holy God: So great and viſible are the advantages of the ſpiritual Worſhip of the *Chriſtians* above all that before ever obtained in the World, and ſo apparent is the neceſſity of ſuch a change as it hath introduced not only in the Object, but alſo in the Manner of the Worſhip fit to be paid to the Deity; whereas you ſee the Worſhip which was before generally received by the *Heathens*, as it was inconſiſtent with all true Reverence of God, ſo was it an abomination in the ſight of God, as being

ing wholly opposite both to his holy Nature, and his Will, and employ'd chiefly in those Practices to which he threatneth Damnation, and which render Men incapable of paying any acceptable service to him, or of holding communion with him, yea such as the very *Heathens*, by the Light of Nature, pronounced Sacrilegious, destructive of all true Religion, and even worse than none at all; so that if an abolition or entire reformation of it could be ever needful, it must be then when those things which were intended to atone and please, became the highest Provocation and the most vile Affront that could be offer'd to the Deity, and which their Wisemen, as they confess'd them to be the product of a long Superstition, so they complied with them only in Hypocrisie, and practised them, *non tanquam Diis grata*, not as pleasing to the Gods, but only as required by the Laws.

CHAP. VIII.

The CONTENTS.

Two Principles of some Philosophers destroyed all Virtue and Morality; 1st, *That there was nothing naturally Good or Evil*;

2dly, *That there was no certainty to be had of what was so*, §. 1. *They generally transgressed the sixth Commandment by innumerable murthers in their Gladiatory Plays, by procuring the abortion of their Children, and by exposing them when born, by practising and allowing Self-murther, and by their hatred of other Nations*, §. 2. *The seventh, by that Fornication which generally obtain'd amongst them, by frequent Adulteries, incestuous Copulations, and by Sodomy and Drunkenness: These Vices were allowed and practised by most of their Philosophers, and used in their sacred Rites*, §. 3. *The eighth, by Theft, accounted among many Nations rather glorious than criminal*, §. 4. *The ninth, by Lying, which the Philosophers held lawful when it was profitable for them*, §. 5. *The excellent Prescriptions of Christianity against all these Sins*, §. 6.

HAving thus shew'd how much the Sentiments which had obtain'd among the *Heathens* tended to the corruption of true Piety, and to subvert that Duty which we owe to God; I proceed now to shew, that they also had entertain'd such Sentiments and Doctrines which plainly tended to evert all Virtue and Charity, and all those other Offices we owe both to our Selves and our Brother. Now this they

did

did both by some general Doctrines, which took away all our obligations to the performance of those Duties, and by such Sentiments as are directly opposite to those Commandments which comprehend the Duties of the second Table. The Doctrines which destroy'd all the Offices of Virtue, Justice and Charity, were,

§. I. 1*st*, That Assertion which maintains that there is nothing unjust, filthy, or evil in its own Nature, but only by virtue of the Laws which have obtained among Men. This was the Doctrine of *Archelaus*, and of *Aristippus*, and was maintained by *Pyrrho*, and the whole Herd of *Scepticks*, and of *Academicks*; and among the Axioms of *Epicurus*, these are two, that *Injustice is not evil in it self*, and that *Justice is nothing in it self*; and agreeable to this *Aristippus* openly declares, that 'tis "*lawful to commit Theft, Adultery, and Sacrilege in season, none of these things being by nature evil.*" And indeed, according to this

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[s] Τὸ δίκαιον εἶ μὴ κατὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ. D. Laert. l. 2. p. 89, p. 134. Ax. 36. οὐκ ἰῶ καθ' ἑαυτὸ δικαιοσύνη. Ax. 37. ἡ ἀδικία ἐ καθ' ἑαυτὸ κακὸν. Diog. Laert. l. 10. p. 671, illic dissentiamus ab Epicuro ubi dicit nihil justum esse natura, Sen. Ep. 97. p. 609.

[t] Κλέπτειν τε καὶ μοιχεύειν διεφυλάσσειν ἐν καιρῷ, μηδὲν γὰρ εἶ τούτων αἰσχρὸν φύσει. De Laert. l. 2. p. 138.

Doctrine, not only Vice and Virtue muſt be empty Names, and God muſt be neither concerned to preſcribe the one, nor to diſcourage, or forbid the other, but humane Laws muſt loſe their force and virtue; for either we are obliged from natural Principles to obey them, or we are not; if we are, it muſt be juſt and equitable ſo to do by virtue of ſome Law of Nature; but if we are not thus obliged to obey them, we muſt be free to violate them, and ſo can have no tye upon our Conſcience to obſerve them. And therefore [v] *Cicero* well notes, that according to this Doctrine, an injurious Perſon may be called incautious, if he be not careful to avoid the laſh of the Law, but he can never be eſteemed unjuſt.

2dly, It always was the Doctrine not only of the *Scepticks* and the *Academicks*, but of many others, that there was no certainty to be had of what was good or evil, their enquiry being this, [w] *quid habemus in rebus bonis aut malis explorati*, what aſſurance have we of what is good or evil, there being no agreement, ſaith *Catulus* in *Cicero*, among *Philoſophers* about *that end*

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[v] Quod ſi pœna, ſi metus ſupplicii, non ipſa turpitudo deterret ab injuriosa facinoroſaque vita, nemo eſt injuſtus, at incauti potius habendi ſunt improbi.

[w] Cat. apud Cic. Acad. qu. l. 2. n. 126.

to which all other Actions are to tend? There is no concord, saith [x] *Maximus Tyrius, about what is good or evil, filthy or decorous, about Laws, and Right, but so great clashing about them, that neither Nation, nor City, nor Family, nor single Men, accord with one another in these things.* Now 'tis evident to all Mens Reason and Experience, that the uncertainty that what we do is good or evil, fit or unfit to be done, tends plainly to weaken our inclinations to, and prosecutions of that Good, and to lessen our care and industry to avoid what is Evil.

§. II. To proceed to the particular Precepts of the second Table: Whereas the Son of Man came *not to destroy Mens* temporal *lives, but to save them,* and his [y] Laws rank Murther among those fleshy Lusts which will exclude us from his Kingdom, and say expressly, that *no Murtherer hath eternal Life abiding in him.*

1*st.* It was a pleasure to the *Heathens* to see Men murther one another; for in their Gladiatory Plays, as they thought fit to stile them, *homo occiditur in hominis voluptatem,* one Man is slain for the pleasure of another, saith *Tertullian.* These Sports or

[x] Οὐ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν ἐ τὸ καλὸν ὁμοίως, ἐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἐ τὸ καλόν. Diss. 1. p. 4.

[y] Luke 9. 56. Gal. 5. 21. Apoc. 21. 8. 1 John 3. 15.

Exercises,

Exerciſes, as they had their original from the Funerals of Great-men, (who being by the *Heathen Theology* made *Heroes*, were to be ſatisfied with humane Blood) ſo were they, ſaith [z] *Lipſius*, the Peſts and Funerals of Mankind; for no War ever cauſed ſuch a ſlaughter of Mankind as did theſe Sports of Pleaſure, which were performed not only by Slaves and Captives bred up to that Art of ſhedding humane Blood, but alſo by Freemen, who ſuffered themſelves to be hired out to this Work, and upon that account were called [a] *auctorati*, *Hirelings*; they were exhibited by *Noblemen*, *Knights* and *Senators*, and by all ſorts of *Governours*, *Emperors*, *Conſuls*, *Prætors*, *Prieſts*, *Quæſtors*, *Ærarii* and *Ædiles*, and obtain'd throughout the *Roman Provinces*, *Colonies*, and *Municipal Towns*. And yet this Butchery is frequently condemned by [b] *Seneca*, as a thing contrary to humane Laws which puniſh Murther with Death, and to the dignity of a Man, *who is a ſacred thing*, *and*

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[z] Credo immo ſcio nullum bellum tantam Cladem vaſtitiemque generi humano pertuliſſe quam hos ad voluptatem ludos. Saturn. l. 1. c. 12.

[a] Lipſ. ib. l. 2. c. 3. l. 2. c. 9. c. 10.

[b] Ab his ſpectaculis crudelior redeo, & inhumanior, occidit aliquis hominem, qui occidit ille meruit ut hoc pateretur, tu quid meruiſti miſer, ut hoc ſpectes? Ep. 7. p. 395. Tantum aberat ut homo hominem non iratus tantum ſpectaturus occideret, Ep. 90. p. 481. Homo, ſacra res, homo jam per luſum & jocum occiditur, Ep. 95. p. 602.

nec

not to be destroy'd for sport and meriment, much less to be destroy'd in cold Blood, without anger or provocation; to behold these things, saith he, *renders a Man more cruel and inhumane than he was before*; and 'tis by [c] *Cicero* stiled, *Spectaculum crudele & inhumanum*, a cruel and inhumane Spectacle.

And yet it is not to be wondred that they should thus delight in seeing Persons slain by one anothers Hands, who were unnatural to their own Off-spring, either destroying them in the Womb by their ἀμβλωθρίσκα φάρμακα, Medicaments to procure Abortion, or exposing them as soon as they were born to Beasts, or leaving them to perish by cold and hunger. The *Spartans* had a Law, commanding them [d] μηδὲν ἀκρωτηριασμένον τρέφειν, *to breed up no Children that were maimed*; and they had a Committee on purpose to examine whether the Child born was εὐπαγὲς καὶ ῥωμαλέον *sound and strong*, and consequently whether it should be educated or exposed; and they had a peculiar place, called *Taygetus*, where they did expose them.

The [e] *Romans* did also approve this practice of exposing their Children, especially

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[c] Tusc. qu. l. 2. n. 36. [d] Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 197.

[e] Multos patres exponere solitos inutiles partus, aliqua parte corporis mutilatos, infirmos, & in nullam spem idoneos. Sen. contr. l. 5. contr. 33.

when

when they were ſpurious, maimed, or infirm, or when their Parents were not able to maintain them: Whence *Gallio* pleads thus for them who debilitated expoſed Children, that they might be more fit to beg, and be the greater Objects of Compaſſion, that this would be for the advantage of the Commonwealth, becauſe, ſaith he, *panciores erunt qui exponent filios*, this will reſtrain Men from the practice of expoſing them. And that which made this unnatural Cuſtom ſo freely to obtain thro' all *Greece*, might be the countenance it had not only from the Laws of *Lycurgus*, but alſo from thoſe two great *Philoſophers* and *Politicians*, *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*; for among the Laws of *Plato* this is one, that *after Men and Women have paſſed the Age of getting and conceiving ſtrong Children, they may promiſcuouſly enjoy one another, provided they take care,* [f] μὴ εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν πάμα, *not to let their Off-ſpring come to light*, or if it do, ἐκτιθέναι, *to expoſe it without Nouriſhment*. *Ariſtotle*, in his *Politicks*, preſcribes this Law concerning the expoſing or breeding up of Children, μηδὲν ἀνάπηρον ἐκτρέφειν, *to breed up none that are maimed*; *but if the Laws of any Nation*, ſaith he, *forbid the expoſing of Children*, [g] περὶ ἀδύνατον ἐγγίνεσθαι καὶ

[f] Plato de Rep. l. 5. p. 657. E, F. [g] Polit. l. 7. c. 16.

ζῶντι

ζωὴν ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ ἢ ἀμέλωσιν, *care must be taken to procure their abortion before they have sense, or life, viz.* the abortion of the Offspring of very old or very young People. *Ælian* indeed informs us, that there was a Law among the *Thebans* in *Africa* [h] φιλανθρώπως κείμενον *agreeable to humanity, forbidding Parents to expose their Children under pain of death*; but speaking of this as a thing singular in them, he intimates, that this practice was either allowed or connived at by most other Nations. And yet it cannot reasonably be denied that this was an inhumane and unnatural murther of poor Innocents, by exposing their own Bowels to Dogs, or to wild Beasts, and so, as [i] *Lactantius* says, was *maxima impietas*, a great Impiety against that God who gave them life.

3*dly*, They were unnatural to themselves, it being frequent with them to cut off their own lives, and to maintain that it was lawful and sometimes the Wise-man's duty so to do; whence this Self-murther was by them stiled ἔξοδον ἔξαγωγὴν, *an exit suitable to Reason*; and God is said, when life became troublesome, to open θύραν ἐξιέναι *a door for them to go out at.* This

[h] Var. Hist. l. 2. c. 7. [i] L. 6. c. 20. p. 619.

was

was the Doctrine of all the [k] *Stoicks*, from their Maſter *Zeno* to *Epictetus* and *Arrian*. Their Wiſe-man, ſay they, doubts not but he may ſometimes do this, and then, ſay they, he doth it εὐλόγως *ſuitably to Reaſon*; *when he lies under a tormenting Pain or an incurable Diſeaſe, when many things moleſt his Life, or when he only ſeems to ſuſpect Fortune, he may then*, ſay they, *open the gate to give life an exit.* This is [l] *Seneca*'s great Apology for Providence which ſuffers evil things to befal good Men, becauſe, ſaith he, *it permits him to reſcue himſelf from them by death*; this he extravagantly magnifies in *Cato*, ſaying, *Liquet mihi cum magno ſpectaſſe gaudio Deos*, I am confident the Gods beheld him with great joy ſtabbing himſelf: They held indeed that *a Fool, that is a wicked Perſon, might not do this, becauſe he was not fit to die*; but they declared, [m] (σοφοῖς δ' ἄλλοθεν ἀξιωτέον ἔξοδον), *that it was reaſonable for their Wiſe-man, as being perfect, thus to deſtroy himſelf.*

The *Epicureans* held the ſame Doctrine, declaring that if Grief were tolerable it was

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[k] Zeno apud Diog. Laert. l. 7. p. 447. Cat. ap. Cicer. de fin. l. 3. n. 47, 48. Sen. Ep. 12, 17, 20, 26, 58, 70. Anton. l. 3. §. 1. l. 5. §. 29. l. 8. §. 47. Arrian. in Epict. l. 1. c. 9. p. 109. l. 2. c. 1. p. 170. l. 3. c. 8. p. 281. & c. 24. p. 342.

[l] De Provid. c. 2. 6.

[m] Stob. Eclog. Eth. p. 187. Cic. de fin. l. 3. n. 48.

to

to be endured, [n] *sin minus æquo animo è vita, cum ea non placeat, tanquam e Theatro exeamus*, if it were not, they were permitted to dispatch themselves when life became unpleasant to them. *Plotinus* the *Platonist* [o] writ a Book, Περὶ εὐλόγου ἐξαγωγῆς, *of lawful Self-murther*; and *Hegesias* was stiled πεισιθάνατος, *a persuader of Men to die*, because he writ a Book, saith [p] *Cicero*, stiled Ἀποκαρτερῶν, *in which he aggravated the evils of this present life*; and it is truly said by *M. Casaubon* from [q] *Laertius*, that *most of the Philosophers practised what these Sects allow'd*; *Zeno* and *Cato*, two great Assertors of this Doctrine, did it; the first ἀποπνίξας ἑαυτὸν *choking himself* when he had broken his Finger; and the second [r] *killing himself* when *Cæsar* had overcome *Pompey*. *Pythagoras* is said to forbid Men to depart this life, *injussu Imperatoris*, without the command of God, and yet [s] *Diog. Laertius* informs us that he starved himself, by abstaining from Meat forty Days; so also did [t] *Cleanthes* the Follower of *Zeno*; [u] *Metrocles* choked, and *Menippus* hanged himself; and [w] *Aristotle* killed himself with Poison.

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[n] Torquat. apud Cicer. de fin. l. 1. n. 39.
[o] Valer. m. l. 8. c. 9. D. Laert. l. 2. p. 129.
[p] Cicer. Tusc. qu. 1. n. 68.
[q] D. Laert. l. 7. p. 382. [r] Cic. de Senect. n. 66.
[s] L. 8. p. 520, 521. [t] L. 7. p. 476. [u] L. 6. p. 361, 364.
[w] L. 5. p. 272.

In

In a word, the [x] *Roman* Laws were ſo favourable to them who died through impatience, vain-glory, or wearineſs of living any longer, that they pronounced their Wills valid; and yet *Pythagoras* ſaw by the Light of Nature, that it was unlawful, [y] *injuſſu Imperatoris*, i. e. *Dei, de præſidio & ſtatione vitæ decedere*, to quit this life without the command of God. *Socrates* in [z] *Plato* confeſſes that this was ἐν ἀπορρήτοις ὁ λόγος, *a ſecret ſaying, that we are placed here upon our watch,* οὐ δὲ δεῖ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν, *from which no Man ought to diſmiſs himſelf*; and [a] *Ariſtotle* adds, that ἀποθνήσκειν φεύγοντα τὶ λυπηρὸν, *to die to avoid what is cauſe of ſadneſs, is the property not of a valiant, but a timorous Man*; and if *Parricide* is by ſo much the more heinous as he is nearer to us in Blood or Affinity who is ſlain, it muſt be ſtill more heinous to be *Felo de ſe*.

Moreover the Self-murtherer accuſes the Providence of God, as being cruel in impoſing burthens on him which it will not enable him to bear; he ſhews his want of Truſt in God, and of that Patience which ſhould have its perfect work in us; he uſurps upon the Right of God, who, as

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[x] Si quis tædio vitæ, aut valetudinis adverſæ impatientia, aut jactatione, ut quidam Philoſophi, mortem ſibi conſciverunt, in ea cauſa ſunt, ut eorum teſtamenta valeant. Ulpian.

[y] Cato de Senect. n. 66. [z] Phædr. p. 47. C.

[a] Eth. l. 3. c. 11.

he

he gave, so can he only take away our life; he acts, saith *Alexander Aphrodisiensis*, in contradiction to the great Principle of the *Stoicks*, that their Wise-man is always happy, even as happy as the Gods themselves, and that his Virtue is sufficient of it self to make him so; for sure it must be folly to deprive himself of so great happiness. And lastly, according to the [b] Principles of *Christianity*, he only labours to avoid a temporal Evil, by falling into that which is eternal. Add to this, what hath been observ'd already, that this Homicide obtain'd among them as part of divine Worship, and was stiled by them *præstantissimum Sacrificium*, the most excellent Sacrifice; so that in many Nations, he that killed his Fellow-man to serve his Maker, and he who sacrificed his Sons and Daughters to the Gods, did that which alone could appease their Rage. But I shall only hence observe how much such cruel Gods and such inhumane ways of Worship tended to countenance these Murthers and these unnatural Barbarities towards their Children, seeing by doing them they only seemed to imitate the Gods, and had the plea of *Aristippus* to excuse their Wickedness, that *if these things were evil they would not be done*

[b] Aug. de Civ. Dei. l. 1. c. 25.

in the Solemnities of the Gods. And ſure we are, this was the riſe of their *Gladiations* at the Funerals of Great-men, they thinking this a proper way to appeaſe or gratifie the Ghoſts of their departed *Heroes*, as [c] *Lipſius* from *Tertullian*, and *Servius* hath obſerved.

Again; Whereas according to the [d] Chriſtian Law, *he that hateth his Brother is a murtherer*, and *he that is angry with him without cauſe*, offends againſt that Law which ſaith, *Thou ſhalt not kill*; whereas the poſitive part of that Commandment requires that *Charity which envyeth not*, that freedom from Revenge which will not ſuffer us to *render evil for evil*; among the *Jews*, a Brother or a Neighbour was confined to one of their own Nation, for whom, ſaith *Tacitus*, they had the greateſt kindneſs, *ſed adverſus omnes alios hoſtile odium*, but againſt all others the hatred of an Enemy, being unwilling to converſe with them, or ſhew them any common kindneſs, as [e] *Juvenal* hath obſerv'd of them; And this ill-nature ſeems to have propagated it ſelf among the *Heathens*, for, as the *Apoſtle* ſaith, they were *full of malice, envy* and *contention*, that they were *hateful to, and hated one another*, Rom. 1. 29. Tit. 3. 2, 3.

[c] Saturnalia, l. 1. c. 8.

[d] 1 Joh. 3. 15. Mat. 5. 22.

[e] Non monſtrare viam eadem niſi ſacra colenti;
Quæſitum ad fontem ſolum deducere Verpum. Sat.

So

So *Tacitus* saith of their Envy, that it was *vitium parvis magnisque Civitatibus commune*, a Vice common to great and little Cities: And [f] *Seneca* is very large in confirmation of these Words of the *Apostle*, representing all the *Romans as Enemies to peace, conspiring the Ruine of one another, and even more fierce and cruel to one another than wild Beasts.* The *Grecians* in this matter were mere *Jews*, for even [g] *Socrates* makes this distinction between them, and the *Barbarians*, that is, all other Nations, that *they were Brethren and Kinsfolk, and* φύσει φίλοι *Friends by Nature*, and so all Quarrels and Contentions among them should be avoided; but the *Barbarians*, saith he, *are* πολέμιοι φύσει καὶ πολεμεῖν τὸ ἐχθρὰν τοῦτο κλητέον, *Aliens and Enemies by Nature, with whom we are to have continual War: They were not*, saith he, *to make slaves of the Grecians, to spoil their Fields, to burn their Houses, or destroy their Countries; but they might do all these things* [h] πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους, *to the Barbarians, as being their Enemies.*

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[f] Inter istos quos togatos vides nulla pax est, alter in alterius exitium levi compendio ducitur — non alia quam in ludo Gladiatorio vita est, cum iisdem viventium pugnantiumque ferarum iste conventus est, nisi quod illæ inter se placidæ sunt, morsuque similium abstinent, hi mutua laceratione saturantur. De Ira. l. 2. c. 8.

[g] Τὸ μὲν ἑλληνικὸν φύσει ὃν αὐτὸ αὑτῷ οἰκεῖον καὶ συγγενές, τῷ δὲ βαρβαρικῷ ἀθνεῖον καὶ ἀλλότριον, apud Plat. de Rep. l. 5. p. 663. D.

[h] P. 644. A. B.

And whereas *Chriſtianity* allows us neither to rejoice in any evil that happeneth to our Enemies, nor to endeavour to avenge our ſelves upon them, or return evil for evil, [i] *Socrates* ſaith, ἐπὶ μὴ τοῖς τῶν ἐχθρῶν κακοῖς ἐκ δίκαιον ἐστὶ φθονερὸν ὄντι τὸ χαίρειν, *it is neither unjuſt, nor invidious to rejoice at the evils of our Enemies.* Even *Cicero*'s good Man is one, [k] *qui nemini nocet niſi laceſſitus injuria,* who hurts no body when no body hurts him. Anger was generally defined by them to be ὄρεξις ἀντιλυπέσεως, *libido ulciſcendi,* a deſire of Revenge upon him whom we conceive to have done us injury; ſo 'tis defined by [l] *Cicero,* and ſo he doth expreſs his Anger againſt *Dionyſius,* ſaying, [m] *Odi hominem, utinam ulciſci poſſem,* I hate the Man, and would be glad to be revenged upon him; and he reſolves to do the like to others, declaring, *Sic ulciſcar facinora ſingula quemadmodum a quibuſque ſum provocatus,* I will revenge all Injuries according as I am provoked by any; ſo it is alſo defined by [n] *Ariſtotle,* who alſo ſpeaks of Meekneſs as that which offends πρὸς ἔλλειψιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τιμωρητικὸς ὁ πρᾶος, *as a defect, becauſe the meek Man will not avenge himſelf;*

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[i] Apud Plat. Phileb. p. 395. C. [k] De Off. l. 3. n. 100. Tuſc. qu. l. 3. n. 9. [l] L. 4. n. 16. [m] Ep. ad Attic. l. 9. n. 91. [n] Rhetor. l. 2. c. 2.

and

and of Revenge, as [o] ἀνθρωπικότερον μᾶλλον *a more manly thing*, and makes it ἀνδραποδῶδες *a very slavish thing not to be angry, because he that is not angry, will not avenge himself.*

§. III. *Comm. 7th*, But if the chief Wickedness which overwhelm'd the *Heathen* World was that Uncleanness of all kinds, which through the blindness of their Mind, saith the *Apostle*, they did with greediness commit; for being under the Conduct of the unclean Spirit, who knew how contrary these Vices were to the divine Purity, how they did war against, debase and pollute the Soul, and how [p] inconsistent they were with all Virtue, as *Cicero*, and other *Heathens* do confess, he led them on, and did continually prompt them to the commission of these things. And,

1*st*, Because this Sin of *Fornication* was common and indulg'd to through the *Heathen* World, and made sacred by the Ceremonies and Worship of their Gods; therefore the *Scripture* doth not only say, *this is the will of God, even your Sactification, that*

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[o] Moral. l. 4. c. 11.

[p] Nec enim libidine dominante temperantiæ locum esse, nec omnino in voluptatis Regno virtutem posse consistere. Cato de Senect. n. 36. Q. Maximus nullam capitaliorem pestem quam corporis voluptatem hominibus dicebat a natura datam. ibid. Vide Somn. Scip. n. 33.

you abſtain from Fornication, and walk not in the luſts of Concupiſcence, as did the *Heathens which knew not God*, but alſo is expreſs and frequent in condemning this Vice;

1*ſt*, As a Sin contrary to Nature, *Fornication being*, ſaith St. *Paul*, *a Sin againſt the Body*; *a Sin of unrighteouſneſs to which God gave the Heathens up for their Idolatry*; a Sin which they who lived in *were given up to a reprobate Mind*, and knew they did things *worthy of death*, 1 Cor. 6. 18. Rom. 1. 28, 29, 32. And laſtly, a Sin contrary to the *moral Law*, and ſo againſt the Law of Nature, for he declares that Law was given for the condemning *Fornicators*, 1 Tim. 1. 10.

2*dly*, As a Sin contrary to the *Chriſtian* Faith, and inconſiſtent with it, by which we do that which *ought not to be named among Saints*; we take the *Members of Chriſt*, *and make them the Members of an Harlot*; *we deſpiſe that God* who hath called us to *Holineſs*, *and given us his Holy Spirit*, Eph. 5. 3. 1 Cor. 6. 15. 1 Theſſ. 4. 7, 8. 1 Tim. 1. 10, 11. Hence he declares it to be contrary to the ſound Doctrine of the Goſpel, and forbids *Chriſtians* to eat with any Brother *who is called a Fornicator*, 1 Cor. 5. 11.

3*dly*, As

3*dly*, As being a Sin which will exclude the *Fornicator* from the Kingdom of God; for *no Fornicator*, saith St. *Paul* thrice, *hath any inheritance in the Kingdom of God, or of Christ*, Gal. 5. 19, 20, 21. — 6. 10, 11. Eph. 5. 5. They, saith St. *John*, *shall be excluded from the New Jerusalem*, Rev. 22. 15.

4*thly*, As that which will assuredly expose them to the Wrath of God; *Fornication and Uncleanness* being things *for which the Wrath of God comes upon the Children of Disobedience*, Eph. 5. 6. Col. 3. 5, 6.

5*thly*, As that which will subject them to eternal Punishments; for *Whoremongers and Adulterers* κρινεῖ ὁ Θεὸς *God will adjudge to Condemnation*, Hebr. 13. 4. The portion of the *Whoremonger* shall be assigned him *in the lake that burns with Fire and Brimstone*, Rev. 21. 8. And what great Reasons the *Apostles* had thus to inveigh against this Sin of Fornication, will be evident when we consider,

1*st*, That it was esteemed no Crime among the *Heathens*, it being [q] not forbidden either by Word or Deed, as we may

[q] Nemo hic prohibet, nec vetat — quin quod palam est venale si argentum est emas, Plaut. Curcul. Act. 1. Scen. 1. Scivi illum amicam habere, verum id vitium ego nunquam decrevi esse adolescentiæ, nam id omnibus innatum est, Ter. Hecyr, Act. 4, Sc. 1.

learn not only from the Teſtimony of the *Poets*, and of the *Fathers*, who in their *Apologies* and Defences of *Chriſtianity*, lay this to the charge of *Heathens*, that they did [r] not account theſe Actions ſinful, or think they *acted contrary to their duty by indulging to them*, and tell the *Heathen* Emperors that they received Tribute from them who kept both Men and Women for ſuch wicked purpoſes; but alſo from the Teſtimony of the two great Orators, [s] *Cicero* and [t] *Demoſthenes*; the firſt pleading for this, *as a thing generally permitted, and never reprehended*; the other declaring that *Whores were allowed throughout all Greece.* It was either permitted or required by the Laws of moſt Nations; In *Elis* and *Bœotia*, and where there were no Wiſe-men ἁπλῶς νενομοθέτηϒ καλὸν τὸ χαρίζεσθϒ ἐρασαῖς, *it was wholly permitted by the Law*, ſaith [u] *Plato*, *it was wholly by Law pronounced honourable to uſe Whores, and neither old nor young Men*

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[r] Tales ſunt οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ϰ) οἱ τῶ γαμαιλύπαις διαφόρως πεφοιτηϰότες, διδάσϰονλες ϑ ϰ) μὴ πάνλως ἀφεϛὸ τὸ ϰαθῆϰον τῶτο γίνεσθϒ. Orig. adv. Celſ. p. 177. & Hom. 5. in Jer. p. 79.

[s] Si quis eſt qui etiam meretriciis amoribus interdictum putet, abhorrer a maiorum conſuetudine atque conceſſis, quando enim hoc non factum eſt? quando reprehenſum? quando non permiſſum? Orat. pro Cælio.

[t] Τὰς μὲ ἑταίρας ἡδονῆς ἕνεϰα ἔχομεν -- τὰς ϑ γυναῖϰας τῆ παιδοποιΐας γνησίως. Apud Athen. l. 13. p. 573.

[u] Conviv. p. 1180. D.

did

did look upon it ὡς αἰσχρὸν *as an impure thing*, *Solon* built a *Temple* which he called [w] Παν-δήμου, *Veneris Templum*, the publick Temple of *Venus*, whither the young Men might resort to commit Fornication as well as at the κεραμεικὸν or σκίρον, the usual places for those Acts of Lewdness; and *Philemon* in [x] *Athenæus* celebrates his praises for making these provisions for young Men, and appointing Women their Stations where they might be ready for their use. *Corinth* was famous to a Proverb for this Vice, κορίνθια γυνὴ, *a Corinthian Woman* and a Whore, being in the Language of the *Heathens* the same thing, and κορινθιάζειν *being to play the Whore*, or indulge to Whoredom, [y] Whores being there consecrated to *Venus*, and brought to Strangers by the Law. It was also a Law among the *Persians*, say [z] *Plutarch* and [a] *Macrobius*, when they gave up themselves to Banquettings and Drunkenness, *cum concubinis non cum conjugibus inire Convivia*, to bring in not their Wives, but their Concubines. It was among the [b] *Ro-*

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[w] Petit In leges Att. p. 472.

[x] L. 13. p. 569. D. E.

[y] Παρέχονσι δὲ τοιάυτα νομίμα καὶ τὴν θεὸν Athen. l. 13. p. 573. ἔξεστιν νόμου τὰς ἑταίρας ἐνθάδε μεθ' ἡμῶν, p. 574. [z] Symp. p. 913. A. [a] Saturn. 7. c. 1.

[b] Tacitus Annal. 2. p. 73. ubi Lipsius, non tam graviter animadversum in libertinorum, aut è plebe quibus hæc militia venerea tantùm non permissa, quod ex Horatio, Ovidio, aliisque liquere potest,

man-

mans permitted to the *Libertines and vulgar ſort*, and thoſe who did profeſs it before the *Ædiles*. And the *Emperors*, as [c] *Juſtin M.* tells them, *received a tribute from theſe Stews and Brothel-houſes* to which almoſt all Men reſorted: And hence grave *Epictetus* exhorts his young Man, if he can to contain till Marriage; if he cannot, only to whore ὡς νομιμὸν ὄν *according to Law*. All the *Indians*, ſaith [d] *Bardeſanes*, excepting only the *Brachmans*, were addicted to *Murther*, *Whoredom*, and *Drunkenneſs*; the *Perſians* and *Parthians*, ſaith [e] *Briſſonius*, had their Herds of Whores for this purpoſe.

And that this practice ſhould obtain ſo generally throughout all *Greece*, and in moſt other Nations, cannot ſeem ſtrange when we conſider that it had the approbation of their moſt celebrated *Philoſophers*, and was practiced generally by them; that the religious Rites of many Nations did require it as an acceptable piece of ſervice to, and a gratification of, their Gods and Goddeſſes; that ſome of their *Oracles* did countenance

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[c] Τὰς πάνλας ἡδέως ὁρῶμεν ὅτι πορνεῖα περάγονλας ἢ μόνον τὰς κόρας ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀρσένων καὶ τέτων μισθὸς καὶ ἐισφοραὶ καὶ τέλη λαμβάνεῖε. Apol. 2. p. 70.

[d] Τῶν ἄλλων ἰνδῶν φονεύόνλων καὶ ἑταιρεύόνλων, καὶ μεθυσκομένων. Apud Euſeb. præpar. Evang. l. 6. c. 10. p. 275.

[e] De Reg. Perſ. l. 2. p. 232.

it,

it, and many of their Gods were famous for it. And,

1*st*, The *Stoicks*, saith *Sextus Empyricus*, maintained that it was not ἄτοπον *absurd* either for them to cohabit with Whores or for Whores to get their Living by such practices. [f] *Plato* forbids the young Men to make bold with Free-women, but gives them liberty to enjoy others; and where, saith he, 'tis done according to the Laws, ὃ δὴπε ψογὸν ἂν δικαίως, *it cannot reasonably be blamed.* That *Diogenes*, *Aristippus*, *Epicurus*, and his Followers, were of this opinion, cannot reasonably be doubted when we consider their avowed Doctrine, That [g] they knew no other Pleasures than those of the Body, the Pleasures of the Taste, the Ears, the Eye beholding Beauty, καὶ τὰς τῆ ἀφροδισίων, *and those of Venus.* Hence *Diogenes Laertius* saith of *Epicurus*, that he not only used *Leontium*, but ἑταίρας καὶ ἄλλας *other Whores*, of whom he mentions four, and many others to whom he wrote amorous Letters: [h] *Aristippus* had his *Lais*, and other Whores; *Diogenes* the same *Lais*; *Stilpo* his *Nicarites*; *Archesilaus* his *Theodota* and *Philete*; *Demetrius* his *Lamis* and

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[f] De leg. l. 8. p. 914. Sympos. p. 1180.

[g] D. Laert. l. 10. p. 606.

[h] Vide Athen. l. 13. p. 588. D. Laert. l. 2. p. 128, 147. l. 3. p. 187. l. 4. p. 251. l. 5. p. 269. p. 307. l. 7. p. 373. Athen. ibid. p. 589.

Lampeto,

Lampeto, whence he was called by her Name; *Socrates* his *Aſpaſia*; and *Plato* his *Archeanaſſa* and *Agatho*; *Ariſtotle* his *Herpillis*, of whom he begat *Nichomachus*; *Zeno* was a lover of Boys, and uſed Whores but once or twice to avoid being accounted an hater of their Sex.

2*dly*, This was a part of the religious Rites of many Nations, who as they went a whoring after falſe Gods in diſhonour of the true, ſo did they whore in honour of their falſe and wicked Deities, as hath been ſhew'd under the Head of their obſcene and filthy Rites of Worſhip. The *Pythian* Oracle, ſaith [i] *Theodoret*, Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπαινεῖ γυναῖκας *praiſed the Women of* Lacædominia *for ſporting freely thus with whom they pleaſed.*

Laſtly, They had the example of *Jupiter*, and almoſt all the other Gods, to encourage them in this practice; whence, ſaith *Lactantius* of *Jupiter*, *omitto virgines quas imminuit id enim tolerabile judicari ſolet*, I mention not the Virgins whom he hath corrupted, this being counted no great Crime among you. And hence *Chærea* in [k] *Terence* ſaith, *that he in this did only imitate their* Jupiter.

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[i] Adv. gent. Serm. 10. Ed. Syl. p. 141.

[k] Quod fecit is qui templa cœli ſumma ſonitu concutit, ego homuncio non facerem? Eunuch. Act. 3, Sc. 5.

And

And yet that this roving Fornication was judged sinful by the Light of Nature, we learn not only from the *Apostle*, who ranks it among the Sins known to the *Heathen* by the Light of Nature to be worthy of Punishment, but from their Sentiments and Customs; for a Whore, saith *Ulpian*, is vile by Profession, and Fornication is by [l] *Philosophers* rank'd among the Species of Intemperance or Incontinency. And even the [m] *Poets*, tho' they will not have it to be *scelus*, a Villany or Lewdness, yet do they acknowledge it to be *flagitium*, a Fault or Crime. Hence, in some Nations, [n] Whores were forbid to come into their Cities: In *Athens*, saith [o] *Demosthenes*, to come into their *Temples*; and both *Greeks* and *Romans* made them distinguish themselves from honest Women by their || Garb, and other notes of Infamy; nor would they permit any to tempt a Virgin or a Free-woman to it: And [p] *Musonius* argues from the care

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[l] Μετὰ γὰρ σωφροσύνης οὐκ ἂν ἑταίρᾳ πλησιάζειν ὑπομένει τις. Muson. apud. Stob. Serm. 6. p. 82, 83.

[m] Non est scelus, adolescentulum scortari, flagitium est, Ter.

[n] Καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων μὴ ἐπιτρεπομένου εἰσιέναι εἰς τὰς πόλεις ἔξω ἢ αὐτῆς. Orig. in Celsum l. 4. p. 206.

[o] Καὶ τὸ τὸ Σῶμα ἑταιρικὸν ὂν οὐκ ἐᾶσιν οἱ νόμοι εἰσιέναι εἰς τὰ ἱερά. Demost. Androt.

|| Jubet lex Attica τὰς ἑταίρας ἄνθινα φορεῖν. Petit. p. 476.

[p] Αἰσχὺς γὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα μέγα τοῖς δεομένοις αὐτὰς ὅταν ἔνδον ἀφανῶς ἢ ἐν τῷ φανερῶς ἰδεῖν ἀνέχεσθαι τοιαύτην ἰδέαν. Muson. ibid.

Men

Men uſe to conceal and deny this practice, that it is oppoſite to that Modeſty which Nature hath implanted in us; and a little conſideration will make it appear to be a violation of the Law of Nature; for were this ſimple Fornication lawful, all Men might make a conſtant uſe of this freedom, nor could any Man by the Law of Nature be obliged to marry; and if that Relation were diſſolved, there could be no ſuch thing as Families, and all natural Affection and Duty between the Father and the Child muſt be cut off, nor could there be any ſuch Sin as Inceſt, but the Daughter might cohabit with the Father, and he with her, becauſe then no Man could know his own Child, no Children their Fathers, and the good Education of Children, on which the good of all Societies chiefly depends, would be neglected, no Man caring to educate ſuch Children as he did not know to be his own, and the Women being ſure to breed them up to their own vicious courſes; And laſtly, without a ſucceſſion in the way of Marriage, no Man could be born to an Eſtate or an Inheritance; and without theſe advantages humane Life would be in many deprived of great advantages and ſupports.

2*dly*, Although Adultery was neither ſo common nor generally allowed as Fornication was, yet was the practice of it very frequent

frequent in many Nations, and in some it was not only connived at, and permitted, but by Law approved. The [q] *Spartans* exhorted their Wives to *lie with the most beautiful Men, whether they were Citizens or Strangers*; and this they did according to the [r] Laws of their *Lycurgus*, who enacted, that an aged Man might bring his Wife to any one he liked to have Children by him, and if any Man saw a fruitful and free Woman, *by the leave of her Husband he might have Children by her.* Hence *Callicratides* the *Pythagorean* gave this Precept to the Wife, that she must bear with her Husband, κἂν ἄλλησι γυναιξὶ (συγγνώῃ), *tho' he used other Women, since the Law allow'd this to the Man, and not to the Woman,* ὥσαδε ἐν τῷ νόμου δεῖ κἀμὲ μὴ ζηλοτυπέειν, *she therefore must bear with the Law, and not be jealous:* And [s] *Plutarch* in the Life of *Lycurgus* having mentioned these Laws, commends them, as being made φυσικῶς, καὶ πολιτικῶς, *agreeably to Nature and to Polity*, and saith they had so good effect, ὥστε ὅλως ἄπιστον εἶναι τὸ τῆς μοιχείας παρ' αὐτοῖς, *that there was no suspicion of Adultery among them*, as if the best Remedy

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[q] Ταῖς γὲ ἑωυτῶν γυναιξὶ συγκαλεῦσι ἐκ τῶν ἀνδρεσσῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἀστῶν καὶ ξείνων. Stob. Serm. 42. p. 293.

[r] Ἵνα ἐν δὲ τέκνον καὶ γυναῖαν ὁρᾷ πείσαντα τὸν ἔχοντα ἐκ τούτης τεκνοποιεῦσι. Stob. ibid. p. 286. Plut. in vita Lycurg. p. 49. [s] Ibid

against

againſt Adultery was to ſay, *by your leave*, before they did it. And indeed, what a Friend *Plutarch* was to this horrid Crime, we learn from his Conjugal Precepts, where he adviſeth the Wife not to be angry or take it ill tho' her Husband, [t] ἐξαμάρτῃ τι πρὸς ἑταίραν ἢ θεραπαινίδα, *ſhould divert from her to a Whore, or Serving-maid*; and as for a Matron, he would not have her ἀπάρχειν *to begin the ſolicitation to Adultery, for that*, ſaith he, *would look ſomewhat whoriſh*, μήτε φεύγειν μήτε δυσχεραίνειν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῷ ἀνδρὶ ἀρχομένῳ, *nor to fly from, or be moroſe to him who begins the ſolicitation, for that would*, ſaith he, *ſhew that ſhe was proud, and an enemy to love.* In *Rome* it ſelf this was a Crime ſo frequent, that [u] *Seneca* complains of it *as a thing done by all the Women without ſhame, ſo that ſhe was deem'd a fooliſh and old-faſhion'd Woman who was not an Adultreſs.* The [w] Law of *Gela*, a City in *Sicily*, allow'd γυναῖκας κοινωνεῖν οἷς ἂν βούλονται καὶ μὴ ἐγκαλεῖσθαι τοῦτο τῶν ἀνδρῶν, *the Women to converſe with whom they pleaſed, and they*

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[t] P. 140. B. C.

[u] Numquid jam ullus Adulterii pudor eſt, poſtquam eo ventum eſt ut nulla virum habeat niſi ut adulterum irriter, Argumentum eſt deformitatis pudicitia, quam invenies tam miſeram tam fordidam ut illi ſatis ſit unum Adulterorum par? infrunita, antiqua eſt quæ neſciat matrimonium vocari unius adulterium. De Benef. l. 3. c. 16.

[w] Bardes apud Euſeb. præpar. Evang. l. 6. c. 10. p. 275.

were

were neither condemned, nor accounted Adultereſſes by their Husbands for ſo doing. The *Bactrian* Women did this, ſaith [x] *Bardeſanes*, with their *Servants*, and with *Strangers*, *their Husbands not blaming them for it.* [y] *Diodorus Siculus* informs us of the Inhabitants of the Iſland of *Tabrobran*, and of the *Ichthyophagites* and *Troglodites*, that τὰς γυναῖκας ἔχεσι κοινὰς, *they had their Wives in common*; [z] *Stobæus*, from *Nicolaus*, *de moribus gentium*, ſaith the ſame of the *Limurneans*, and the *Agathyrſi*, a People of *Sarmatia*; [a] *Herodotus* teſtifies of them that ἐπίκοινον τ γυναικῶν μίξιν ποιέον) ἵνα κασιγνήτοὶ ἀλλήλων ἔωσι, *they had their Wives in common that they might be called Brethren*; The *Tyrrhenians* and the *Thaſcians*, ſaith *Athenæus*, had the ſame Law; [b] *Strabo* informs us of the People of *Tapyra* by the *Caſpian* Sea, that the Law bound them to let out their Wives to other Men, after they had had two or three Children by them: The *Maſſagetæ*, ſaith *Pyrrhon*, [c] *had alſo their Wives common*; they married but one Wife, ſaith [d] *Strabo*, χρῶν) ὃ τ ἄλλων ὀκ ἀφανῶς,

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[x] Ἀδιαφόρως πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς αἱ γυναῖκες κοινωνοῦσι τοῖς θέλοις, καὶ τοῖς ξένοις, ἄδειαν ἔχουσαι τ τοιαύτων καὶ ὑπὸ τ ἀνδρῶν μὴ ἐγκαλεισθαι. Ibid. p. 276. B.

[y] L. 3. p. 140. B. 152. C. 165. C. [z] Serm. 42. p. 291.

[a] L. 4. c. 104. [b] L. 12. p. 517. D. [c] D. Laert. l. 9. p. 200. [d] Strabo l. 11. p. 353.

but they uſe other Mens publickly : The *Scythians*, ſaith [e] he, have their Wives common, *according to the Laws of Plato*; and, laſtly, [f] *Origen* ſaith of the *Heathens* in general, that *they ſpake of their Fornications and Adulteries without ſhame, as of ſome notable Exploit.* Nor is it wonder'd that theſe things ſhould be done at *Rome*, where *Cato* lent his Wife to *Hortenſius*; or in *Greece*, where moſt of the *Philoſophers* approved the practice; for *D. Laertius* informs us, that this was the avowed Doctrine of *Zeno*, and *Chryſippus*, *Diogenes*, *Antiſthenes*, and *Plato*, who is poſitive that theſe things ought to be common among Friends. This he repeats and frequently inculcates, and even eſtabliſhes as a Law. Moreover, in ſome Nations this was thought a piece of ſervice to their *Gods* and *Goddeſſes*, as hath been proved already.

And yet this was ſo plainly a Sin againſt the Light of Nature, that many of the [g] *Philoſophers* have condemn'd it, and in

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[e] L. 7. p. 209.

[f] Βλέπεις γὰρ τοὺ ὑπὸ τ ἐθνῶν τίνα τρόπον ὡς ἀρετήν ἐδ' ὅτι καλαλέγουσι τὰς πορνείας, ἢ τὰς μοιχείας ἐαυτῶν ἀδὲ αἰδέμονοι ὁμολογεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα πεποιηκέναι. Hom. 5. in Jerem. Ed. Huet. To. 1. p. 79. C.

[g] Αἱ μὲ μὴ μοιχείαν συμπλοκὰὶ θρυλούμεναι. Muſon. apud Stob. p. 82. Serm. 6. Ἀδικεῖ χ τὰν αὐτᾶς παλείδα μὴ ἐπιμίσσα τοῖς ἐνδιαβεβλαμμένοις, ἐφ' οἷς τὸ μέγιστον τ πρεσίμων ὤειται θάνατ. Pyneras apud Stob. Serm. 72. p. 444. Vide Arrian. l. 2. c. 4. p. 178.

many

many places it was punished in the Woman with Death, in the Man with Infamy; nor was the injured Person punishable if, in his Rage, he slew the Adulterer; and as among the primitive *Christians* no Absolution was to be given to him, so, say the [h] *Heathens*, there was no καθαρμὸς *purgation* appointed by their sacred Rites to restore such Persons to the favour of the *Gods* as had violated the sacred Bond of Matrimony. I proceed,

3*dly*, To their incestuous Copulations, which also were allow'd by many and great Nations; the *Persians*, *Medes*, *Indians*, *Æthiopians*, saith St. [i] *Jerom*, mixed with *Grandmothers*, *Daughters*, *and Nieces*: This of the *Persians* is so well known, and so fully proved by [k] *Bar. Brissonius*, that it is superfluous to say more of it, excepting only that this was accounted a thing [l] *sacred* by their *Magi*, and they did it *according to Law*. Of the *Egyptians* it is declared, by [m] *Diodorus Siculus*, [n] *Sextus Empy-*

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[h] Stob. Ibid.

[i] Persæ, Medi, Indi, Æthiopes Regna non modica & Romano Regno paria, cum Matribus, & Aviis, cum Filiabus, & Neptibus copulantur. Contr. Jovin. l. 2. F. 28. A.

[k] De Reg. Perfico. l. 2. p. 230, 231.

[l] Τὰς δ' μάγες ὅσιον νομίζειν μίγεσθαι, ἢ θυγατρὶ μίγνυσθαι. Laert. pro. p. 5. Τούτοις δὲ μιγεῖσι συνέρχεσθαι νενόμισται. Strabo l. 15. p. 505.

[m] Diod. Sic. l. 1. p. 16. [n] Emp. l. 3. c. 24.

ricus, and others, that τὰς ἀδελφὰς ἄλοχον ποιεῖς γάμου, *they married their Siſters*, and that they did this, ὀφὰ τὸ γενόμενον ἐν τούτοις Ἴσιδος ἐπίτευγμα, *in imitation of their Goddeſs Iſis.* [o] *Minutius Fœlix* and [p] *Philo* ſay, *Egyptiis & Athenis legitima cum Sororibus connubia*, the *Egyptians* and the *Athenians* alſo married with their Siſters: The *Athenians* and *Spartans*, ſay [q] Hiſtorians, did it by the permiſſion of their Law-givers; from the *Aſſyrians*, ſaith *Conſtantius Manaſſes*, the *Perſians* had this Cuſtom, and they from the example of *Jupiter*; from the *Perſians* it paſs'd, ſaith *Bardeſanes*, to the *Medians*; from them to the *Maguſæans*, to *Egypt*, *Phrygia*, and *Galatia*; and all theſe things they did agreeably to the Philoſophy of [r] *Zeno* and *Chryſippus*: And yet this is by [s] *Diodorus Siculus* declared to be παρὰ κοινὸν ἔθος, *contrary to the common Cuſtom*; by [t] *Hipparchus* it is reckoned among ἀνοσιαλάτες ἡδονὰς *the moſt impure Pleaſures*; by *D. La-*

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[o] Min. p. 35. [p] Philo de Special. leg. p. 602.

[q] Ἔξεστιν ἢ τὴν Ἥρων τὴν ἀδελφὴν καὶ παρὰ Πέρσαις τοῦτο καὶ Ἀσσυρίοις νόμος, ita de Jove. Lucian. de Sacrif. p. 85. Καὶ ὁ μάγον ἐν τῇ χάρᾳ ἐκείνῃ καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ κλίματι τέτες τὸν ἀνοσίκς νόμκς οἱ Πέρσαι ἐποίκν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσοι αὐτῆς τῆς Περσίδος ἐξεδήμκν ὁίλινες καλέν Μαγυσαῖοι. Bardes. apud Euſeb. præp. Evang. l. 6. c. 10. p. 275.

[r] Καὶ μιλεάσι λέξι σωιέρχεως καὶ ξυζαλεάσι καὶ ὑοῖς. D. Laert. de Chryſippo, de Zenone Sext. Empyr. l. 3. c. 24, 25. Plutarch. de Stoic. Repugn. p. 1024. F. Orig. adv. Celſ. l. 4. p. 194. [s] Apud Stob. Serm. 106. p. 573.

[t] Ibid. p. 481.

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ertius it is said to be, χαμαιζύπαις μᾶλλον πρέπει ἢ θεοῖς, *fitter for the Stews than the Gods*; Whence *Plato*, and other Philosophers, would allow *no Men or Women to converse with one another in these* [u] *degrees.*

3*dly*, Another Sin of which the Apostle speaks, *Rom.* 1. and of which most of the Philosophers were accused, was τὸ μίσημα κατὰ φύσιν, *the Sin of Sodomy. Justin M.* declares that in every Nation παίδων πλῆθος, *a multitude of Boys were bred up to this execrable Art.* They had a Privilege from the *Romans*, παίδων ἀγέλας ζωοτρέφειν, *to breed up herds of Boys to it*; and they who were thus taught, were stiled, saith *Lipsius*, *Pueri pædagogii*; and of these both *Tacitus* and [w] *Seneca* speak with the greatest Indignation. [x] *Athenæus* informs us that many preferr'd it before the use of Women, and that in many Cities of *Greece*, παιδαγωγία τὸ ὂν τῷ ἔθει, *this practice was studiously promoted*: The *Cretians*, and the Inhabitants of *Chalcis*, were notoriously guilty of it; [y] *Maximus Tyrius* imputes it to the *Greeks* in general: From the *Græcians*, the *Persians* de-

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[u] Πλὴν συσσιτεῖ καὶ μισεῖ καὶ τῶν συσσιτίων παίσι. De Rep. l. 5. p. 657. E. Τῷ ἔθει καὶ τὸ νόμῳ τὸ πρὸς ἀδελφὴν καὶ ἀδελφὸν μίξιν ἀποκωλύσαντι. Simplic. c. 47. p. 274.

[w] Transeo Puerorum infelicium greges quos post transacta convivia aliæ cubiculi contumeliæ expectant, transeo agmina exoletorum. Ep. 95. p. 601.

[x] L. 13. p. 601. [y] Diss. 10. p. 108.

rived this cuſtom, ſaith [z] *Herodotus*, and [a] the *Scholiaſt* upon *Nazianzens Steleteuticks*; and the Wiſe-men of *Greece*, ſaith [b] *Bardeſanes*, were not reprehended for it; [c] *Plato* confeſſeth it will be a difficult matter to keep it out of his Commonwealth, *it being allow'd by the* Cretians, *the* Lacedemonians, *and by other* Greeks *and barbarous Nations*; and he himſelf ſeems to allow it to Soldiers. The *Gauls*, ſay [d] *Diodorus Siculus* and [e] *Bardeſanes*, tho' they had very fine Women, *were very much addicted to the love of Boys, and were permitted to marry* with them; that practice obtained alſo among the [f] *Germans*; and, ſaith [g] *Athenæus*, among the *Thuſcians*.

Moreover theſe practices had the countenance and ſuffrage of moſt of the *Philoſo-*

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[z] Πέρσαι παρ' ἑλλήνων μαθόντες παισὶ μίσγονται, Herodot. l. 1. Athen. l. 13. p. 603. A.

[a] Στηλ. p. 64.

[b] Παρ' ἕλλησι μὲν καὶ οἱ σοφοὶ ἐρωμένοις ἔχοντες οὐ ψέγονται. Apud Euſeb. præp. Evang. l. 6. c. 10.

[c] Ἡ κρήτη τε ἡμῖν ὅλη καὶ ἡ Λακεδαίμων τιθᾶσι νόμους περὶ τῶν ἐρώντων παίδων τὰ ἀρρένων καὶ θηλειῶν σκαιοτέρους παντὸς ἄτασιν. De leg. l. 8. p. 919. F. & p. 913. Metuit ne τῶν τε ἄλλων ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων διαφθειρῶν τὸ λεγόμενον ἄτακτον Ἀφροδίτην ἐνιέντες ἐρῶντες τε καὶ ἀκόντες μίσγοιντο γυναιξίν. V. de Rep. l. 5. p. 662. C.

[d] Παρὰ τοῖς Γάλλοις οἱ νεοὶ γαμοῦσι μὲν παρρησίας δὲ χάριν τοῦτο ποιοῦνται διὰ τὸ παρ' αὐτοῖς νόμον. Diod. Sic. l. 5. p. 214.

[e] Bard. apud Euſeb. præpar. Ev. l. 6. c. 10.

[f] Ἀρρενομιξίαι παρὰ Γερμανοῖς οὐ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν αἰσχροῖς.

[g] Athen. l. 12. p. 517. l. 13. p. 601.

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phers; whence [h] *Athenæus* having told us of some who perished on the account of it by divine Vengeance, breaks forth into this Exclamation, *Be aware therefore, ye Philosophers, lest you also perish for it after the same manner:* [i] *Lucian* says that τὸ παιδερασεῖν, *this unnatural Lust sprang up together with Philosophy, and therefore,* saith he, ἀφείσθω μόνοις φιλοσόφοις, *let it be left to them alone:* [k] *Plutarch* plainly confesses, he was inclined to allow of it for their sakes; *for,* saith he, *when I hear the complaints of the Parents against them for using their Children so contumeliously, I am afraid to be* εἰσηγητὴς καὶ σύμβουλον, *an Introducer and Counsellor of this practice; but again, when I think of* Socrates, Plato, Zenophon, Æschines, *and* Cebes, καὶ τὸ πᾶν χόρον ἐκείνων τῶν ἀνδρῶν οἱ τὰς Ἀρρένας ἐδοκίμας ἐρῶντας, *and the whole company of those Men who approv'd of these Masculine loves, I change my opinion, and am moved by an emulation of them, tho' I leave every Man to enjoy his own opinion in this matter.* To the *Philosophers* he mentions we may add from [l] *Diogenes Laertius*, and others, *Archesilaus*, who was φιλομειράκιον.

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[h] Ὁρᾶτε ἐν καὶ ὑμᾶς οἱ φιλόσοφοι ὦ φίλοι φύσιν τῆ Ἀφροδίτη χρώμενοι, καὶ ἀτεβοῦντες εἰς τὸ θεὸν μὴ τὸ αὐτὸν διαφθαρῆτε τρόπον, l. 13. p. 605. D.

[i] De amor. p. 216, 236.

[k] De lib. Educ. p. 11, 12.

[l] L. 4. p. 251, 253.

a lover of Boys, and was upon that account branded as φθορέα τ νέων, *a corrupter of Youth*; [m] *Bion Boryſthenes*, and [n] *Zeno*, who uſed Women rarely, γυναικῶν ὃ ἀεὶ, *but Boys continually*, ſaith *Antigonus Caryſtius* in his Life; whence it ſeems reaſonable to conjecture that the words in [o] *Laertius* ſhould be read γυναικῶν ἠρχήτο ὃ γανίως, *he uſed Boys not ſeldom, Women but once or twice*, which laſt words ſhew the probability of this conjecture. *Ariſtotle* is taxed by [p] *Laertius* for the love of *Pythocles*; by *Athenæus* for the love of his Scholar *Phaſelytis*. The *Oracle* at *Delphi*, ſaith [q] *Theodoret*, praiſed the Wiſdom of *Lycurgus*, who allowed the love of Boys; and the *Pythian Oracle*, ſaith [r] *Lucian*, the Wiſdom of *Socrates*, who practiſed it as μάλιστα ὠφελῶν, *moſt profitable*; and the *Phœnicians*, ſaith [s] *Athanaſius*, thought it a grateful piece of ſervice to the Mother of the Gods to play the *Sodomites*: In fine, the *Cretians*, ſaith [t] *Plato*, from the Story of *Ganymedes* thus loved by *Jupiter*, ſaid, *they enjoy'd their Pleaſure* ἐπόμενοι τῷ Θεῷ, *in imitation of their God*.

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[m] Apud Athen. l. 13. p. 563. [n] L. 7. p. 373.
[o] L. 10. p. 605. [p] L. 13. p. 566.
[q] Serm. 10. adv. Gr. p. 630. B. [r] De Amor. p. 233.
[s] Orat. contr. Gent. p. 165. A.
[t] Plato de leg. l. 1. p. 776. E.

And

And yet *Plato* pronounceth both of these unnatural Lusts, and of the incestuous Copulations beforementioned, that they were [u] θεομισῆ καὶ ἄκρων αἰσχίστα, *hateful to God, and most abominable in themselves*; and [w] *Max. Tyrius* saith of the last, that it is ἄδικος ἡ μίξις, *an unjust mixture of Madmen.*

4*thly*, Whereas Drunkenness, as experience teacheth, is both the incentive to all manner of Uncleanness, and to those Quarrels which often end in the destruction of Men's lives, and so violates both the sixth and seventh Commandments; this also was a Sin of which the *Heathens* were exceeding guilty, almost all Nations who had the use of Wine being addicted to it, as we learn from [x] *Athenæus*, who declares, concerning the *Colophonians*, that they used *to employ the whole Night* πρὸς τὸ μεθύειν, *in Drunkenness*; that the People of [y] *Byzantium* were ἀκόλαστοι καὶ ζωστιάζειν καὶ πίνειν, *intemperate in Whoring and in Drinking*; that the [z] *Chalcedonians* were also after their example, φιλοπότοι, *lovers of Drink*; that the [a] *Thessalonians* spent the Day ἐν πότοις καὶ ἀκολασίαις, *in Drinking and Lasciviousness*; that the [b] *Syrians* for the most part of the Day

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[u] De leg. 8. p. 912. [w] Diss. 10. p. 168.
[x] L. 13. p. 526. [y] Ibid. [z] Ibid. [a] p. 527.
[b] Ibid.

were

were γασερίζόμενοι οἰνοις, *loading their Bellies with Wine*; that the People of [c] *Tarentum* were always converſant περὶ ζωυσσίας καὶ πότους, *about Drinking and Whoring, living in Pleaſures now, upon the Principle of* Epicurus, *that they did not expect to live hereafter*: The [d] *Macedonians*, ſaith he, *lived* ἀσότως *like Sots*; amongſt the Nations which μέθης χαρὰν *uſed this Vice*, [e] he reckons from *Plato de legibus*, the *Lydians*, the *Perſians*, the *Carthaginians*, the *Gauls*, the *Spaniards*, *the Thracians*, the *Scythians*, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα γένη, *and ſuch like Nations*, and the *Indians*; add to theſe the [f] *Illyrians*, the *Argives*, the *Mileſians*, the *Tirynthians*, and the People of *Methymnum* in *Crete*, and of *Phigalea* or *Phialea* in *Arcadia*; all the [g] *Greeians* were infamous to a Proverb for this; to guttle ἑλλωικῶς, and *Pergræcari being to drink to exceſs*; and ſo were the [h] *Scythians*, whence ἐκσκυθίσαι *bears the ſame ſenſe.*

In fine, This was one part of the Worſhip which they paid to their *Gods* and *Goddeſſes*: The *Armenians* were great ado-

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[c] L. 4. p. 166. [d] P. 167. [e] L. 10. p. 432.

[f] P. 437, 443.

[g] Græco more bibere, *to be as merry as a Greek.* Eraſm. Adag. Ch. 4. cent. 1. p. 695. Dies noctesque bibite pergræcamini. Plaut. Muſtel.

[h] Σκυθίζειν & Scythica potio, Eraſm. Adag. Chil. 2. Cent. 3. p. 337. Athen. l. 10. p. 417.

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rers of *Anaitis*, in whose Solemnities both Men and Women continued μεθ' ἡμέραν καὶ νυκτὸς χυθισὶ πίνοντες, *Day and Night drinking to excess*; the same was done in the Feasts of *Bacchus*, saith the [i] *Scholiast* upon *Aristophanes*, ἐν ᾗ τὰ Διονύσια ἄγοντο, καὶ μεθύοντες πορνὰς ἥρπαζε, *in which being drunk they snatched up their Whores*; hence, when *Megillus*, the *Lacedemonian*, had told the *Athenian* that he saw their whole City drunk at the Solemnity of *Bacchus*, marvel not at that, saith the *Athenian*, [k] νόμῳ ἐστὶν ἡμῖν ὅτῳ, *the Law then requires it of us*; and [l] *Plato* allows no Man to be drunk, πλὴν ἐν ταῖς τοῦ Διονύσου ἑορταῖς, *save at the Feasts of Bacchus*; and hence, saith [m] *Athenæus*, they called the Drink used at those *Sacra*, μέθη, and their God μεθυμναῖον, *the drunken God*, and introduced him οἰνώμφον, *overcharged with Wine*. Nor were these Vices proper to the Solemnities of *Bacchus*, but were an usual Appendix to other Sacrifices they offered to their *Deities*; whence *Seleuchus* saith, that anciently it was not usual to drink Wine much, or abound in Dainties, [n] μὴ θεῶν ἕνεκα τοῦτο δρῶντες, *save when they did this in honour of their Gods*, ὅτι δι' ἃ τοὺς θεοὺς οἴνου δεῖν ἐπελάμβανον, *for*

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[i] Εἰρὼ. p. 689.
[l] L. 9. p. 363.
[n] Athen. l. 2. p. 40.
[k] De leg. l. 1. p. 777. l. 6. p. 870. F.
[m] L. 10. p. 428.

whose

whoſe ſake they conceived it was their duty to be drunk; on which account they called their Feaſts, held after their Sacrifices, θοίνας and μέθας, becauſe at theſe Solemnities they thought they might be drunk; and τὸ μεθύειν *to be drunk* hath its original hence, that μετὰ τὸ θύειν αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, *they uſed to be ſo after their Sacrifices: No times of Feaſting, no Actions, no other Sights*, ſaith [o] *Plutarch, rejoice us more than thoſe which we ſee*, or do, ὀργιάζοντες, ἢ θυσίαις παρόντες, ἢ τελεταῖς, *at the Orgia of* Bacchus, *or being preſent at the Sacrifices and Myſteries of the Gods; for when the Soul thinks or collects by Reaſon that the God is moſt preſent, then laying aſide all fears and ſorrows, it lets it ſelf looſe to its Pleaſure*, μηχεῖ μέθης καὶ παιδιᾶς καὶ γέλωτος, *even to Drunkenneſs, and Sports, and Laughter.* Hence [p] *Diogenes* ſaid, he was incenſed againſt them who ſacrificed to the Gods for Health, but did ἐν αὐτῇ τὲ θυσίᾳ καὶ τὴ ὑγιείας δειπνεῖν, *ſup at thoſe Sacrifices againſt their Health*; and *Ariſtippus*, who loved [q] οἶνον παλαιὸν καὶ ἑταίρας, *old Wine, and Whores*, being taxed for his Luxury, replied, εἰ τοῦτο φαῦλον ἐστιν οὐκ ἂν ἐν τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ἑορταῖς ἐγίνετο, *if this were evil, it would not be practiſed in the Feaſts of the Gods*: And

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[o] Non poſſe ſuaviter v. p. 1101. E.
[p] D. Laert. l. 6. p. 329. [q] L. 2. p. 120.

yet

yet Drunkenness is by all their [r] *Moralists* put among the Species of Intemperance, and accounted matter of Shame: [s] *Plato* forbids all Men to drink to excess *till they be forty Years old*, and then only sends them to the Feasts of the Gods thus to rejoice with them.

The *Stoicks* Wise-man was not to be [t] drunk at all, because there was Iniquity and Madness in it; whereas their Wise-man must be guilty of no Sin, and never must be Mad: And *Pythagoras* forbad all excess of Drink, and said, that *Drunkenness hurts the Mind in the* [u] *strength and vigor of it.*

§. IV. *Comm. 8th.* Again, whereas *Christianity* forbids not only Violence and Rapine, Oppression and Extortion, but all the Arts of Fraud and Over-reaching our Brother; *Didymus* upon the Question in [w] *Homer's Odysses, Who art thou, and whence*

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[r] Aristot. de Mor. l. 3. c. 13. p. 41. Zenoph. de dict. Socr. l. 1. p. 564. ἐκ αἰσχυνῆς μεθύων.

[s] Μέθης ὃ μὴ πολυοινίας τὸ παράπαν ἀπέχειν ἢ νέον, De leg. l. 2.

[t] Dicunt Stoici ἐκ οἷ μεθυσθήσεσθαι τὸν νῆφον ἔχουσάν τι γὰρ μεθυὼν ἁμαρτητικὸν παρέχειν, λήρησιν (τε) εἶναι παρὰ τὸν ὑγιαίνον (l. οἶνον.) Stob. Eclog. Eth. p. D. Laert. l. 7. §. 118.

[u] Τὸν μέθυσον ἐν ἀνθρ. νοὸς βλαβὸν καλεῖν, λέγων μὴ παραβαίνειν μήτε τὸν πότον, μήτε τὸν σιτίον, l. 8. n. 9.

[w] Τὸ ξεῖναι τίνες ἐστε, πόθεν πολεῖς; ὑστερὸν κέλευθα εἶα τε λιπόντες. Od. γ. v. 80, 82.

comest

comeſt thou, is it as a Thief to kill, and do miſchief to other Nations? ſaith οὐκ ἄδοξον ὧν παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς τὸ λῃστεύειν ἀλλ' ἔνδοξον, that *Theft among the Ancients was rather counted glorious than criminal*; and *Euſtachius* there ſaith the ſame, περὶ τοῦ πειρατεύειν, of *Piracy and other Theft*, and proves this from *Thucydides* and [x] *Herodotus*, who ſaith of the *Thracians*, and others, γῆς μὲν ἐργάτιν ἀτιμώτατον, τὸ δὲ ζῆν ἀπὸ πολέμου καὶ λῃστείης κάλλιστον, *they thought it diſhonourable to till the Earth, but very honourable to live by War and Theft*; that ὁ βίος τῶν ἑλλήνων, *the life of the Greeks at firſt was ſpent in Theft*; and that *this was ſo far from being accounted diſhonourable*, ὡς ἐν καλῷ μᾶλλον τι καθεστηκέναι, *as that it rather was accounted honourable.* The place referred to in [y] *Thucydides*, is too large to be tranſcribed; it ſaith, that *anciently not only the Barbarians, but the Græcians in the Iſlands and the Continent lived chiefly upon Theft and Rapine*, ἔτι ἔχον τε καὶ αἰσχύνην τότε τοῦτο ἔργον φέρον ἢ νῦν, *that way of living being then rather accounted glorious than ſhameful, yea*, ſaith he, καὶ μέχρι τοῦδε πολλαὶ τῶν ἑλλάδος τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ νέμονται, *this practice continues till now in moſt Parts of Greece.* Of the *Phocenſes*, [z] *Juſtin* ſaith,

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[x] L. 5. c. 6. [y] L. 1. princip. [z] L. 43. c. 3.

that

that *they lived mostly latrocinio maris*, that is, *by Piracy, that being in those times accounted glorious*; and [a] *Strabo* having mention'd eight several Nations, he saith, πάντα μὲν ἔν τοῦτα λῃστρικώτατα ἔθνη, *all these are excessively given to Theft; from the River* Euphrates *to the Ocean, and towards the East,* [b] ὁλοσχερῶς ὡς κλέπτης δ' οὐ πάνυ ἀγανακτεῖ, *he that is reproached as a Thief is not much offended at it; 'twas accounted glorious among the* [c] *Cicilians*, saith *Sextus Empyricus, allowed by the* [d] Spartans *and* Egyptians, *by the* [e] Germans *and the Inhabitants of* [f] Spain; and, saith [g] *Sextus Empyricus, That cannot be unjust which is done by the God* Mercury, *the Prince of Thieves*, πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴη θεὸς κακός, *for how can a God be wicked?*

And yet it is as certain, from the Light of Nature, that Theft and Rapine must be acts of Injustice, as that it is the property of Justice to give to every one, or to let a Man quietly enjoy, his own, and to do no Man any Injury: nor is any thing more cer-

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[a] L. 7. p. 220.

[b] Apud Euseb. præp. Evang. l. 6. c. 10. p. 276.

[c] Εὐκλεὲς τοῦτο οἱ Κίλικες ἐνόμιζον εἶναι. Hyp. l. 3. c. 24.

[d] Apud Ægyptios & Lacedæmonios furari honorificum. Jul. Firm.

[e] Latrocinia nullam habent infamiam quæ extra fines cujusque Civitatis sunt. Cæsar de Germanis, l. 6. de bello Gall. c. 23.

[f] De Hispanis vide Plutarch. in vitâ Marii, p. 408.

[g] Ibid. p. 154.

tain

tain than is that of *Seneca*, *there is no Man* (or Nation) *which lives by Theft and Rapine*, [h] qui ad illa quæ furtis & latrociniis conſequuntur, non malint ratione bona pervenire, & potius illa invenire quam eripere, *who would not rather honeſtly have thoſe things, than as the fruit of Theft, and would not rather find, than ſnatch them from another*; *which ſhews*, ſaith he, *that Virtue ſhines ſo bright in the Minds of Men, that they who will not follow it, muſt ſee it is the Voice of Nature*: And hence we find that in all civiliz'd Nations Theft was ſtill puniſhed either with [i] Infamy, or with Servitude, or with [k] double Reſtitution, or with Death, according as it was more or leſs pernicious; and even in *Sparta*, where it ſeems to have been allow'd in Boys to ſatisfie their Hunger, yet was it puniſhed [l] with ſevere Stripes as often as the Thief was apprehended.

§. V. *Comm. 9th.* Laſtly, Whereas the *Chriſtian* Doctrine makes it a part of the New Creature, and of the Image to which

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[h] De Benef. l. 4. c. 17.

[i] Infamia & Servitute. Stob. Serm. 10. p. 133. Serm. 42. p. 292.

[k] Θάνατος ἢ δίπλων τὰ ἀξίας τὰ κλέμματος. Ariſt. probl. §. 29. qu. 14.

[l] Πολλὰς πληγὰς ἐπίβακε τῷ ἁλισκομένῳ. Stob. Serm. 42. p. 287.

Chriſtianity

Christianity renews us, *to speak the truth one to another, and put away the lying Lip*, threatning Damnation to the Man *that loves* or *makes a lye*, *Eph.* 4. 24, 29. *Col.* 3. 9. *Rev.* 22. 15. The *Heathen* Philosophers held this lawful when it was profitable for them, as owning the Rule of *Menander*, κρεῖττον ψεῦδος ἢ ἀλήθεια κακόν, *a Lye is better than an hurtful truth*; and that of *Proclus*, τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν κρεῖττόν ἐστιν τ ἀληθείας, *good is better than truth*; and of *Darius* in [m] *Herodotus*, ἔνθα γάρ τι δεῖ καὶ ψεῦδος λέγειν λεγέσθω, *when a lye will profit, let it be used*; and that of *Plato*, *he may lye who knows how to do it*, ἐν δέοντι καιρῷ, *in a fit season*; *for there is nothing decorous in truth*, saith *Maximus Tyrius*, *but when it is profitable, yea sometimes*, saith he, καὶ ψεῦδος ὤνησεν ἀνθρώπους, καὶ τ ἀληθὲς ἔβλαψεν, *truth hurts, and a lye profits a Man.* And to countenance this practice, both [n] *Plato* and the *Stoics* seem to have framed a *Jesuitical* distinction betwixt lying in words, and with assent to an untruth, which they called *lying in the Soul*; the first *they held convenient for a Governour of a City against their Enemy, or for their*

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[m] L. 3. p. 191.

[n] Τὴν ψυχὴν περὶ τὰ ὄντα ψεύδεσθαι πάντες μισοῦσι, τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος πολλὲ καὶ τὶ χρήσιμον, ὥστε μὴ ἄξιον εἶναι μίσους. De Rep. l. 2. p. 607. Τοῖς ἄρχουσι τ πόλεως περσήκει ψεύδεσθαι ἢ πολεμίων ἢ πολιτῶν ἕνεκα, l. 3. p. 611.

good; *it may be done*, ſay the *Stoics*, κ) τ τῦ ⟨υμφέροντ@ πρόφασιν, κ) καὶ ἄλλας οἰκονομίας τ βίε πολλάς, *in reſpect of advantage, and for many other offices of life*; *he may* °λέγειν ψεῦδ@, κ) ψεύδεσθ, ἀλλὰ μὴ δόγ ψεύσως τὸ ψεῦδ@ λέγειν, ψεῦδ@ δ' ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀδέπτε φάσι τ ⟨όφον, *tell a ly craftily, and for gain, but he muſt never embrace an untruth through ignorance, or aſſent to it*, this being a reflection on their Wiſe-man, and a diſparagement to his Wiſdom, the other well conſiſtent with his Honeſty.

And yet they knew, by the Light of Nature, that P *tollendum eſt ex rebus contrahendis omne mendacium*, no lye was to be uſed in Contracts; that the honeſt and wiſe Man ſhould be q ἀδόλ@ *free from all Falſhood*, and ſhould do and ſpeak nothing διεψευσμένως, κ) μεθ' ὑποκρίσεως, *in Falſehood or with Hypocriſie*: And all Men who conſider the uſe of Words, muſt know they are deſigned only to be the Indication of our Minds, and conſequently that when we do not ſpeak according to our Minds we pervert the natural uſe of them.

And even all theſe things were recommended to them by their Gods, as they were repreſented by thoſe Poets, *from whom*

° Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 183. P Cic. de Off. l. 3. n. 81.
q Anton. l. 2. §. 16, 17. l. 4. §. 49.

ſaith

saith [r] *Plutarch, we have received the opinions which obtain among us touching the Gods*; for, as we have seen from *Sextus Empyricus*, that they were taught to thieve from the example of *Mercury*, and to lye from *Jupiter*, who might well wink at the Lyes of Lovers, when he himself was *Versipellis, one who used all Wiles and lying Artifices, and turned himself into no less than twelve false shapes that he might satisfie his Lust*; so, saith [s] *Cicero, are the Gods introduced by the Poets as inflamed with Anger, prone to Wars, Fightings, Discords and Dissentions, Adulteries, Sodomy and Lust, to the highest degree.*

§. VI. *Lastly*, Whereas *Christianity* designed there should be no Wars, not giving one direction how to manage them, but plainly doth suppose that all who bear the Name of *Christians* should live in perfect love, and *follow peace with all men*, and so makes good that saying of [t] *Justin Martyr*,

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[r] Τῆς δ' ἐν περὶ θεῶν δόξης καὶ παντάπασιν ἡμῖν οἱ τε ποιηταὶ, καὶ οἱ νομοθέται, καὶ τέτον οἱ φιλόσοφοι. Amator. p. 763. C.

[s] Poetæ & irâ inflammatos & libidine furentes induxerunt Deos, feceruntque ut eorum bella, pugnas, prælia, vulneraque videremus, omnia præterea dissidia, discordias, effusas in omni intemperantia libidines, adulteria, vincula, & cum humano genere concubitus. De Nat. Deorum, l. 1. n. 31.

[t] Ἄρρητοι ἐσμὲν πρὸς εἰρήνην, πάντων μᾶλλον τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Apol.

We Chriſtians do excel all Men in our inducements of them to a perfect peace one with another. It is evident from the peruſal of the Laws and Conſtitutions of the *Greeks*, the *Spartans*, the *Athenians*, and the *Romans*, of the Writings of *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*, and of all who did then write of Government, that 'twas their chief concern to train up Men in War, *i. e.* to propagate their Dominions by the ſlaughter and deſtruction of other Nations; that upon this account they expoſed thoſe Children which were not fit for War; that they declared it their greateſt Virtue, and the thing moſt worthy of reward to propagate their Conqueſts, and made them *Gods*, and worthy of the higheſt Veneration after death who died in ſuch Wars. Now,

1*ſt*, Let us conſider that oppoſition which all theſe Actions bore to thoſe Attributes of divine Goodneſs, Love and Mercy to Mankind, to his Purity and Holineſs, his Righteouſneſs and Truth, in which it is our glory and happineſs to be like him, by which we live that *life of God* from which the *Heathens* were alienated by thoſe wicked Works, become *Partakers of the divine Nature*, and are *created after the image of God*, *in righteouſneſs, holineſs, and truth*, and by which we become the *Sons* and *Children of our heavenly Father*, and *perfect*, ſaith our Lord, *as he is perfect*, and

and ſo are fitted for communion with him here, and rendred meet to be partakers with him of happineſs hereafter; and we ſhall eaſily diſcern that this *Chriſtianity* which was reveal'd on purpoſe to engage us to be *holy as our God is holy, merciful as our heavenly Father is merciful, righteous as he is righteous*, and which preſents to us ſuch admirable Examples of all theſe *Chriſtian* Virtues in our God and Saviour, and ſuch inducements to glorifie God by our endeavour to be thus like him, is a moſt excellent Inſtitution, worthy of God, and highly requiſite to reduce the World into that temper which was abſolutely requiſite to fit them for communion with him, and enjoyment of him.

2*dly*, Let us conſider how much this Inhumanity and murtherous Diſpoſition tends to the ruin of Mankind, and how this Hatred, Enmity, contentious and revengeful Temper, diſpoſeth Men to all manner of Barbarity and Michief they can do to thoſe they malign and long to be reveng'd of; how this Impurity, Whoredom and Adultery tends naturally to the ruin of their Eſtates, their Reputation, and their Bodies, and gives them a Wound incurable, and *a Reproach that cannot be wiped off*; how all ſuch fleſhly Luſts *do war againſt the Soul*, are inconſiſtent, ſay the very *Heathens*, with all Virtue, and ſink us into a

ſenſual and brutiſh State; how plainly Theft and Rapine, Fraud and Oppreſſion, and all injurious Dealing, tend to the ſubverſion of all Mens Properties; Untruth and Falſhood to the perverting of the uſe of Words, and to the diſſolution of all Commerce; how Drunkenneſs conduceth to the impairing Mens Eſtates, the impoveriſhing their Families, the ſubverſion of their Reaſon and Diſcretion, the ruin of the Body, and the deſtruction of the Soul; and, laſtly, that Wars are uſually attended with all theſe Evils in a lump, being a Trade of Robbery and Slaughter, always attended with Drunkenneſs and Lewdneſs, Fraud and Stratagems.

And, on the other hand, let us conſider the wonderful power of *Chriſtianity*, when it is cordially embraced, to ſheath the Sword, to ſtill Contentions, and bind the Hand to its good Behaviour, to prevent all ways of being cruel to our Neighbour's Life, or prejudicial to his Affairs, Eſtate, and Fortune, or injurious to his good Name, and Honour; and that it [u] frees the Heart from all Hatred and Malice, Envy, Rancor and Bitterneſs of Spirit, from evil Surmiſes and Suſpicions; the Tongue from Wrath, Clamor, Evil-ſpeaking, reducing ſuch Offences

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[u] Math. 5. 22. 1 Joh. 3. 15.

to

to that Commandment, which saith, *Thou shalt not kill*, because these evil Dispositions incline us to do hurt to those we hate, malign, or are angry with; this Wrath too often begets those Quarrels which end in the destruction of our Brother's Life; this Language renders him vile and despicable in the eyes of others, and so inclines Men to undervalue both his Life and his Concerns.

2*dly*, Again, it is not easie to recount those liberal provisions it hath made for Love and Charity, for Mercy, Pity, and Compassion, and whatsoever may endear my Brother to me, and draw forth all my Powers to assist him; for it commands every Man to *love his Brother as himself*, to seek his Good, and shew him all that Kindness which he would expect or beg himself when he is under like necessity; it bids us burn when others are afflicted, and *weep with those that weep*, that is, it bids us be as forward to relieve them under all their Pressures and Afflictions, as if their Sufferings were our own: Now, what can farther be required to our outward Happiness in this World, than the security of what we enjoy at present from any hand of Violence, and the assurance of our Brother's help towards the enjoyment of the thing we want? And,

3*dly*, It is no leſs conducive to the publick Good by the advancement of all thoſe ſocial Virtues which are ſo plainly requiſite to the preſervation, happineſs, the quiet, and the comfort of Society, *viz.* Love and Charity, (of which I have diſcourſed already) righteous Dealing, Truth and Peace. And,

1*ſt*, It enjoins all Men *to deal with others as in like caſes they judge reaſonable they ſhould be dealt with*; and ſo ſets up in every Man's Breaſt an eaſie and a comprehenſive Rule of Juſtice; ſo that a bare reflection on his own Sentiments, and an attendance to his own deſires, will teach him all the duties of Juſtice and of Charity he owes to others.

2*dly*, It requires every *Chriſtian*, *putting away lying*, *to ſpeak the truth to his Neighbour*, and tho' he *promiſes to his hurt*, *not to vary from it*, making all lying to be an indication that we *have not yet put off the old Man*, and truth a part of that divine Image to which we are renewed, and declaring that *whoſoever loveth or maketh a lye*, ſhall be excluded from that *Jeruſalem* which is above, and that *all Lyers ſhall be caſt into the lake of fire and brimſtone*. [w]

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[w] Pſal. 15. Col. 3. 9. Eph. 4. 24. Rev. 22. 15. — 21. 8.

3*dly*, It

3*dly*, It enjoins us to *be at peace among our ſelves, to live in* * *peace, to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace*, and *as much as in us lies, to live peaceably with all Men:* It repreſents peace as a fruit of the good Spirit, and a property of that Wiſdom which is from above; as one of thoſe things in which the Kingdom of God doth chiefly conſiſt, and which is requiſite to render all our ſervice acceptable to God; as that which ought to rule in every *Chriſtian*'s Heart, and that which he ſtands bound to follow and purſue, as ever he expects to ſee the Face of God, and that which will derive the greateſt Bleſſings on him; *Bleſſed are the peace-makers, they ſhall be called the Sons of God*,

Add to this, laſtly, the excellent proviſions *Chriſtianity* hath made to remove the cauſes and occaſions of the contrary Evils, (1.) By giving ſuch a reliſh of ſublimer Bliſs, as renders the Soul dead to all the trivial concerns of Earth, by declaring that the Friendſhip of this World is Enmity to God, and that if any Man loves the World, the love of the Father is not in him; by inſpiring us with that Contentment which allays the cravings of the covetous and

* 1 Theſſ. 5. 13. 2 Cor. 13. 11. Eph. 4. 3. Rom. 12. 18. Gal. 5. 22. Jam. 3. 17. Rom. 14. 17, 18. Col. 3. 15. Hebr. 12. 14. Math. 5. 9.

greedy

greedy Appetite, by transforming the *Chriſtian* into Humility and Meekneſs, and ſo preventing the tumults and diſturbance of the haughty Spirit, by ranking all that Strife, Contention and Diviſion which diſturbs the publick Peace, among thoſe *fleſhly luſts which they that do ſhall not inherit the Kingdom of God:* Laſtly, By moulding the Soul into that ſimple, honeſt and ſincere Deportment which cuts off all thoſe flattering Addreſſes, and thoſe falſe Pretences which bely the Thoughts and Conſcience of the Speaker, and more than this it cannot do in order to our publick Weal, ſince that can never ſuffer but from unjuſt and treacherous, factious and turbulent, proud and aſpiring, or worldly and rapacious Spirits.

Of the *purity from all filthineſs of fleſh and ſpirit* which *Chriſtianity* requires, I have ſaid ſo much already, that it is needleſs to add more. And now, from theſe Conſiderations, it muſt be eaſie to diſcern the Excellency of theſe *Chriſtian* Precepts, and how happily conducing, how highly requiſite the revelation of them was to the good Order and the publick Welfare of the *Heathen* World, ſo fill'd with contrary Principles, ſo deviating from the practice of all theſe excellent Preſcriptions.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

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The Heathens *failed in all the particular acts of Natural Religion: Prayer and Sacrifices were held by many Philosophers to be of no virtue to obtain the favour of God,* §. 1. *Their Faith was not an assent to a Divine Testimony, but to the delusions of Devils, and their Oracles,* §. 2. *They impaired that love, fear, and obedience, which was due to the Deity,* Ibid. *And contradicted all the Ends which Natural Religion must be designed to promote.* §. 3. *And which were excellently advanced by the Prescriptions of Christianity,* Ibid.

THE *Heathens* being thus mistaken in their Objects, and thus exceeding faulty in the manner of their Worship, 'tis not to be expected that whilst they acted suitably to these false Opinions, and these evil Practices, they should do any other duty of Religion well, and agreeably to the mind of their Creator. For,

1*st*, Having so many false Objects of ther Worship from whom they thought that *all their* [y] *Blessings were derived*, they

[y] Τῶν ἄλλων αἴτιον ἀγαθῶν πάντων ἡμῖν αὐτὸν (ἥλιον) γεγονέναι πάντες ἂν ὁμολογήσειαν. Plat. Epin. p. 1006. A.

must

muſt tender their Prayers and their Thankſgivings to them for them, place their truſt in them and their dependence on them, muſt fear and love them, as they conceiv'd they did them good, or were inclined to do them hurt, and ſo muſt rob the real Author of them of all theſe tributes due unto him; and their Obedience being the reſult of what their *Oracles*, *Prieſts*, and *Prophets*, who had eſtabliſhed all their vile, barbarous, and ridiculous Cuſtoms, taught them to perform, they muſt be ſtill employ'd in thoſe Practices which were entirely inconſiſtent with all true Obedience and acceptable Service to him, and ſo muſt be both diſobedient and unthankful to the great Author of their Beings. For to proceed to a particular Conſideration of the Duties due to the Deity.

§. I. 1*ſt*, The *Pythagoræans*, ſaith [z] *D. Laertius*, taught that Men ſhould not pray for themſelves, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ ξυμφέρον, *becauſe they knew not what was profitable for them:* And [a] *Socrates* came near to this opinion when he pray'd himſelf and exhorted others to pray, ἁπλῶς τὰ ἀγαθὰ διδόναι, *only in general that God would give good things*, for the ſame reaſon; for both theſe Opinions in effect ſhew, that either they knew of nothing which was abſolutely good, (as

[z] L. 8. p. 494. [a] Xenoph. Mem. l. 1. p. 571.

pardon

pardon of Sins, and preservation from them, and advancement in Piety and Virtue is) and therefore always fit to be requested; or else conceived with the *Stoicks* that these things might be obtained without divine Assistance; *Origen* adds, that if any Persons were to be brought before *Kings* and *Princes*, διὰ δόγματα, for their Opinions, they should be, not the *Christians*, but the *Epicuræans*, who denied the Providence, καὶ οἱ τὸ παράπαν μηδὲν φάσκοντες ἀνύειν τὰς εὐχὰς, καὶ τὰς ὡς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον θυσίας, and the *Peripateticks*, who said, that *Prayers and Sacrifices offer'd to the Deity did profit nothing*; and tho' [b] *Aristotle* in his *Politicks* is forc'd to mention τὴν περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἐπιμελείαν, *a regard to the Divinity*, because it might have been a capital Offence to exclude all Deities from a Commonwealth, or say it was in vain to pray to them; and in his [c] Morals he admits that the Gods might have a care of humane Affairs: Yet since he begins this with an *if*, and concludes it with an ὥσπερ ἔοικεν, *as it may seem*, and the contrary follows with so bright an evidence from the avowed Doctrine of *Aristotle*, [d] καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ Περιπάτου ἀναιρέσιων τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρόνοιαν, καὶ τὴν φύσιν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους τοῦ θεοῦ, and the *Peripateticks* who *destroy'd all Providence to-*

[b] De Rep. l. 7. c. 8. [c] L. 10. c. 9. [d] Origen adv. Celf. l. 3. p. 156.

wards

wards us, and all relation of God to Man, by confining Providence to the Heavens and celeſtial Beings; and ſeeing [e]*Origen* doth charge the *Peripateticks* as well as the *Epicureans* with Hypocriſie, in their compliance with thoſe who did both Pray and offer Sacrifice to the Images of the Gods, I ſee no cauſe to doubt the truth of this aſſertion of that learned Father, who was ſo throughly acquainted with all the Doctrines of the moſt celebrated *Philoſophers*, and ſo ſincere, that I never yet found him guilty of laying a falſe imputation to their charge. This alſo follows in great meaſure from the Doctrine of the *Stoics*, who thought it needleſs to pray to the Gods for Virtue and Felicity, as having that in their own power; which opinion, ſaith *Cotta*, was ſo general, that no Man ever pray'd to the Gods for Wiſdom, Virtue, or Felicity; and [f] *Maximus Tyrius* enquires τὶς ἀγαθὸς ἂν ἔτι εὐδαιμονίας ἀρετῆ ἔχων, *what good Man, having Virtue, will pray to the Gods for Felicity?* And the inexorable Fate which they maintain'd, doth abſolutely deſtroy the uſe of Prayer and Sacrifices, for that, ſaith the ſame [g] *Max. Tyrius*, being ἀδιαστόλου καὶ ἀμεταβλήτου, *ungovernable and immutable, muſt render Prayer ridiculous*, ὃ γὰρ

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[e] P. 375. [f] Orat. 30. p. 298. [g] Ibid. p. 297.

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τοῖς δεομένοις δίδωσι, *because it giveth nothing to the Indigent,* [h] he adds, that *Prayer is needless even on supposition of a Providence*; for *he that prays,* saith he, *is either worthy to obtain what he prays, or he is not,* εἰ μὲν ἔν ἀξίῳ τάξει, κἂν μὴ εὐξάμενος, *if he be worthy he will obtain it tho' he do not pray, nor will his neglect to do so render him unworthy, yea,* μὴ ἐνοχλῶν τυχεῖν ἀξιώτερος, *he will be more worthy, because he doth not trouble God with his importunity; but if he be unworthy he will get nothing by his Prayer, but will be more unworthy for molesting God with his Petitions.* Thus did he argue, not considering that Prayer is highly reasonable in it self, and beneficial to us; for it tends naturally to beget within us a continual sense of our own impotency and insufficiency to obtain any Blessings without divine Assistance, and so to keep us humble, and in continual dependence upon God for all the Blessings which we want: It also doth inform us how much we are obliged to him for the free Collation of his choicest Blessings, and so excites us to thanksgiving for them, and makes us naturally to enquire, *what we shall render to the Lord for all his benefits?* Moreover, by the importunity we use in the procuring of them,

[h] P. 299. [i] P. 294, 295.

we

we are convinced of their worth, and ſo induced more to prize them, and this earneſt ſeeking of them doth improve our ſpiritual Appetites, and by converſing thus with Heaven our Hearts are raiſed above earthly things; and, laſtly, the conditions of obtaining our Petitions being theſe, That *we do not regard iniquity in our hearts*, but are fully reſolved to depart from it. (2.) That we do uprightly reſolve and purpoſe to be doers of his Will, and therefore beg his aſſiſtance to ſtrengthen us againſt temptations to Sin, and to enable us to do it. (3.) That we be juſt and honeſt, and ready to repair the Injuries that we have done to others. And, laſtly, That we have Hearts free from Wrath, and full of Charity and Mercy to our Brother, and as ready to forgive as we expect to be forgiven. Theſe, I ſay, being the conditions of an acceptable Prayer, the due performance of this Duty is ſo highly inſtrumental to purifie our Hearts from Sin, and to engage us to the performance of our Duty both to God and Man, that by laying this command upon us, and letting us know he will derive his Mercies on us only in anſwer to our Prayers thus qualified, God acteth ſuitably not only to Wiſdom, but to the goodneſs of his Providence, and is as kind a Father to us when he requires us to ask, as when he anſwers our Requeſts. And

whereas

whereas [k] *M. Tyrius* adds, that μεταθίεσθαι καὶ μεταπινώσκειν, to change and to repent, is not suitable to a good Man, and much less to the Deity, and so it must be a mistake to think the Gods are flexible, and may by Prayers and Sacrifices be induced to change their minds; and *Plato* represents this opinion of their *Priests*, as that which did induce Men to continue in their Injustice, as hoping ἔξαχεῖσθαι that *the Gods might be appeased with gifts:* I confess it's very absurd to think that we can hope to bribe God with our gifts to vary from the eternal Rules of Righteousness, this being to impeach his Justice; or to move him by our Arguments, as if we could suggest to him something he did not know, or had not well considered; or incline him to what he is unwilling, by fair Speeches and Importunity; this being to look upon him rather as a Man who changeth without cause, than as an unchangeable God, who cannot vary from the just methods of his Government to gratifie our Importunity: But then this doth not render our Petitions fruitless, or our Prayers unnecessary, but only makes it necessary to the success of our Addresses, that there should be a change in us; in our Affections, from a love, to an hatred of every evil way,

[k] P. 294.

from a diſlike to an approbation, of the ways of Piety; in our Wills, from a perverſe and refractory, to a Mind ready and willing to obey God's Precepts; and then that God who is immutable will therefore be diſpoſed to hear us, for he is unchangeably willing to fulfil the rational deſires of them that fear him, and give aſſiſtance to every Soul that uprightly deſires to ſerve him.

2*dly*, Thankſgiving muſt be entirely deſtroy'd by all thoſe Sects which denied either that there was any Providence, or that it reached to our Affairs on Earth: And (2.) By thoſe Doctrines which made all the reſults of it neceſſary; and in the higheſt imports of it, it was impaired by them who thought we only were beholden to it for things indifferent, and which might be not good, but hurtful to us. To proceed to the internal acts of Worſhip.

§. II. 3*dly*, Their Faith, as it doth properly relate to a divine Revelation, was ſo far from being an aſſent to a divine Teſtimony, that it was only an aſſent to the deluſions of the Devil inſpiring his mad Prophets, or ſpeaking in his Oracles, and ſo 'twas only an aſſent to the Teſtimony of the Father of Lyes: As it is by the Apoſtle ſaid to be *the expectation of things hoped for*, we have ſeen how the hopes of future Recompences

compences was stiled by the Heathens, μυθώδης ἐλπὶς, *a fabulous hope*; how uncertain the *Philosophers* were after all their searches touching these Objects of our Hope: And, lastly, as it relateth to our trust in God as a sure refuge, and a firm support in all our Dangers and Calamities, this was extremely weakned by their grand Objection against Providence, arising from those Evils which befel good Men, to which they were unable to give a satisfactory Answer; and hence *Velleius* in [l] *Cicero* is forced to break off his Discourse upon that subject, *ne autoritatem videretur afferre peccandi*, lest it should minister a Licence to Men to sin; and [m] others so exaggerated the Miseries of humane Life, as to conclude, that *Death or a short Life was one of the best and greatest gifts God had vouchsafed to Mankind.*

4*thly*, The love of God, as it consists in an high valuation of him for his divine Excellencies, a choice of him above all things as our chiefest Good, and so a preference of him, and adherence to him above all other objects of our love, so is it visible, (1.) That all they who denied a

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[l] De Nat. Deor. l. 3. n. 64.

[m] O ignaros malorum suorum quibus non mors ut optimum inventum naturæ laudatur, &c. Hæc est inquam quæ efficit ut nasci non sit supplicium. Sen. Consol. ad Marciam, cap. 20.

Providence concern'd in our Affairs, deprived us of all grounds of this affection to him; for let him be never ſo excellent in himſelf, if I can be no better for him, or reap no advantage by his Excellencies, I can have little reaſon to love him who loves not me, and from whoſe Excellencies I can expect no benefit. (2.) 'Tis alſo evident that they who made created and inſenſate Beings or evil Spirits, Gods, and owned that all their Bleſſings were received from them, (as *Plato* ſpeaketh of the Sun,) muſt rob God of the affection due to him for his Excellencies, and his Goodneſs, by aſcribing that to other Beings either uncapable of, or unwilling to do us good, which is the chief foundation of that affection which we owe to the true God. And, (3.) That they impair'd our love to him, who made him to have no immediate intercourſe with us, but to abandon us to the care of Dæmons, and to the Souls of dead Men; for the leſs we think we are regarded by him, the leſs will our affection be to him. And, (4.) That they who thought we lay under an inexorable Fate, which render'd all our actions neceſſary, muſt take off our affections from him, as being inſufficient to reſcue us from any of thoſe Evils to which this Fate ſubjects us. And, laſtly, That they owned ſo many evil and pernicious Deities, from whoſe malignity this

God

God either would not, or could not, deliver us, must in great measure take off our affection from him, and also own they had so many Deities whom they might have too much cause to dread, but had no cause to love.

5*thly*, Whereas the fear and reverence of God is such an humble, awful, and ingenuous regard to the divine Nature, as rendreth us unwilling to do any thing which may offend or argue our contempt of him, this being founded upon his Power and his Goodness, 'tis easie to perceive, (1.) That tho' they might have that great dread of all their evil and pernicious Deities which tended to raise in them superstitious and frightful apprehensions of them, yet could they have no filial fear of them, nor any ingenuous regard towards them. (2.) That the opinion which so generally obtained among *Philosophers*, that a good God could not be angry with them, or do them any hurt, was also destructive of this fear and reverence, because we cannot reasonably think we can offend him by any thing we can do, who is never displeased with us, or rationally fear him who will only do us good; for, as *Seneca* saith, *furor est metuere salutaria*, 'tis madness to be afraid of what is only salutary. And as this Doctrine makes it madness, so the denial of a Providence makes it needless to

fear him who will do nothing to us; and the introduction of Fate makes it fruitleſs to fear him, becauſe upon that ſuppoſition, no caution can avoid, no power alter any thing which may befal us.

6thly, To proceed to the duty of active Obedience to the will of God, it muſt be own'd that they made it a great duty, ἕπεσθαι, πείθεσθαι, ὁμοιοῦσθαι τῷ θεῷ, to obey the Will, follow the Conduct, and imitate the Perfections of the Deity; but then when we conſider what vile things the *Poets* had ſaid of their Gods, and add to this that of *Velleius*, that *what the Poets had ſaid of them, were* non multo abſurdiora *not much more abſurd than what the Philoſophers had taught concerning them*, and that they had themſelves eſtabliſhed all that vile worſhip of them which had obtain'd every where to all the vulgar Deities; to imitate or to obey and follow their Conduct, as they were by their *Prieſts* and *Oracles* directed to do, was to be guilty of the worſt of Crimes. Add to this, that to follow God, according to the Doctrine of the *Stoicks*, was only to make a Virtue of neceſſity, it being only to do as the Dog does that is tied to the Cart's tail, to follow becauſe he muſt, or as [n] *Seneca's* wiſe Man, *effugere*

[n] Ep. 54.

neceſ-

necessitatem quia vult quod ipsa coactura est, to avoid necessity by doing what he knows he must do whether he will or no; and then, where is the iniquity in choosing to do the evil which he must also do were he never so much unwilling, and in doing which he doth as truly ἕπεσθαι τῷ θεῷ follow the eternal and immutable Decrees of their God, as doth the virtuous Man? And tho' the *Philosophers* spake great things and good things of being like the Gods in doing good, in acts of love and mercy, forbearing and forgiving Injuries, yet their general opinion, that the Deity could not be angry, and would inflict only medicinal Chastisements, tended not only to subvert all capital Punishments, but to the encouragement of Vice in others, and to beget in us, by a pretended imitation of him, a fond Lenity, pernicious to Servants, Children, and Subjects.

Lastly, To give them their due, they spake very excellent and magnificent things of Passive Obedience, and acquiescing in the conduct of Providence, so that even the *Christian* Doctrine seems chiefly to excel them only in two things, *viz.* The example of it in our blessed Lord, and the encouragements it affords us to it from the assistance of the Holy Spirit, and an eternal and exceeding recompence of all we suffer for the sake of Righteousness; but

then they ſpoiled all this by their general Doctrine of the lawfulneſs of *Self-murther* when any great Diſaſters and Calamities befel them, and by their uſual recourſe to it in ſuch caſes; for this ſhew'd their want of Patience under the hand of God, their want of Fortitude under Afflictions, and of acquieſcence in the Will of God, and their diſpleaſure at the diſpenſations of his Providence, and even their contradictions to their own Rules and Doctrines; for if God, by whoſe Providence theſe things befel them, neither did, nor would hurt them, why were they ſo diſguſted? If all their Afflictions were ſalutary and medicinal, why did they ſo refuſe their Phyſick? Why were they ſo afraid of what was ſalutary? So ready to withdraw themſelves from what would do them good? If their wiſe Man muſt be ſtill happy under all the viciſſitudes of Fortune, why ſhould he chuſe to put an end to his own happineſs? And if it were his Wiſdom only to deſire what was in his power to obtain and to preſerve, whatever might befal him, why was he ſo diſguſted at that which never thwarted his deſires?

§. III. Now ſince all that natural Religion could be deſigned to promote and teach, was,

1*ſt*, The

1*st*, The worship of that Deity, and of him alone, who is the true and proper Object of all religious Worship; this being by consent of *Heathens* an act of Gratitude and Justice due to him on the account of his divine Excellencies and beneficial Influences, and therefore not to be neglected without great Ingratitude, nor given to another without great Injustice in robbing God of that which is his right.

2*dly*, The performance of that Worship in such a manner as is most suitable to his Nature, or to the Excellencies and the Perfections of the Deity, and to his holy Will, and so most proper to obtain the two great ends of all religious Worship, *viz.* the promotion of God's Glory, and the obtaining of his Blessing, Assistance and Protection. And,

3*dly*, The doing this in all the parts and the concernments of religious Worship, which employ either the inward or the outward Man, the Body or the Soul, which being both derived from him, we must stand bound to glorifie him with. And since I have already shew'd, that all these things were by the Sentiments of the *Philosophers*, and by the Customs, Practices, and religious Rites, which had obtain'd generally among the *Heathens*, wholly overthrown, or much impaired, and that all the inducements to Piety were either que-

stion'd

ſtioned or denied by their Wiſe-men. Hence it is eaſie to diſcern how excellent, beneficial and neceſſary that Revelation was which reduced Men to the only Object of religious Worſhip, and taught them how to perform this Worſhip in a due and acceptable manner, and gave them admirable directions how to perform every part of it moſt to God's Glory and our higheſt benefit, and the moſt powerful inducement ſo to do. For,

1*ſt*, It requires Prayer ſhould be ſo performed as to be ſtill attended with thoſe diſpoſitions which fit us for the divine Favour, and diſpoſe us for our duty both to God and Man, as hath been formerly obſerv'd, and then affords us ſuch an humble confidence, that whatſoever we ask according to his Will, with a true willingneſs to do our duty, and with a fervency and a concernment ſuitable to the great value of the Bleſſings we deſire, we ſhall receive; and therefore ſo as to free us from all doubtfulneſs and all anxiety of Mind concerning any things we want, becauſe we ask them of that heavenly Father, who knows all our needs, and is more willing than any earthly Parent to give good things to his Children.

2*ly*, It enjoins that Thankſgiving, which as it preſuppoſes a due obſervation, a conſtant remembrance, and an high valuation of

of divine Blessings, so it naturally tends to produce a grateful acknowledgment, and an affecting sense of them, disposing us to a readiness and a sincere endeavour to make some suitable returns to the God of all our Mercies: And this as,

1*st*, It is a duty very necessary to promote those great and glorious ends the divine Wisdom hath designed in all his Dispensations, *viz.* his Glory in the World; for whereas other Duties do more remotely tend to ascribe Glory to God, Thanksgiving most expressly doth it, it being the whole business of the thankful Man to celebrate the divine Praise, and give to God the Glory of his Goodness. So,

2*dly*, It is a very advantageous Duty, as being the best method to secure, to sanctifie and encrease the Blessings we enjoy, and also the best expedient to procure fresh Mercies at God's hand, because it shews they are not lost upon us, but are improved to those ends for which his Wisdom did vouchsafe them. And,

3*dly*, It is a very pleasant Duty; for 'tis the experience and lively sense of divine Goodness which moves us to offer this spiritual Sacrifice, as the return due to the author of this Love and Mercy; so that this duty cannot be perform'd till first the Soul be filled with an affecting sense of divine Bounty, and hath *tasted that the Lord*

is

is gracious; it being the Heart enlarged with the ſenſe of Mercies, which makes the Tongue break forth into returns of Praiſes: 'Tis this which ſweetens Life and makes it comfortable to us; which preſerves us from that inward grief of Heart, ſadneſs and heavineſs of Spirit, and diſcontent which melancholy Spirits are apt to fall into, ſince the performance of this duty naturally tends to fill our Hearts with gladneſs, and our Tongues with joy, from the conſideration of a Providence ſo kind to us, and ſtill watching over us for good. And,

3*dly*, It directs us to live continually in that fear of God * which purifies the Heart from all prevalent affection to Sin, and cleanſeth it from all filthineſs of Spirit, from evil Thoughts, from luſtful Motions and Deſires, from Diſcontent and inward Murmurings, from Pride and Covetouſneſs, from Envy, rancor of Spirit, and whatſoever elſe defiles the Soul, and ſo doth fit it to be an Habitation of God thro' the Spirit: And, (2.) Which lays reſtraints upon us from indulging to any ſinful Courſes; for *by the fear of the Lord Men depart from evil*, Prov. 16. 6. Which, (3.) doth diſpoſe us to ſincere obedience to the Laws of

* Pſal. 19. 9. 2 Cor. 7. 1.

God,

God, that ſo we may not loſe his favour, incur his diſpleaſure, or be deprived of thoſe ineſtimable Bleſſings he hath promiſed to them that fear him; for *he that feareth the Lord will not diſobey his word, and he that loveth him will keep his ways*, Eccluſ. 2. 21.

4*thly*, It commands that love of God with all our Hearts, Soul, and Mind, which obligeth us to have an higher value for his favour than for all other enjoyments whatſoever, and to cleave to him above all things, and ſo to abandon any Pleaſure or Enjoyment which ſtands in competition with him, to reſiſt all temptations to forfeit his Affection, and to endure any Loſſes or Afflictions that we may retain it, as knowing he is worthy of our higheſt love by reaſon of his excellent Perfections, his near Relation, and his immenſe Goodneſs to us, and will moſt certainly reward all our ſincere affection to him with the moſt laſting and the greateſt Bleſſings.

5*thly*, It obligeth us to yield ſincere obedience to thoſe Commands which are all holy, juſt and good, and the reſult of excellent Wiſdom directing us to what is highly ſuitable to our Reaſon and ſatisfactory to our Minds, which we can reflect upon with pleaſure and humble confidence in God, and ſo in keeping them there is great reward; for if Heaven it ſelf can

make

make us happy, and the eternity of that State can add to its Felicity, both are entail'd upon, and will be the ſure fruit of this obedience. And,

6thly, It requires us entirely to commit our ſelves in well-doing to the conduct of divine Providence, with patience to ſubmit to, and cheerfully to acquieſce in all its Diſpenſations, as being well aſſured that our heavenly Father knows what condition is beſt for us; that his Faithfulneſs will not permit him to lay upon us more than he will enable us to bear; that he deſigns all Evils that befal us for our ſpiritual good; knows how to make them ſerviceable to that end, and ſtands obliged by promiſe to make them all conduce to it; and, laſtly, hath aſſured us that *theſe light afflictions, which are but for a moment, ſhall work for us an exceeding and eternal weight of glory.* So excellently contriv'd is every part of our religious Worſhip by this Diſpenſation, for our Comfort here, and our eternal Happineſs hereafter.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

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From what hath been discourſed it is inferr'd, (1ſt,) *That God by introducing Chriſtianity, hath demonſtrated the folly of the Wiſdom of the World, as is ſhew'd by a brief Recapitulation of what hath been ſaid,* §. 1. (2dly,) *The truth of Chriſtian Faith is proved from the conſideration of the means by which it was ſo ſpeedily propagated thro' the World,* §. 2.

NOW the only Inferences I ſhall make from this Diſcourſe are theſe two:

1*ſt*, That hence we may learn the truth of the Aſſertion of St. *Paul*, that God did by this Diſpenſation μωραίνειν *demonſtrate the folly of the Wiſdom of the World*, in that,

1*ſt*, When the World through Wiſdom knew not God, when their Wiſe-men were groping after him, as they who are in darkneſs uſe to do; when, as *Plutarch* ſaith, they were ἰλιγγιῶντες *in a Vertigo* concerning him, and ſpake ſtill of him, ſaith *Porphyry*, ὡς εἰκάσαι, *by conjecture*, confeſſing they had nothing certain either of the Names, or Nature of the Gods, and

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ſo upon the matter were *without God in the World*; when, laſtly, they who had attain'd to ſome knowledge of a Creator of the World, yet did not worſhip him as God, but plaid the Hypocrites in Religion, neither converting any ſingle Perſon from his Idolatry in worſhipping them *who by Nature were no Gods*, nor daring themſelves to recede from it, but chuſing rather to comply with it themſelves, and to eſtabliſh in the World the Worſhip of that whole rabble of ignoble Deities which had obtain'd in it; when, I ſay, it was thus with them, he ſent poor Fiſhermen, who neither had any Philoſophy to inſtruct them, nor any Eloquence to perſuade Men, nor any Power to give authority to their Doctrine, nor any Wiſdom to contrive how they ſhould manage their Affairs, nor any skill in Diſputation, nor any Sophiſtry to impoſe upon the World, to make ſuch admirable Diſcoveries both of the Nature and all the glorious Attributes of God, the Unity, the Power, Wiſdom, Juſtice, Truth, Goodneſs and Mercy, of the Deity, which all the Heathen Wiſdom was never able to attain to; and ſo effectually confirm'd what they deliver'd to the World, as to engage Men every where to renounce their former Idolatry, and turn from their Idols to the worſhip of the living and true God alone, and by this ſudden

sudden and entire conversion of those who heard them candidly, and with an equal and unprejudic'd Mind, shew'd that the Doctrines of Faith were [p] τῇ κοιναῖς ἐννοίαις ἀρχῆθεν συναδόμενα, suitable to the common notions of Mankind from the beginning.

2*dly*, Whereas the Philosophy of the *Epicuræans* and *Peripateticks* taught Men absolutely to deny any Providence concern'd in our Affairs; the *Academicks* and *Pyrrhonists* that there was no reason to believe it; the *Stoicks*, *Platonists*, and *Pythagoreans*, to own only such a Providence as introduced and establish'd the most gross Idolatry, and all the vile and cruel Customs which had obtain'd in the Heathen World, or was attended with such a chain of Causes, such an inexorable Fate as render'd all our actions necessary, and so not worthy of reward or punishment, and therefore only tended to render Men either more Superstitious, or Profane: These poor, ignoble, weak, and despised Fishermen and Tent-makers, whom God had chosen to shame their Wisdom, and baffle and confound their Strength, gave us such admirable Ideas and excellent Discoveries of a

[p] Orig. adv. Cels. l. 3. p. 135.

Providence, as tended clearly to demonſtrate God's manifeſt Wiſdom, and his rich Goodneſs to Mankind, and his deſign of freeing them from the former bondage they were in to Sin, and the Corruptions which were in the World through Luſt, and to render them pure, holy, juſt, and true, full of the higheſt Charity and Mercy to all Men, and ſo partakers of the divine Nature, and of that Life of God from which the World was alienated by wicked Works; and ſo to fit them for eternal Happineſs in the enjoyment of himſelf, as gave them juſt aſſurance this Providence watch'd over them for good that feared him, and would make all their Afflictions miniſter to that end, and *as their outward Trouble did abound, would make their inward Conſolations to abound much more*; and did and ſaid this with ſo much evidence and conviction, and ſuch a triumph of the truth, as made theſe Doctrines to be readily embrac'd by Myriads; and gave ſuch ſenſible experience of theſe things as rendred the generality of *Chriſtians* examples of the higheſt Purity, and cauſed the World to ſtand amazed at their unſhaken Faith, their admirable Patience, and their great Joy under the ſharpeſt Tryals.

And whereas Providence was by them wholly committed to the management of *Dæmons*

Dæmons and *Genii*, i. e. to the Spirits of the Air, of which, saith Scripture, *Satan is the Prince*; or to the Souls of dead Men, and so to them who neither had Ability, nor Wisdom, nor Will to do us good; according to the *Christian* Doctrine the whole Scheme of Providence is committed to him who is the Wisdom of the Father, and hath all power over all things in Earth and Heaven in his hands, and to that Spirit who is the eternal Spirit, and the power of God, and knoweth all things, and so to them who having a divine Nature must be exceeding able to accomplish all these things; which, by the way, gives one good reason for the more express Revelation of the sacred Trinity under that Gospel, which was to confound all Idolatry, and to give a sovereign Remedy against it, which as it formerly was in good measure done by the *Shechinah*, as our Learned *Primate* hath with great evidence demonstrated, so it is done more fully by putting all things under the conduct of the holy *Jesus*, and sending of the holy Spirit to be still present with us for consolation and assistance, and so to render needless and plainly overthrow the vain Imaginations so rooted in the *Heathen* World touching the government of all things by *Dæmons* and by *Genii*.

3*dly*, Whereas the Philoſophy of the World has rendred it uncertain whether the Soul ſubſiſted after the diſſolution of the Body, whereas it had argu'd and laugh'd Men out of all fear of future Puniſhments, and rendred all their expectations of Rewards and Bleſſings in a future Life precarious and uncertain, and could attain to no knowledge of the true excellency and duration of them; this *Life and Immortality hath been brought to light by the Goſpel*; and the eternal Miſery of the incorrigibly Wicked ſo clearly is propounded, and by ſuch powerful Miracles and Demonſtrations of the holy Spirit ſo confirm'd, as to eſtabliſh in the *Chriſtian* ſuch a ſtrong and laſting Faith, as Time and Vice, tho' moſt concern'd to do it, hath not been able to deface; and whereas all the Notions of theſe things invented by *Philoſophers*, *Prieſts*, and *Poets*, proved ineffectual to work any conſiderable reformation in the Lives of Men, this Grace of God which brought the tydings of this great Salvation hath effectually taught Myriads, *denying all ungodlineſs and worldly luſts, to live ſoberly, and godly, and righteouſly in this preſent world, in expectation of this bleſſed hope*, and made them *ſtedfaſt and immoveable* under all Afflictions, and even Death it ſelf, as *rejoicing in hope of the glory of God*.

Laſtly,

Lastly, Whereas the Doctrines and Sentiments of the *Heathens* had much impair'd or wholly overthrown the Principles and Practice of all moral Virtue, and fill'd the World with Wars and Slaughter, Hatred and Revenge, Theft and Rapine, Falshood and Lying, and all manner of Impurities; these Fishermen have deliver'd such admirable Precepts and Prescriptions for the advancement of all kinds of Charity and Justice, Purity and Temperance, Peace and Quiet, Truth and Sincerity, which were they cordially embraced and practiced suitably, would render all Mankind partakers of a present Happiness.

Infer. 2. *2dly*, From the speedy propagation of this Doctrine by such means through the World so indisposed to receive it, I conclude that it was propagated by divine assistance, and therefore was assuredly the Revelation of the Will of God; for that a Doctrine [q] so new, and therefore so reproach'd; so requisite as was preten-

[q] Τὶ δήποτε καινὸν τοῦτο χρῆμα ἢ ἐπιδίδομα εἰσῆλθε τῷ βίῳ νῦν ἢ ἐπὶ πρότερον. Diognet. apud Just. p. 492. ἆρα μὴ τοσοῦτον αἰῶνα ὁ θεὸς ἀνεμνήσθη δικαιῶσαι θεωπων βίον πρότερον ἢ ἡμέλε. Cels. apud Orig. p. Εἰς τὶ φθονήσειν ἡμᾶς πρότερον ἢ ἐπὶ μυριάδας. Jul. apud Cyril. l. 3. p. 106. l. 4. p. 138.

ded for the promotion of God's Glory and the Welfare of Mankind, and yet *reserved for the last Times*, and the declining Ages of the World, as if God had till then forgot them; a Doctrine so inconsistent with, and so destructive of all other ways of Worship, and whose *Heathen* Professors were obliged to look upon the *Heathen* World, upon their former selves, and the whole Race of their Progenitors, as the most vile Idolaters; yea were obliged to detest as *Devils* those whom they had hitherto adored as *Gods*; a Doctrine so incredible in its Author, his Virgin Birth, the obscureness of his Parentage, in the meanness of his outward Condition, in his reception and treatment from the governing part of that Nation where he first appeared, in all those Circumstances which are most considered by the generality of Mankind, he being[r] contemn'd, oppos'd, reviled, whipt, and condemn'd as the worst of Malefactors by the Chief *Priests* and *Scribes* and *Rulers* of the People, and made to suffer a painful and accurs'd Death, which so disparaged his Doctrine both to

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[r] Ὁ ὑμέτερος λεγόμενος χριστὸς ἄτιμος καὶ ἄδοξος γέγονεν ὡς κ' ἐφάτη καταράτα τὴν ἐν τῷ νόμῳ θεὸν πεπεσθαι. Trypho apud Just. p. 249. *See the Note on* 1 Cor. 1. 23.

Jews

Jews and *Gentiles*, that to the one it became *a stumbling Block*, and by the other was accounted *Foolishness*; a Doctrine so incredible in that Article which is alledg'd to take off the scandal of the Cross, and is indeed the Basis of the *Christian*'s Hope, *viz.* the Resurrection of Christ from the dead, as a pledge and earnest of the future Resurrection of all that believe in him, that it was [t] mock'd at by the *Gentiles* as a thing impossible and without example; a Doctrine so repugnant to every Sect of *Philosophers* in those Opinions for which they most eagerly contended; to the *Epicuræans* conceit of an idle unconcern'd God; to the *Peripateticks* confinement of Providence to the Heavens; to the *Platonists* Dæmons, and community of Wives; to the *Pythagoræans* transmigration of Souls; to the *Stoicks* corporeal God and inexorable Fate. Again, it was a Doctrine opposite to the Decrees of *Emperors* and the whole *Heathen* World against the introduction of new ways of Worship; a Doctrine which calls for self-denial, love of Enemies, a life of highest Purity, and deadness to the Plea-

[t] Ἀπόπτυσον ἅμα καὶ ἐξωσίαλον. Cels. ap. Orig. p. 240. Theoph. ad Autol. l. 1. p. 77. C. Arnob. l. 2. p. 51. Minut. p. 11. Lact. l. 7. c. 22.

ſures and Enjoyments of the World, and for a willingneſs to bear the Croſs, and ſuffer all the Miſeries of Life and cruel Death, and this only in hopes of future Bleſſings from a crucified Jeſus; a Doctrine which thwarted the Principles of Education, the Paſſions, Humours and Affections, the Inclinations, Cuſtoms, Preſcriptions and Superſtitions of the World, which had ſo long overſpread them, and therefore rendred the practice of it as difficult as the belief; a Doctrine which for theſe cauſes was ſo violently contradicted both by the Zeal and Malice of the *Jew*, and the Philoſophy of the *Gentiles*, which it condemned as folly; by the Sword of *Emperors*, ſtill glutted with the Blood of *Chriſtians*; and by the *Rhetoricians* Topicks of Perſuaſion, and all the Machinations both of Men and Devils; I ſay it is not to be conceived that ſuch a Doctrine ſhould by the means of ſimple and illiterate Men, ſubject to many thouſand Miſeries, and deſtitute not only of that Eloquence which was ſo taking in thoſe Days, but of all viſible Protection from that *Jeſus* for whom they ſuffer'd, and void of all that might commend them to the World, or which might fit them either to inſtruct their Proſelytes, or to convince their Adverſaries; I ſay, that ſuch a Doctrine

ſhould

should by the means of Persons so unqualified spring forth, and shoot like Lightning from East to West; cancel the Ceremonies of the *Jew*, confound the *Scepticism*, and baffle all the Wisdom of the *Greeks*; that it should instruct the rudeness of the *Barbarians* in the sublimest Mysteries, and change their savage Customs into Christian Charity and Humility; that it should suddenly usurp the name of the *prevailing Doctrine*, as [t] *Porphyry* and others call it, and spring up as it were at once, saith *Origen*; that it should shackle even the Prince of Darkness, and make his Kingdom fall like Lightning from the Skies; that it should subdue by Sufferings, and make the Scepter bow to the Cross; that it should conquer the most civiliz'd part of the World in less time than others take to travel over it; a World so rivetted by Laws and Customs, and so enslaved by Mulcts and Penalties to its ancient and therefore venerable Superstitions, so enthrall'd to the Vassalage of Satan, and overgrown in Wickedness, and so impa-

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[t] Οἷά τις ἁλὶς βολὴ, &c. Euseb. H. Eccl. l. 2. c. 3. ἡ καταδιδαχή. Porph. apud Euseb. præp. Evang. l. 9. c. 10. Vales. in Euseb. p. 62, 63. Julian. Misopog. p. 99. Ἔθνος χριστιανῶν ὥσπερ πεχθὲν & ἐσάταξ. Orig. in Cels. l. 8. p. 405.

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tient of Diſturbance; I ſay, that ſuch a Doctrine ſhould convert ſuch a World, by ſuch unlikely means, having no heavenly Power engaged to aſſiſt it, but rather to confound it, if it were a Cheat, and having no other thing to be alledged by its Aſſertors for their attempt to do this, but the aſſiſtance of the Holy Ghoſt, and the performance of their Saviour's Promiſe, that *he would be with them, and give them a Mouth and Wiſdom which all their Adverſaries ſhould not be able to gainſay*, is ſure a thing incredible, a very Prodigy of Prodigies.

This Argument depends on ſuch Principles as are confirmed to us by Reaſon, and Experience, *viz.*

1*ſt*, That the ſtronger the Prejudice is, the ſtronger muſt the Power be which overcomes it.

2*dly*, That a new Doctrine which ſtands obnoxious to many Prejudices both of the Judgment and Affections, and which contains many things which ſeem to render it incredible to the one, and many more which render it unpleaſant to the other, is moſt unlikely to prevail upon the World in oppoſition to all other Doctrines.

3*dly*.

UPB

3dly, That Men are not easily induced to reject those Principles which they received from their Education, but are still backward to admit new Faiths, to confess their Errors, and condemn themselves, and pass hard Sentences upon the state of their Ancestors, Relations and beloved Friends.

4thly, That Men are naturally wedded to their Lusts, and bear a passionate affection to the Pleasures and Enjoyments of the World; and therefore that which suddenly prevails upon them to renounce them all, must be of greater power and more prevailing efficacy than the temptations of the World.

5thly, That 'tis not easie to prevail with Men to quit a present and important Interest, only in hopes of future Good, or to expose themselves to the worst of Sufferings in confirmation and pursuance of those hopes, without the most concluding grounds of hope, much less in contradiction to them.

6thly, That Men of the lowest Birth and Education, and such as were great Sufferers both in their Reputation and their Persons, were Men unlikely to prevail upon many Persons of all Sorts and Conditions, Ages and Sexes, to quit their Religion and their habitual Lusts, their worldly

worldly Intereſts, alluring Pleaſures, and eſpouſed Tenets, much leſs their Lives and deareſt Relatives, to expoſe themſelves to thoſe Evils which are moſt contrary to the deſires of humane Nature, and to the deſigns of natural Men. And,

Laſtly, That when the greateſt Princes and Potentates, edg'd by the keeneſt Malice, and aſſiſted by the Arts of Wit and Policy, Learning and Eloquence, and driving on profeſs'd deſigns to ruin and extirpate the Doctrine, Faith and Perſons of ſuch inconſiderable Men, whoſe Faith enjoin'd them to endure all Afflictions without the leaſt diſturbance of the Civil Government, or oppoſition to their Cruelty, and whoſe Practice was agreeable to their Faith; I ſay, when Perſons of ſo great Ability and Wiſdom, by all their Subtilty and Power, and all their other Arts engaged againſt them, only encreaſed the number of thoſe Men whoſe utter extirpation they ſo zealouſly and ſo inceſſantly purſued, 'tis rational to conclude, as they affirmed, that a more powerful hand was on their ſide, and that *God had choſen the fooliſh things of the World to confound the wiſe, and weak things to confound the mighty.*

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In confirmation of this Argument it may deserve to be considered, that tho' the Wisdom of the *Heathen* Philosophers had nothing in it that seemed much to thwart the Affections or Inclinations of Mankind, albeit their Divinity did not reproach what their Fore-fathers owned, but was consistent with, and did establish all those Modes of Worship which had obtain'd in every Country; albeit it met with nothing to oppose and persecute the first Abetters and Promoters of it, but was encouraged by *Kings* and *Princes*, and had all the advantages of Art and Rhetorick to set it off, the endeavours of the smoothest Pens and subtilest Heads to recommend it to the World; yet could it not present it with any thing so well accommodated to our natural Apprehensions, or any thing so worthy of a Deity, and so entirely suited to advance the Welfare of Mankind, as are the *Christians* Faith and Precepts; nor yet obtain and spread it self in many hundred Years through any places of those barbarous Nations in which the Gospel flourished in the *Apostles* Days, but in its flourishing Condition was confined to *Greece*, and *Italy*, where it either vanish'd of its own accord, or else concluded in *Scepticism*, or *Epicurism*, the most flourishing and lasting of all Sects, saith

ſaith *Cicero*; or was eclipſed by the appearing of the Goſpel-light; and whilſt it flouriſhed moſt, it is apparent from the complaints, confeſſions, and declarations of their greateſt Sages, as well as *Chriſtian* Writers, how ineffectual it was to work a Reformation in the World; how few of thoſe who were the greateſt Maſters of it lived according to what they wrote; how rare a thing it was to find a *Polemo* or *Phædon*, or any other Perſon whoſe Reformation it had wrought; on which account the *Apoſtle* triumphantly enquires, *Where is the Wiſe-man, where is the Diſputer of the World?* What have they done in order to the Reformation of Mens Lives, or the Inſtruction of their Underſtandings, comparatively to that which they are pleaſed to call *the fooliſhneſs of Preaching?* Since then the *Chriſtian* Doctrine, tho' ſtript of all theſe fair advantages which might commend it to the World, and clogg'd with all the prejudices forementioned, did in the ſpace of forty Years make ſo large a diffuſion of it ſelf through many places where ſcarce the Name of a *Philoſopher* was known; and ſince it wrought ſo admirable a change and reformation in the Lives, Cuſtoms, Manners, Laws, and Conceptions of ſo many Myriads, it may be rationally thought to be derived from that

ſuperiour

superiour Power to which the *Heathen* ways of Worship did in vain pretend. Add to this, that none of their *Philosophers*, or of their chief Admirers, would suffer for the truth of their Assertion, or seal it with their Blood; none did pretend their Doctrine derived from Heaven, or that they had received the gift of Tongues, or of the Holy Ghost, in order to the confirmation or the propagation of it to succeeding Generations; whence 'tis evident they wanted all those Motives and Arguments of Credibility which *Christianity* affords us.

FINIS.

Aristotle 184. 111. 268. 280
Cicero 184. 264
Plato 232. 267, 8. 278
Sondra
Pythagoras 184. 231, 2
Socrates 226. 232 268. 280
Demosthenes 264
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Epictetus 266.
Epicurus 267
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Plutarch 272, 9.
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